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I. INTRODUCTION
Open, peer-to-peer, privacy-enhancing networks of software
resources power massive digital economies in the form of crypto
coin protocols and their users. A coin is an item that operates as
a medium of exchange, or a currency, and therefore deserves to
be exempt from regulation as a security or commodity in the view
of many sellers of digital tokens.1 The Telegram Group, led by the
founder of social media giant VKontakte, attempted to build such
a token, the Gram coin and the TON Blockchain, promising “a
decentralized platform for everyone.”2 Initially planned as a
public offering like Ether, Ripple, TRON, and other popular
tokens, Telegram transitioned Gram into a private offering
restricted to accredited wealthy investors, purported to restrict
the resale of Grams, disclaimed any obligation to govern or
maintain the coin or the TON Blockchain or to create any
applications for it, and stated that the TON Foundation would
not vote Grams it retained.3 Even so, the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) enjoined any offer to sell Grams not
registered as securities.4

1 See, e.g., Defs.’ Br. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. and in Supp. of Defs.’
Mot. for Summ. Judg. at 25–28, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 19-cv-09439 (S.D.N.Y.
brief filed Jan. 15, 2020), http://bridgingtheweek.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/Defendants
Motion for SJ Telegram.pdf [http://perma.cc/8VPP-VNCA] (arguing that a coin as an item
used for exchange is exempt from regulation as a security under 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10))
(collecting cases); CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213, 227–29 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(discussing, but rejecting, argument that exchanges of cryptocurrencies involve “actual
delivery” of a currency or commodity and are exempt under 7 U.S.C. §
2(c)(2)(C)(i)(II)(bb)(AA) from regulation by Commodity Futures Trading Commission)
(citing CFTC v. Gelfman Blueprint, Inc., No. 17-7181, 2017 WL 4228737 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Sept. 21, 2017)).
2 Defs.’ Br. in Opp. to Pl.’s Mot. for a Prelim. Inj. and in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for
Summ. Judg., supra note 1, at 9–10, 17–20, 28.
3 See id. at 1, 7–20, 28–29. But see SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., 448 F. Supp. 3d 352
(S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding that Telegram stated that it intended to use investor funds to
develop the TON Blockchain, that Grams could be purchased en masse as cryptocurrency
and return value to purchasers as a result), final judgment entered, (S.D.N.Y. June 26,
2020) (enjoining defendants Telegram Group, Inc. and TON Issuer, Inc. from offering
security without an effective registration statement or applicable exception to registration
requirement); Complaint at ¶¶ 2, 52, 54, 79, 86, 89, 104, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No.
19-cv-9439 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed Oct. 11, 2019) (alleging that Telegram at least
indirectly sold Grams to the public, sold them regardless of whether purchasers would use
TON Blockchain, indicated that it would integrate Grams with Telegram Messenger
under its control, did not restrict all resales at a profit, and sold more than $424 million in
Grams in the U.S.).
4 See Telegram, 448 F. Supp. 3d 352. While recognizing the existence of an
exemption for private offerings to accredited investors by which Telegram could sell
Grams without registering them, the SEC contended that given Telegram’s intention that
Grams reach the public to fuel the TON Blockchain, this exemption could not apply, so
this exemption could not apply to Grams or seemingly any other cryptocurrency.
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The government’s pursuit of Kik Interactive for marketing a
crypto coin as an unregistered security heightened the tension
between permissionless software development and potentially
crushing regulation.5 While Section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933 (Securities Act) and Section 12(g) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) require that certain
securities and stocks be registered before they are offered to large
segments of the public, Kik’s coin does not necessarily represent
stock in a company but rather a ticket to enter a decentralized
ecosystem of digital services.6 Kik is a software and social media
company.7 If it can be prosecuted for offering a cryptocurrency,
relics of banks’ checkered past will haunt most blockchain
enterprises.

See id. at 358–59; Pl.’s Mem. in Supp. of Emerg. Appl. for Order to Show Cause, Temp.
Restr. Ord., and Ord. Granting Exped. Discov. and Other Relief, at 23–25, Telegram
(S.D.N.Y. brief filed Oct. 11, 2019). Some lawyers in this area opine that one of the three
main routes to make an ICO, Regulation D, requires issuers to specify that tokens issued
under such an exemption cannot be sold for at least a year. See, e.g., Bonnie J. Roe,
Regulation A: A Pathway for the ICO?, LEXOLOGY (July 26, 2018),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c208268c-bd8a-4b19-8dff-aaa828c99293
[http://perma.cc/RFG2-WP8G] (citing Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. § 230.500 et seq.); Jennifer
A. Connors et al., Offering Exemptions Available to Companies Issuing ICOs, LEXOLOGY
(May 14, 2018), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bbfe3e00-9cc4-4eb5-988608b245062a0f [http://perma.cc/7FKF-AHM8] (citing Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506).
Regulation A, which does not impose the one-year restriction on issuers or purchasers,
requires the issuer to prepare potentially complex equity or debt arrangements in
addition to the terms and conditions for the token itself. See Roe, supra.
5 See, e.g., SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19-cv-5244, 2020 WL 5819770 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 30, 2020) (granting summary judgment to SEC on claim that unregistered offering
of blockchain-based digital currency called “Kin,” which could be used to buy and sell
copyrightable works among other things, and instructing parties to file proposed
injunctive and monetary judgment for plaintiff), subsequent proceedings at slip op.
(S.D.N.Y. final judgment filed Oct. 21, 2020) (entering consent judgment, from which
defendant waived any appeal, enjoining defendant from issuing any security without
filing a registration statement, and requiring it to pay a $5 million civil penalty and to
notify SEC of any sale or transfer of three million Kin tokens and any new digital asset or
token); Complaint, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19-cv-5244 (S.D.N.Y. complaint filed
June
4,
2019),
http://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.516941/gov.uscourts.nysd.516941.1.
0.pdf [http://perma.cc/V479-64XU]; Br. of Amicus Curiae The Blockchain Association, at
20, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 19-cv-09439 (2d Cir. brief filed Apr. 3, 2020, refilled
May 13, 2020) (arguing that settlements like the one in Kik Interactive, along with
“limited and opaque statements, speeches, no action letters, [and] closed-door meetings,”
are “prejudicing firms trying to comply with the law and depriving the public of any
[administrative] notice or comment”); see also ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS
INNOVATION: THE CONTINUING CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 8–
13 (2016).
6 See Defendant’s Answer at ¶¶ 77, 112–19, 122, 190, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc.,
No.
19-cv-5244
(S.D.N.Y.
Aug.
6,
2019),
http://www.courtlistener.com/docket/15722539/22/us-securities-and-exchange-commissionv-kik-interactive-inc/ [http://perma.cc/YFA6-ZBF9].
7 See id. ¶¶ 5, 37.
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Federal courts have concluded that cryptocurrencies could
fall under the federal securities laws, the commodities laws, or
other statutes.8 Courts have also found state statutes and

8 See, e.g., SEC v. NAC Foundation, LLC, No. 20-cv-04188-RS, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4079
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2021) (claims stated under Securities Act and Exchange Act for fraudulent and
unregistered offerings of AML Bitcoin); Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 18-cv-06753, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 32982 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2020) (claim stated under Securities Act for unregistered
sale of Ripple token); SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 19-cv-09439 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2019)
(restraining digital token sale or promotion as unregistered sale of securities); SEC v. Titanium
Blockchain Infrastructure Servs., Inc., No. CV18-4315, slip op. at § IV (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2018),
subsequent proceedings at (C.D. Cal. May 23, 2019) (enjoining blockchain business from, inter
alia, violating Section 5 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e, by directly or indirectly, in the
absence of any applicable exemption, selling securities by means of prospectus or otherwise in
interstate commerce without a registration statement being in effect with SEC); Solis v. Latium
Network, Inc., No. 18-10255, slip op. (D.N.J. Dec. 10, 2018) (claim stated under Securities Act for
$25,000 investment in digital token with limited platform “functionality”); Rensel v. Centra Tech,
Inc., No. 17-24500, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100720 (S.D. Fla. June 14, 2018) (one plaintiff of two
adequately pleaded claim for selling unregistered securities); SEC v. PlexCorps, No. 17 Civ. 7007,
2017 WL 6398722 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017) (finding that likelihood of success existed that SEC
would establish that “PlexCoin Tokens” were investment contracts under Securities Act and
Exchange Act that should not be sold in interstate commerce without registration statement
being in effect with the SEC as to them); CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F. Supp. 3d 213 (E.D.N.Y.
2018) (declining to dismiss claim that cryptocurrency constituted regulated commodity under
Commodities Exchange Act); Audet v. Fraser, No. 16-CV-940, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 167830 (D.
Conn. Oct. 11, 2017) (declining to dismiss claim that cryptocurrency offering violated Securities
Act); Press Release, SEC, SEC Halts Alleged $1.7 Billion Unregistered Digital Token Offering
(Oct. 11, 2019), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-212 [http://perma.cc/FQL7-KL98]
(SEC ordered promoters of Telegram token, the Gram, to halt offering as unregistered offering of
securities); No-Action Letter re: Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. (July 25,
2019),
http://www.sec.gov/corpfin/pocketful-quarters-inc-072519-2a1
[http://perma.cc/H6ZX4NJQ] (suggesting that digital token sale might be a security if proceeds are used “to build the . . .
[p]latform,” if the platform is not “fully functional and operational,” or if it is possible to transfer
tokens to wallets); Letter from Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, to the Hon. Ted Budd, U.S. House of
Representatives (Mar. 7, 2019), http://www.coincenter.org/app/uploads/2020/05/clayton-tokenresponse.pdf [http://perma.cc/B3PL-27L8] (Securities Act and Exchange Act may cover ICOs
because they “encompass virtually any instrument that may be sold as an investment”) (emphasis
added); No-Action Letter re: TurnKey Jet, Inc., SEC, Div. of Corp. Fin. (Apr. 3, 2019),
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/2019/turnkey-jet-040219-2a1.htm
[http://perma.cc/VZX9-WFQR] (similar to Pocketful of Quarters, supra); Press Release, SEC, Two
ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree to Register Tokens as Securities (Nov. 16,
2018), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-264 [http://perma.cc/33DY-J6LM] (Airfox and
Paragon agreed to consent orders barring their unregistered token sales, refunding money to
previous purchasers, and agreeing to register); Press Release, SEC, SEC Obtains Emergency
Order Halting Fraudulent Coin Offering Scheme (May 29, 2018), http://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2018-94 [http://perma.cc/Y7VR-T386]; Br. of SEC in Supp. of U.S. in Opp. to Def.’s Mot. to
Dism. Indictment at 11–17, United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR-0647 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2018)
(arguing that defendant’s RECoin tokens were securities despite being classified as a
cryptocurrency); Public Statement, SEC, Div. of Enf’t and Trading Mkts., Statement on
Potentially Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets (Mar. 7, 2018),
http://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/enforcement-tm-statement-potentially-unlawfulonline-platforms-trading [http://perma.cc/9USG-R9RG]; Press Release, SEC, SEC Suspends
Trading in Three Issuers Claiming Involvement in Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Technology
(Feb. 16, 2018), http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018-20 [http://perma.cc/UZH5-T3M7];
Public Statement, Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin
Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017), http://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-1211 [http://perma.cc/X5WZ-LZWA]; Munchee Inc., No. 10445 (Dec. 11, 2017),
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common-law theories applicable to some token-related disputes.9
With the SEC and state securities regulators warning that the

http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf
[http://perma.cc/VQB3-WW9Q]
(enforcement action against smartphone app developer who issued tokens to public); Complaint,
Plexcorps, No. 17-CV-07007 (E.D.N.Y. complaint filed Dec. 1, 2017) (contending that token was a
security whose offering should have been registered); SEC Report of Investigation Pursuant to
Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Release No. 81207, 2017 WL
7184670 (July 25, 2017); Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, SEC (July 25, 2017),
http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings
[http://perma.cc/D5X6BJWM]; Investor Alert: Public Companies Making ICO-Related Claims, SEC (Aug. 28, 2017),
http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ia_icorelatedclaims [http://perma.cc/DM82LEP2]; Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual Currency-Related Investments, SEC Off. of Inv.
Educ. & Advoc. (May 7, 2014), http://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/alertsbulletins/investor-alert-bitcoin-other-virtual-currency [http://perma.cc/Y8GK-JJMU] (Bitcoin
investment opportunities could be securities); see also In the Matter of AWAX Ltd., No. CD-201900006
(Feb.
25,
2019),
http://asc.alabama.gov/Orders/2019/CD-2019-0006.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T7V2-KF2T]; News Release, Alabama Securities Commission, Alabama
Securities Commission Updates Coordinated Crypto Crackdown (Aug. 28, 2018),
http://www.asc.state.al.us/news_detail.aspx?ID=12943 [http://perma.cc/LC53-94FB] (describing
state administrative orders as part of “Operation Cryptosweep”); ALABAMA SECURITIES
COMMISSION,
ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTIONS
2018,
http://asc.alabama.gov/2018.aspx
[http://perma.cc/JNL7-XFQL] (listing five cease and desist orders issued between April 20 and
May 18, 2018, targeting blockchain projects Extrabit, Leverage, Pool Trade, Platinum Coin, and
Chain
Group
Escrow);
ShipChain,
Inc.,
No.
20182574
(May
21,
2018),
http://2hsvz0l74ah31vgcm16peuy12tz.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/ShipChain-Inc-Administrative-Order-to-Cease-and-Desist-COS01685821xD2C78-1.pdf [http://perma.cc/P999-C9AS] (identifying tokens sold by ShipChain as
securities); Press Release, Ohio Department of Commerce, Ohio Division of Securities Participates in
“Operation Cryptosweep,” a Coordinated International Cryptocurrency Crackdown (May 21, 2018),
http://apps2.com.ohio.gov/admn/pressroom/View?FileName=3655.pdf [http://perma.cc/2K3T-T38W]
(noting that the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) brought about
nearly seventy state or Canadian provincial inquiries and investigations and thirty-five enforcement
actions related to ICOs or cryptocurrencies); LeadInvest, No. ENF-18-CDO-1760 (Tex. State Secs.
Bd.
Feb.
26,
2018),
http://www.ssb.texas.gov/sites/default/files/ENF-18-CDO-1760.pdf
[http://perma.cc/CR5D-CZK5] (issuing emergency cease and desist order, finding that a “technology
company that specializes in the development of trading software” was offering a cryptocurrency
lending program to Bitcoin miners that, inter alia, was an unlawful unregistered offering of
securities in Texas); Caviar & Kirill Bensonoff, No. E-2017-0120 (Mass. Secs. Div. Jan. 17, 2018),
http://www.morrisoncohen.com/siteFiles/files/2018_01_17%20%20In%20the%20Matter%20of%20Caviar%20and%20Krill%20Bensonoff.pdf
[http://perma.cc/RR7Q-U92G] (seeking to stop unregistered ICO and obtain refunds); Cryptocurrency
Enforcement, TEX. STATE SECS. BD., http://www.ssb.texas.gov/cryptocurrency-enforcement
[http://perma.cc/WWF2-EWP2] (“The Texas State Securities Board was the first state securities
regulator to enter an enforcement order against a cryptocurrency firm and to date the Securities
Commissioner has entered 26 administrative orders involving 79 individuals and entities.”).
9 See, e.g., Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 3d 950, 952 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2020) (discussing claims stated under Securities Act and California Corporations Code for
unregistered sale of Ripple token); Fabian v. Lemahieu, No. 19-cv-00054, 2019 WL
4918431, at *13–14 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2019) (declining motion to dismiss state law claims
for fraud, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation in marketing Nano Coins); Audet
v. Fraser, No. 16-CV-940, 2017 WL 4542386, at *9–11 (D. Conn. Oct. 11, 2017) (declining
to dismiss claims that cryptocurrency offering violated Securities Act and amounted to
common law fraud and aiding/abetting thereof); Shin v. Time Squared Global, LLC, No.
SACV 15-0943, 2016 WL 8856653, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2016) (declining to dismiss
claims for intentional misrepresentation, breaches of contract, and promissory estoppel
respecting blockchain business).
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securities laws apply to many cryptocurrencies,10 token and
appcoin promoters may subject themselves to long prison
sentences for offering or selling unregistered securities, operating
unregistered “exchanges,” transacting in tokens, advising those
who transact in tokens as “investments” as to which tokens are
best or when it is time to buy or sell them, or even publishing
articles or books on the topic.11 In other countries—notably
China, India, Russia, and South Korea—similar laws threatened,
for at least a time, to decimate cryptocurrency trading.12

10 See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 8; Statement on Potentially
Unlawful Online Platforms for Trading Digital Assets, supra note 8; Public Statement, Jay
Clayton, SEC Chairman, Statement on NASAA’s Announcement of Enforcement Sweep
Targeting Fraudulent ICOs and Crypto-asset Investment Products (May 22, 2018),
http://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-nasaas-announcement-enforcementsweep-targeting-fraudulent-icos-and [http://perma.cc/MC5C-95KG]; see also Andres Guadamuz
& Chris Marsden, Blockchains and Bitcoin: Regulatory Responses to Cryptocurrencies, FIRST
MONDAY
(Dec.
7,
2015),
http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/6198
[http://perma.cc/KT5E-PPPR] (citing Investor Alert: Bitcoin and Other Virtual CurrencyRelated Investments, supra note 8); Press Release, SEC, SEC Sanctions Operator of BitcoinRelated
Stock
Exchange
for
Registration
Violations
(Dec.
8,
2014),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2014-273
[http://perma.cc/N634-MME7];
Investor
Bulletin: Exchange-Traded Funds (ETFs), SEC Off. of Inv. Educ. & Advoc. (Aug. 2012),
http://www.sec.gov/files/etfs.pdf [http://perma.cc/R4QD-BR2Z].
11 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a), (c); 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1); Investor Bulletin: Initial
Coin Offerings, supra note 8; William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173, 182, 192 (1933); Malcolm A. MacIntyre,
Criminal Provisions of the Securities Act and Analogies to Similar Criminal Statutes, 43
YALE L.J. 254, 254–55 (1933); Bernard Susman, Exempted Transactions Under the
Securities Act of 1933, 24 WASH. U. L. Q. 383, 383–84 (1939).
12 See Evelyn Cheng & Cheang Ming, Bitcoin Briefly Falls 11% after South Korea
Moves to Ban New Cryptocurrency Trading Accounts, CNBC (Dec. 28, 2017, 7:45 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/28/bitcoin-drops-11-percent-as-south-korea-moves-toregulate-cryptocurrency-trading.html [http://perma.cc/KYQ4-9RZ9]. South Korea reversed
course in large part. See Swapna Krishna, South Korea Won’t Ban Cryptocurrency
Trading After All, ENGADGET (Feb. 20, 2018), http://www.engadget.com/2018/02/20/southkorea-no-ban-on-cryptocurrency-bitcoin-trading/
[http://perma.cc/MVG9-KJR2].
The
China story is more complicated; authorities reportedly banned banks and payment
processors from providing any direct or indirect Bitcoin-related services, including
clearing transactions, exchanging Bitcoins for government currencies, or registering
Bitcoin-related customers. See Guadamuz & Marsden, supra note 10; U.S. LIBR. OF CONG.,
GLOB. LEGAL RSCH. CTR., Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions (Jan. 2014),
http://www.loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/regulation-of-bitcoin.pdf [http://perma.cc/T48JHJQ7]. The Central Bank of the Russian Federation warned against all transactional use
of Bitcoins as potentially linked to illegal conduct. See id. India’s banking regulators
reportedly issued notices or rules that prompted cryptocurrency exchanges to shutter
themselves. See U.S. LIBR. OF CONG., supra (citing Anuj Srivas, Bitcoin Exchanges Shut
Shop
in
India,
HINDU
(Dec.
26,
2013),
http://www.thehindu.com/business/Industry/bitcoin-exchanges-shut-shop-inindia/article5504407.ece [http://perma.cc/F5HX-KPTL]; Abhiram Nandakumar & Ratnika
Maruvada, RBI Puts the Brakes on the Bitcoin Train, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2014),
http://blogs.reuters.com/india/2014/01/17/rbi-puts-the-brakes-on-the-bitcoin-train-in-india/
[http://perma.cc/3ZH8-TNAN]). See Nirupama Devi Bhaskar et al., Bitcoin IPO, ETF, and
Crowdfunding, in CHUEN, HANDBOOK 315 (David L. K. Chuen ed., 2015) (discussing
Russia); Kenneth Rapoza, Will Russia Make Any Waves In Crypto This Year?, FORBES
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Concerns about the SEC’s role are slowing down crypto coin
offerings, even as some publishers of software and digital content
struggle with arbitrary bans and large deductions from their
revenue to app stores’ operators.13 Digital tokens and appcoins
solve historical dilemmas of software licensing—including
traditional app stores’ closed systems for app approval, high
advertising costs as a percentage of initial revenue, low levels of
participation in in-app economies, and high intermediary charges
reducing developers’ margins.14 Millions of app users can

(Jan. 2, 2019), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/02/will-russia-make-anywaves-in-crypto-this-year/#717e9d8c4271 [http://perma.cc/P9V7-ZW82] (“[R]ussian ICOs
have come and gone. That market is dead. STOs are the new thing, but the Russians
looking to raise money that way are setting up shop in Singapore or here in the U.S.”).
Enforcement seemed to be lax in 2018, however, with allegedly fraudulent Russian ICOs
continuing in existence until they were shut down by North Dakota and Texas, and crypto
exchanges opening offices in Russia, a blockchain platform operating in Moscow, and
apparent ICO promoters from Russia being active in Ukraine and New York. See id.;
Waves Platform, BITCOIN WIKI (2019), http://en.bitcoinwiki.org/wiki/Waves_Platform
[http://perma.cc/N3BQ-A2K3]. Interestingly, one exchange that has or had an office in
Russia was originally from another ICO-skeptical jurisdiction, China, i.e. Binance, and it
has had meetings in Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Hong Kong. See Rapoza, supra; Binance
Weekly Report: Binance Research, CZ Cryptokitties, and More, BINANCE (Jan. 6, 2019),
http://www.binance.com/en/blog/288965342777069568/Binance+Weekly+Report:+Binance
+Research,+CZ+Cryptokitties,+and+More
[http://perma.cc/H9AZ-66PB]
(reporting
activity in Shanghai); Olga Kharif, Biggest Crypto Exchange Takes on Tether With Own
Stablecoins,
BLOOMBERG
(June
5,
2019,
11:19
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-05/biggest-crypto-exchange-takes-ontether-with-own-stablecoins (noting that Binance was largest crypto exchange in mid2019 and made announcements from Hong Kong); see also REUTERS, China’s Bitcoin
Market Alive and Well as Traders Defy Crackdown, EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Sept. 30, 2017),
http://tribune.com.pk/story/1520086/chinas-bitcoin-market-alive-well-traders-defycrackdown/ (noting more than three years after Bitcoin and other coins were made illicit,
or at least suspect, China waited until September 4, 2017 to formally ban ICOs and even
weeks after that, “the three largest players OkCoin, Huobi and BTCChina . . . announced
that they will close their mainland businesses by the end of September”).
13 See How Can the Blockchain Disrupt the App Store Business?, MEDIUM (Oct. 31,
2017),
http://medium.com/@appcoins/how-can-the-blockchain-disrupt-the-app-storebusiness-13f0321bb48a [http://perma.cc/9B2D-83TK] (“Whenever a user makes a
purchase inside a game or an app, the developer only gets 70% of the transaction value.
AppCoins will change that by rewarding the developer with 85% of the tokens spent by
the user.”); Laurel Deppen, Android Developers: Here are 4 Types of Apps Google Just
Banned
from
the
Play
Store,
TECHREPUBLIC
(July
27,
2018),
http://www.techrepublic.com/article/android-developers-here-are-4-types-of-apps-googlejust-banned-from-the-play-store/ [http://perma.cc/D987-2SAP] (discussing seemingly
vague ban on apps that are repetitive of other apps in experience and are not unique in
store’s eyes); Jason Pontin, Why Publishers Don’t Like Apps, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW
(May 7, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/s/427785/why-publishers-dont-like-apps/
[http://perma.cc/AS3X-UDNR] (noting a thirty percent share demanded by app stores);
James Titcomb, Murdoch-backed App Opens Feud with Google after Android Ban,
TELEGRAPH (U.K.) (Apr. 16, 2018, 4:29 PM) (describing allegation that app store breached
British law by banning app that pays users for viewing ads upon unlocking mobiles) (on
file with author).
14 AppCoins: Redesigning the App Economy, APPCOINS 1 (Dec. 14, 2017),
http://web.archive.org/web/20180330084054/https://appcoins.io/pdf/appcoins_white_paper.
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potentially use digital tokens to exchange game content or unlock
game developers’ upgrades.15 Banking law’s past could therefore
slow down software and internet inventions.
Enter regulatory competitors. Regulatory competition—sometimes
criticized as a “race to the bottom”—involves efforts by jurisdictions to
match or surpass the attractiveness of other jurisdictions’ laws from the
standpoint of companies and investors.16 On some occasions, countries
such as Australia, Brazil, Singapore, Switzerland, Belarus, and
Lithuania, and states such as New Hampshire, Nevada, and Wyoming,
have reassured some types of token promoters that they will not be
targeted or amended their laws to attract initial coin offering (ICO)
promoters, rather than chasing them away with vague bans.17 The
European Union is slowly gaining a reputation for trying not to scare off
ICOs.18 Like Singapore, it has taken a light-touch approach by vaguely

pdf [http://perma.cc/Y769-X7SN].
15 Reinaldo Ferreira, $18 Million ICO: Social Android App Store Aptoide Launches
AppCoins, EU STARTUPS (Nov. 8, 2017), http://www.eu-startups.com/2017/11/socialandroid-app-store-aptoide-launches-appcoins-with-a-e60-million-ico/
[http://perma.cc/2CER-N84H] (explaining one million apps downloaded more than four
billion times by 200 million users of Aptoide app store, which was subsequently involved
in launch of AppCoins to enable payments by developers to users for viewing ads, and
trade digital and/or user-generated content in-game).
16 See, e.g., Thomas Apolte, Jurisdictional Competition For Quality Standards:
Competition of Laxity?, 30 ATL. ECON. J. 389, 402 (2002).
17 See James Gatto, Nevada Passes Pro-blockchain Law, SHEPPARD MULLIN (June
13,
2017),
http://www.lawofthelevel.com/2017/06/articles/virtual-currency/nevadablockchain-law/
[http://perma.cc/6DZC-GUJX]
(explaining
Nevada
prohibited
municipalities from requiring licenses from blockchain-based businesses “or imposing any
other requirement relating to the use of a blockchain by any person or entity”); Bhaskar et
al., supra note 12, at 318–19 (noting Australia and Brazil planned to but did not regulate
cryptocurrencies as payments etc. in 2014); Jennifer Post, Wyoming Signs Cryptocurrency
Bills
into
Law,
THOMPSON
COBURN
(Apr.
11,
2018),
http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/publications/item/2018-04-11/wyoming-signscryptocurrency-bills-into-law [http://perma.cc/933L-39L9] (indicating that Wyoming law
amendments in 2018 included explicit exemption from money transmitter regulations,
and exempting “utility tokens” from state securities law as long as they can be exchanged
for products or services, are not sold as investments, and their issuers are not involved in
supporting a secondary market for trading them). See also DAVID L. K. CHUEN & LINDA
LOW, INCLUSIVE FINTECH: BLOCKCHAIN, CRYPTOCURRENCY AND ICO 106, 113 (2018);
Diego Zuluaga, Should Cryptocurrencies Be Regulated like Securities? 3, (Ctr. for
Monetary & Fin. Alts. Inst., Briefing Paper No. 1 June 25, 2018),
http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/cmfa-briefing-paper-1-updated.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LH2U-JYLN] (discussing why some regulatory approaches will squelch
ICOs or at least make them inaccessible to startups or non-bankers); Franklin R.
Edwards, Kathleen Hanley, Robert Litan & Roman L. Weil, Crypto Assets Require Better
Regulation: Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable on Crypto Assets, 75 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 14, 15–17 (2019) (discussing friendlier approaches to ICOs on part of Japan,
South Korea, etc.).
18 Gina Conheady, The EU Approach to ICO Regulation: A Friendly Regulatory
Framework for ICOs?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 23, 2018, 11:19 AM),
http://news.bloomberglaw.com/securities-law/the-eu-approach-to-ico-regulation-afriendlier-regulatory-framework-for-icos [http://perma.cc/FZ5C-NLVV] (explaining that,
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warning that some ICOs could be subject to prospectus requirements,
without finding specific tokens in violation of them.19 Such moves may
explain why the SEC announced in 2018 that Bitcoin and Ether, two
cryptocurrencies with the most users and largest market capitalizations,
are not securities, despite previously announcing that ICOs may involve
securities and require registration of all parties involved.20
The ICO market has grown more than 1,000% annually by
value, and perhaps even faster by units, with more than 1,100
coins being founded in less than a decade.21 Should Congress or
other U.S. states consider adopting an approach like that of
Singapore or New Hampshire? If so, where will the deregulatory
push end, and at what cost? Will the European Union or Asian
Tigers divert investment from the U.S., or could lax regulation
harm U.S. investors while China, EU members, India, and
Russia protect their investors by taking a hard line on ICOs?22
Will ICO authors follow the original “bitcoin refugees” into exile
in Asia, Canada, or island nations ranging from the Bahamas
and Bermuda to Cyprus and Malta?23

while European Securities and Markets Authority has concluded that ICOs “could,
potentially,” be securities offerings that must be preceded by a prospectus and registered
unless exempt, the European Central Bank has stated that for purposes of currency and
payments laws, “in the EU, virtual currency is not currently regulated and cannot be
regarded as being subject to the (current) Payment Services Directive or the E-Money
Directive”).
19 See id.; see also JONES DAY, Initial Coin Offerings—A Singapore Perspective,
White Paper 2, 4–5 (Nov. 2017), http://www.jonesday.com/files/upload/initial-coinofferingsa-singapore-perspective.pdf [http://perma.cc/9BGS-WM3E]; cf. Zuluaga, supra
note 17, at 3 (describing exemption of ICO tokens that can be redeemed for services and
are not marketed as investments as “lighter”). See generally Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy
Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 111 (2012).
20 See, e.g., All Cryptocurrencies, COINMARKETCAP, http://coinmarketcap.com/all/views/all
[http://perma.cc/8QHW-G87N] (last updated Dec. 21, 2020).
21 See CHUEN & LOW, supra note 17, at 111–13; David Rohret & Michael Vella,
Crypto Currency: Expanding the Underground Cyber Economy, PROQUEST,
http://search.proquest.com/openview/048f46b1c47681eb0f1d928fe435f79e/1?pqorigsite=gscholar&cbl=396500 (noting a count of 1,147 “crypto coins” by 2017), in
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBER WARFARE AND
SECURITY (ICCWS 2018) 645 (John S. Hurley & Jim Q. Chen eds., 2018),
http://toc.proceedings.com/38822webtoc.pdf [http://perma.cc/2HPM-34A4].
22 See CHUEN & LOW, supra note 17, at 106–12.
23 See Jeffrey Gogo, Bahamas Releases Discussion Paper on Crypo-Asset Regulation,
BITCOIN.COM (Nov. 10, 2018), http://news.bitcoin.com/bahamas-releases-discussion-paper-oncrypto-asset-regulation/ [http://perma.cc/GPC2-BVX3]; see also Jasper Hamill, Canadian
Regulators Welcome US Bitcoin Refugees with Open Arms, REGISTER (May 20, 2013, 15:57 UTC),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/20/canada_welcomes_bitcoin_traders_fintrac_letter/
[http://perma.cc/7LXA-4JJ3]; Nathaniel Popper, Have a Cryptocurrency Company? Bermuda,
Malta
or
Gibraltar
Wants
You,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
29,
2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/29/technology/cryptocurrency-bermuda-malta-gibraltar.html
[http://perma.cc/RHC7-5N39].
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This Article explores precedents that exist within U.S.
securities and consumer protection laws for a light touch approach
for use by the U.S. in the context of global regulatory competition
for ICOs. The novelty of its approach lies in surveying the
treatment of specific types of statements to investors or consumers
in areas outside of federal securities law. Some of these statements
closely resemble those that ICO and appcoin promoters use to sell
tokens, gain followers, attract developers, and tout their respective
ecosystems. In Part II, the Article examines typical ICO white
paper statements and their regulatory implications.24 The law of
commercial speech and intermediate First Amendment scrutiny
undergirds Part III, which analyzes First Amendment issues
arising out of cryptocurrency and ICO promotion.25 Part IV contains
a brief survey of statutory and constitutional principles supporting
light-touch regulatory regimes, including principles that shape the
law of federal securities fraud, securities registration, false
advertising of goods or services, common-law fraud, and products
liability.26
Crypto coin offerings are similar to relatively unregulated
provision of information in securities law and in other fields,
including vague boasts and “ad speak,” genuine optimistic
statements about the future, subjective ratings of securities or
commodities, software “upgrades,” search-engine speech, and the
creation of economies in virtual worlds. This Article highlights
the First Amendment and other constitutional issues that
onerous regulations may confront and draws analogies to how
legislatures and the courts have reconciled the freedom of
economic expression and the cause of consumer protection under
the Exchange Act, the Lanham Act, consumer fraud law, and the
law of warranties. Several themes in the case law in these areas
are ripe for application to ICOs: the need for precision and
proportionality in framing regulation, the proscription against
regulatory overkill and one-size-fits-all approaches, and the duty
of courts and regulators to preserve basic freedoms.27

24 Cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (plurality
opinion) (discussing “the less than strict standard that generally applies in commercial
speech cases”); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995) (calling this
“‘intermediate’ scrutiny”); see Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States,
527 U.S. 173, 183 (1999) (assessing substantial state interest to justify extensiveness);
Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 374 (2002) (stating that Central Hudson
scrutiny is “significantly stricter than the rational basis” analysis).
25 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra Part III.
26 See infra, Part IV.
27 See id.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF CRYPTO SPEECH
A. Software’s Historically Deregulated Domain
Regulation exists on a sort of spectrum. On one side there is
what the Supreme Court has referred to in constitutional terms as
“comprehensive federal system[s]” of regulation.28 Further, in the
deregulatory direction are multistakeholder approaches, like the
regulation of the internet under the light-touch (initially) of the U.S.
Department of Commerce,29 or the regulation of the early ICOs.30 In
early ICOs, participants in building markets and infrastructures
mostly regulate their own “ecosystems” using standards, protocols,
shared applications, and research communication, while the common
law and statutes stand in reserve for the more severe disputes that
arise.31 A multistakeholder approach to internet governance gained
prominence with the operations of the Internet Corporation for
Assigned Names and Numbers.32 Next comes self-regulation, which
is sometimes merely an adjunct to public regulation in a
multistakeholder approach.33 At the other extreme from fully

28 See P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affs. v. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 502–503 (1988)
(involving federal petroleum pricing law); cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 454–55 (1977) (federal occupational health and safety law).
29 See generally Adamantia Rachovitsa, Rethinking Privacy Online and Human Rights:
The Internet’s Standardisation Bodies as the Guardians of Privacy Online in the Face of Mass
Surveillance, UNIV. GRONINGEN FAC. L. RSCH. PAPER SERIES NO. 01/2017 (2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2911978; see also Michael L. Rustad,
Internet Law in a Nutshell, SUFFOLK UNIV. L. SCH. RSCH. PAPER NO. 09-05 8–10, 44–48, 196–
206, 217, 366 (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1329092 (describing
multistakeholder approach and roles of Department of Commerce, FTC, Federal
Communications Commission, state attorneys general, and Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers, among others).
30 See P.R. Dep’t of Consumer Affs. v. Isla Petrol. Corp., 485 U.S. 495, 502–03 (1988)
(involving federal petroleum pricing law); cf. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Rev. Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 454–55 (1977) (federal occupational health and safety law).
31 See DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND BITCOIN
AND OTHER CRYPTOCURRENCIES IS CHANGING THE WORLD loc. 68 (2018) (ebook),
http://books.google.com/books?id=NqBiCgAAQBAJ&pg=PT68.
32 See Kieren McCarthy, Read the Letter than Won the Internet Governance Battle,
REGISTER, (Dec. 2, 2005, 09:07 UTC), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/12/02/rice_eu_letter
[http://perma.cc/6TA6-ZNB4]; see also STEWART PATRICK, THE SOVEREIGNTY WARS:
RECONCILING AMERICA WITH THE WORLD 168–9 (2018).
33 See generally Alejandro Komai & Gary Richardson, A Brief History of Regulations
Regarding Financial Markets in the United States: 1789 to 2009, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 17443, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17443
[http://perma.cc/M9Q7-S3Q9]; Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That Which We
Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United
States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2011); Matthew P. Allen, A Lesson from History,
Roosevelt to Obama—The Evolution of Broker-Dealer Regulation: From Self-Regulation,
Arbitration, and Suitability to Federal Regulation, Litigation, and Fiduciary Duty, 5
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1 (2010). Cf. Rustad, supra note 29, at 49.

Do Not Delete

2021]

5/17/2021 12:06 PM

Crypto Coin Offerings and the Freedom of Expression

413

regulated industries are unregulated bazaars, anarchy, anonymous
speech-making, and internet content in some respects.34
Polycentric approaches to regulation help organize the
internet’s potential chaos, using a multistakeholder approach. In
polycentric systems of regulation, multiple nodes enforce norms on
a semi-autonomous basis. Nodes may include states,
nongovernmental
organizations,
corporations,
voluntary
associations, and other actors.35 A polycentric model is driving
aspects of U.S. cybersecurity policy.36
34 See Restoring Internet Freedom, 82 Fed. Reg. 25568 (proposed May 23, 2017)
(describing internet interconnection services, as opposed to retail internet service for a
monthly or hourly fee, as “historically unregulated”); FCC Report to Congress, FederalState Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 FCC Rcd. 11501, 11524 para. 43 (Apr. 10,
1998) (“The language and legislative history of both the House and Senate bills indicate
that the drafters of each bill regarded telecommunications services and information
services as mutually exclusive categories.”); Letter from Five Senators to Honorable
William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC, at 1 (Mar. 20, 1998) [http://perma.cc/67U8-DZNR]
(“[N]othing in the 1996 [Telecommunications] Act or its legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to alter the current classification of Internet and other information
services or to expand traditional telephone regulation to new and advanced services.”);
Comments of AT&T Services, Inc., Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet;
Framework for Broadband Internet Services, before the FCC, GN Docket Nos. 14-28, 10127, at 59 (July 15, 2014) [http://perma.cc/VL7W-53RA] (describing “backbone Internet
access and content-delivery services to thousands of large and small businesses and edge
providers” as “historically unregulated peering and transit arrangements” under federal
law); see also Sarah Castle, Cyberbullying on Trial: The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
and United States v. Drew, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 579, 597 (2009) (“After all, [internet speech]
involves the expression of words and thoughts through an historically unregulated
medium.”); Ann Daniels, The Online Gun Marketplace and the Dangerous Loophole in the
National Instant Background Check System, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIV. L.
757, 760, 766–67 (2014) (noting that websites such as Armslist operate as “unregulated
bazaar[s]” because federal law exempts secondary sales of firearms from regulations
applicable to primary sales with licensed gun dealers); Philipp Paech, The Governance of
Blockchain
Financial
Networks,
80
MOD.
L.
REV.
1073
(2017),
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/87569/1/Paech_Governance%20of%20Blockchain_Author.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5SRS-LJ45] (attributing “the original, highly disruptive concept
underlying Bitcoin or Ethereum” to “open, largely anonymous, unregulated peer-to-peer
networks that eliminate the need for financial intermediaries”). For example, on bulletin
boards organized by Usenet or services such as Yahoo!, young people and others could
anonymously post their thoughts for the world at large to potentially read. See Castle,
supra, at 583 n.24.
35 See Elinor Ostrom, Coping with Tragedies of the Commons, 2 ANN. REV. POLI. SCI. 493, 528
(1999) [http://perma.cc/EP7W-7TDQ]; see also Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach
for Solving Collective-Action Problems 1–2 (2008) (Ind. Univ. Sch. Pub. & Env’t Aff., Research Paper
No.
2008-11-02),
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W086_Ostrom_DLC.pdf [http://perma.cc/V9DM-9AFV]; VINCENT OSTROM, THE MEANING OF AMERICAN
FEDERALISM: CONSTITUTING A SELF-GOVERNING SOCIETY 17–18 (1991); VINCENT OSTROM,
Federalism, Polycentricity, and Res Publica: Some Reflections on the American Experiments in
Republican Government, in THE PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT: VINCENT OSTROM’S
QUEST TO UNDERSTAND HUMAN AFFAIRS 49 (Filippo Sabetti, Barbara Allen & Mark Sproule-Jones
eds., 2008); see generally Vincent Ostrom, Polycentricity, Paper Presented at 1972 Annual Meeting of
the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C. (Sept. 5, 1972)
http://hdl.handle.net/10535/3763 [http://perma.cc/Z5QN-3WXH].
36 See CCIA Urges Senate to Improve Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act, COMPUT.
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Cryptocurrencies may be well-suited to polycentric regulatory
responses. Crypto coin networks are not traditional properties or
companies that could ever be controlled by an executive officer or
board of directors; they bring together dispersed creative and
technical contributors. Bitcoin is a “concept” and “network” like the
internet, as well as a quantum of measurement or value for various
transactional purposes.37 Altcoins, appcoins, and ICOs involve
opportunities to access or deploy segments of digital code.38 The
Monetary Authority of Singapore describes coins and tokens as
“cryptographically—secured representation[s]” of the right to obtain
something or do something, presumably something that the issuer
of the coin or token can influence.39
As the first cryptocurrency, Bitcoin has a fascinating history. It
was launched in January 2009 with a reference to the second
bailout of the British banks.40 A paper attributed to Satoshi
Nakamoto was subtitled “A Peer-to-peer electronic cash system.”41
Just as Napster and Limewire replaced vulnerable websites for
hosting music files with a distributed network of user file libraries,
Bitcoin would distribute the transaction ledger in a permissionless
and transparent way, while eliminating inflation by restricting the
number of coins and requiring increasingly complex math problems
to be solved to issue them as supply runs out.42 It is thought that
the PayPal blockade of Wikileaks—a move towards coordinated
corporate censorship that presaged recent initiatives to ban social
media users—contributed to online support for an alternative to
corporate systems.43 In that respect, the rise and fate of

& COMMC’NS INDUS. ASS’N (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ccianet.org/2015/10/ccia-urges-senateto-improve-cybersecurity-information-sharing-act [http://perma.cc/TF9V-3JZB]; see generally
Vulnerabilities Equities Policy and Process for the United States Government, WHITE HOUSE
(Nov. 15, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/External%20%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF [http://perma.cc/4PKH-TVFY].
37 See Some Bitcoin Words You Might Hear, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/en/vocabulary
[http://perma.cc/9A9B-8LXM]; Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash
System, BITCOIN, http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf [http://perma.cc/7JNK-NNF8].
38 See Cryptocurrencies: Oversight of New Assets in the Digital Age: Hearing Before
the H. Comm. on Agric., 115th Cong. (2018) (statement of Lowell D. Ness, Managing
Partner of Perkins Coie LLP); Nathan Schneider, Decentralization: An Incomplete
Solution, J. CULT. ECON. 1, 7 (2019) (discussing altcoins); Zuluaga, supra note 17, at 2
(discussing ICOs and AppCoins as code); cf. Policing the Wild Frontier, ECONOMIST (Apr.
26,
2018),
http://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/04/26/regulatingvirtual-currencies-and-icos [http://perma.cc/3GGM-DN6R] (ICOs involve investments in
“virtual tokens,” a form of “technology,” specifically based on “blockchain technology”).
39 JONES DAY, supra note 19, at 2.
40 Coryanne Hicks, The History of Bitcoin, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 1, 2020),
http://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/the-history-of-bitcoin.
41 Nakamoto, supra note 37.
42 See id.
43 See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the
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cryptocurrencies is fundamentally tied to the great political
controversies of our century.44 Bitcoin and crypto coin software in
general embody a form of political association and organizing for
collective freedom.45
Cryptocurrencies and blockchains are in their infancy. They
are like the internet in 1989 or 1990. In their world, Amazon and
Google have not been invented yet. Innovators are trying to solve
problems with transaction costs and delays, energy consumption,
theft, and lack of trust.46
Part of the case for crypto coins involves promoting economic
efficiency.47 Blockchains could reduce the costs of wire transfers,
private ledgers, and other financial costs dramatically by some
estimates.48 One method of enabling frictionless commerce is to
deploy automated smart contracts to pay out tokens based upon
conditions triggered by Internet of Things devices or other
technologies.49 Cryptocurrency-enabled sectors of the economy in
the near future could include software, social media, logistics,
hospitality, wallets, payments, capital markets and investment
banking, real estate, and many others.50
Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 311, 312–15
(2011) (describing blockades of Wikileaks donations); Mark Jansen, Bitcoin: The Political
Virtual of an Intangible Virtual Currency, 17 INT’L J. CMTY. CURRENCY RSCH. 8, 10 (2012)
(describing links of BitCoin’s rise to Wikileaks blockade); Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and
Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM), http://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf-bitcoin/
[http://perma.cc/29SW-XHR7].
44 See Benkler, supra note 43, at 313; Philip Di Salvo, Whistleblowers, in THE
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JOURNALISM STUDIES 1, 1–3 (2019); KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON, CYBERWAR: HOW RUSSIAN HACKERS AND TROLLS HELPED ELECT A PRESIDENT:
WHAT WE DON’T, CAN’T, AND DO KNOW 1 (2018); Peter Oborne, He’s a Hero, not a Villain,
30 BRIT. JOURNALISM REV. 43, 44 (2019); Brian Rappert, Leaky Revelations: Commitments
in Exposing Militarism, 60 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY S148, S148 (2019).
45 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, When Speech Is Not “Speech,” 78 OHIO STATE L.J. 839, 884
(2017) (arguing that “First Amendment protection should extend only to collective,
communicative activity that has relevance to democratic citizenship and self-governance
(defined broadly)” and surveying related case law). It is noteworthy that the sale of violent
video games to minors and the operation of commercial adult websites constitute “speech,”
even though such conduct offers little in terms of argumentation or analysis that is
important for political or economic progress. See Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S.
786, 790 (2011); see Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666–67 (2004).
46 See, e.g., Nicola Atzei, Massimo Bartoletti & Tiziana Cimoli, A Survey of Attacks
on Ethereum Smart Contracts, in 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRINCIPLES OF
SECURITY AND TRUST 164–86 (Matteo Maffei & Mark Ryan eds., 2017).
47 See DAVID MILLS ET AL., FED. RSRV. BD., 2016-095, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY IN PAYMENTS, CLEARING, AND SETTLEMENT (2016).
48 See PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW: THE
RULE OF CODE 64 (2018); see RACHEL F. FEFER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10810, BLOCKCHAIN
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (2019); see MILLS ET AL., supra note 47.
49 See DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 72–76, 81, 88.
50 See, e.g., infra Tables 1 and 2; see also Eric Johnson, Logistics Startup ShipChain
Hit with Cease-and-Desist Order, JOC.COM (May 23, 2018, 12:48 PM),
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B. Crypto Coin White Papers as Speech
ICOs are solicitations to buy or subscribe to systems of
digital code, or to accept them for various forms of informational
or commercial exchanges.51 Bitcoins are computer files that share
certain characteristics of currencies, such as being tradable for
goods or services or for official currencies, and being accepted for
deposit in online accounts (wallets, i.e. other computer files).52
Application tokens, known as appcoins, coordinate rights of
access to content, programs, networks, or online democracies,
most famously in the way that semi-autonomous code-based
economic agents known as “smart contracts” operate on the
Ethereum network to unlock content or resources in an
ecosystem, the “Cryptocosm.”53
Bitcoin transactions, like those in the banking system, are
recorded on ledgers.54 A ledger is a database, and a database is a
form of speech. Blockchains are public ledgers of transactions,
and differ from bank ledgers in being more public, more
comprehensive of all transactions in a given cryptocurrency or

http://www.joc.com/international-logistics/logistics-startup-shipchain-hit-cease-and-desistorder_20180523.html (discussing an example of a logistics project); Abhimanyu Krishnan,
4 Blockchain Projects That Will Change the Real Estate Industry, INV. IN BLOCKCHAIN
(Mar. 13, 2018), http://www.investinblockchain.com/blockchain-projects-real-estate/
[http://perma.cc/3BGG-V6MV] (discussing hospitality and real estate project examples);
LBRY (@LBRYcom), TWITTER (2019), http://twitter.com/LBRYcom (providing updates on a
social media project); Ledger Fever: 95 Bitcoin & Blockchain Startups in One Market Map,
CB INSIGHTS (Feb. 23, 2017), http://www.cbinsights.com/research/bitcoin-blockchainstartup-market-map/ [http://perma.cc/3BGG-V6MV] (listing capital markets and
wallets/payments projects); Matt Levine, The SEC Gets a Token Fight, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
29, 2019, 5:35 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-01-28/the-sec-gets-atoken-fight [http://perma.cc/M59E-DJW7] (discussing apps).
51 See Future Tech Podcast,
Cooley LLP Marco Santori Fintech Bitcoin and
Blockchain
Attorney,
YOUTUBE
(July
11,
2017),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPGQS0Aiu5Q; see Zuluaga, supra note 17, at 2, 4; cf.
Policing the Wild Frontier, supra note 38, at 67 (explaining that ICOs involve buying or
subscribing to “blockchain technology”).
52 See Fed. Election Comm’n, Advisory Opinion 2014-02 (May 8, 2014), at 2,
http://www.fec.gov/files/legal/aos/2014-02/2014-02.pdf [http://perma.cc/V53G-SPK4] (citing
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND CURRENCIES 5
(2013), http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654620.pdf [http://perma.cc/CM9W-WDN4]); see
François R. Velde, Bitcoin: A Primer, CHI. FED LETTER (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.),
no.
317,
Dec.
2013,
at
1,
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago_fed_
letter/2013/cfldecember2013_317.pdf [http://perma.cc/R9L7-YDLR].
53 See Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright, Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin
Offerings, and the Democratization of Public Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 463, 474–
78 (2019); see also How Can the Blockchain Disrupt the App Store Business?, supra note
13; Future Tech Podcast, supra note 51; GEORGE GILDER, LIFE AFTER GOOGLE: THE FALL
OF BIG DATA AND THE RISE OF THE BLOCKCHAIN ECONOMY (2018).
54 Benjamin Wallace, The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin, WIRED (Nov. 23, 2011, 2:52 PM),
http://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf-bitcoin/ [http://perma.cc/29SW-XHR7].
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token, and semi-private in that in many instances the
transacting parties’ names, addresses, countries of residence, and
IP addresses are not reliably linked to each transaction record.55
Blockchains are often touted as being “immutable,” but “forks” of
a particular chain, such as the Ethereum blockchain, may change
the ledger after a vote or other decision by the token’s
subscribers, foundation, or other controlling parties.56 They
promote the integrity of cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin by
providing a radically distributed, yet richly transparent index of
transactions.57
ICOs involve the sale of cryptocurrency tokens based
largely on white papers, or extended arguments for why a new
way of organizing economic relations, assembling and deploying
assets, or exchanging messages or entitlements could benefit
the buyers of tokens.58 An ICO white paper typically strikes four
major themes: bold and optimistic predictions for the future,
summaries of the cryptographic solution employed, indications
of how the coin or asset will unlock content or network
resources, and arguments about how peer-to-peer production of
that content or resource will help secure a better or more
efficient future. Table 1 presents examples of future-predictive
themes
from
influential
white
papers
for
ICOs.59

55 See Fed. Election Comm’n, supra note 52, at 2; DEP’T OF COM., NAT’L INST. OF
STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8202, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW (2018); Rebecca
Lewis et al., Blockchain and Financial Market Innovation, ECON. PERSPS. (Fed. Rsrv.
Bank of Chi., Chi., Ill.), no. 7, 2017, at 1; see also 2 ANDREAS M. ANTONOPOULOS, THE
INTERNET OF MONEY 59–60 (2017).
56 See Vitalik Buterin, Hard Fork Completed, ETHEREUM FOUND. BLOG (July 20,
2016), http://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/20/hard-fork-completed/ [http://perma.cc/2VJP6UFJ]; see DAVID MILLS ET AL., supra note 47, at 17.
57 See Ty McCormick, The Darknet: A Short History, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 9, 2013,
5:44
PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/12/09/the-darknet-a-short-history/
[http://perma.cc/288Y-SKWN].
58 See Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 8 (referring to use of white
papers in ICOs).
59 While Bitcoin did not hold an ICO, it offered coins in return for mining, or
contributions of computing power to the network, so it is included here as offering
something for coins for that reason, as well as for the sake of completeness.
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Table 1: ICO White Paper Predictions
Bitcoin60

In payment systems, security and privacy will come into conflict
as increases in computing power may necessitate a public history
of transactions that is too large and complex to tamper or forge;
the public record of transactions could threaten privacy while
hacks will threaten payment security.

Ethereum61

In the future, autonomous agents will exist on blockchains to
allocate resources and currency balances, offering an alternative
to centralized corporations.

Ripple62

There is a need for a global, distributed payment-processing
system, which would resist not only fraud but also authentic
transactions that conflict (presenting the double-spending
problem).

EOS63

Blockchain users typically write distributed applications or
DApps for customers in finance, logistics, media, retail sales, or
the sharing economy, and want a decentralized and open-entry
community in which to do so, secured with cryptography and a
“Constitution” for dispute-resolution.

TRON64

By partnering with BitTorrent, a decentralized userbase adopting
the same crypto token can empower creators to distribute their
work directly to fans without incurring intermediary charges.

Nakamoto, supra note 37, at 1.
Vitalik Buterin, A Next Generation Smart Contract & Decentralized Application
Platform,
23,
http://web.archive.org/web/20140126001912/http://www.ethereum.org/ethereum.html
[http://perma.cc/5G52-ELAE].
62 David Schwartz, Noah Youngs & Arthur Britto, The Ripple Protocol Consensus
Algorithm, http://ripple.com/files/ripple_consensus_whitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/LPS5XX6Q].
63 Ian
Grigg,
EOS
An
Introduction,
7
(July
5,
2017),
http://whitepaperdatabase.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EOS-Introductionwhitepaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/CR4J-3BU9]; see also EOS.IO Technical White Paper v2,
GITHUB
(Mar.
16,
2018),
http://github.com/EOSIO/Documentation/blob/master/TechnicalWhitePaper.md
[http://perma.cc/CZ4G-NJEY]; GITHUB, http://github.com [http://perma.cc/MNX6-LLA9].
BitCoin, Ether, Ripple, and EOS were among the top 200 coins by market capitalization
in early 2020. See, e.g., All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 20.
64 Tron:
Whitepaper,
TRON
16
(2018),
http://web.archive.org/web/20180104232249/https://dn-peiwo-web.qbox.me/TronWhitepaper-1031-V18-EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/K9CX-2T8Q]. See also Tron: Advanced
Decentralized
Blockchain
Platform,
TRON
4
(Dec.
10,
2018),
http://tron.network/static/doc/white_paper_v_2_0.pdf [http://perma.cc/7GXU-WE78]; Ailsa
Sherrington, TRON Answers Our Questions About Project Atlas, THENEXTWEB (Dec. 5,
2018),
http://thenextweb.com/hardfork/2018/12/05/tron-answers-our-questions-aboutproject-atlas [http://perma.cc/77DD-WSNJ]. TRON was among the top 200 coins by
market capitalization in early 2020. See, e.g., All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 20.
60
61
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Golem65

Instead of subscribing to expensive corporate cloud service
providers, digital artists and others in need of sophisticated
computing resources will rent them from a decentralized
supercomputer fueled by microservices rendered in exchange for
token transfers.

Kin66

Creative people with internet access, by building cooperative
content platforms using tokens, will be liberated from dependence
on large advertising-based social media corporations.

Filecoin67

Internet users, by using encrypted and decentralized storage of
their content provided in exchange for the network’s coin, will
evade censorship and interception of data while enjoying
reliability of files.

Steem68

Contributors to the vast advertising businesses of major social media
platforms will take control of their creativity by using smart tokens to
rapidly and efficiently earn money from fan communities.

Musicoin69

Hundreds of thousands of musicians can collaborate
independently on the same blockchain-powered platform to sell or
license their music and get paid rapidly and reliably.

Bancor70

An “Internet of Value” will enable anyone to adopt a digital token
that will help them get paid for writing articles, commenting in
discussions, or selling goods or services.

Gram71

A social media application can integrate an advanced multiblockchain architecture that can handle thousands of distributed
applications for the network’s users.

65 The
Golem Project: Crowdfunding Whitepaper, GOLEM (Nov. 2016),
http://golem.network/crowdfunding/Golemwhitepaper.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8JH2-6RXB].
Golem was among the top 100 coins by market capitalization in early 2020. See, e.g., All
Cryptocurrencies, supra note 20.
66 Kin: A Decentralized Ecosystem of Digital Services for Daily Life, KIN 6 (May
2017),
http://www.kin.org/static/files/Kin_Whitepaper_V1_English.pdf
[http://perma.cc/Q6HK-5VNG]. See also Levine, supra note 50 (describing Kik
Interactive’s dispute with the SEC over registration of this white paper).
67 Filecoin: A Decentralized Storage Network, PROTOCOL LABS 1 (July 19, 2017),
http://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf [http://perma.cc/QT2A-5KL8]. Filecoin was among the top 200
coins by market capitalization in early 2020. See, e.g., All Cryptocurrencies, supra note 20.
68 Steem: An Incentivized, Blockchain-based, Public Content Platform, STEEM 5
(June 2018), http://steem.com/SteemWhitePaper.pdf [http://perma.cc/SA96-AXTU].
69 Musicoin: A Decentralized Platform Revolutionizing Creation, Distribution and
Consumption
of
Music,
MUSICOIN
12
(Oct.
2017),
http://drive.google.com/file/d/1KVvcwPKUngMNffgWW65k1p4UvKg5QG0u/view
[http://perma.cc/626S-MDGH].
70 Eyal Hertzog, Guy Benartzi & Galia Benartzi, Bancor Protocol: Continuous
Liquidity for Cryptographic Tokens Through Their Smart Contracts, 3 (Mar. 18, 2018),
http://storage.googleapis.com/website-bancor/2018/04/01ba8253bancor_protocol_whitepaper_en.pdf [http://perma.cc/LDB7-39VS]. Bancor was among the
top 200 coins by market capitalization in early 2020. See, e.g., All Cryptocurrencies, supra
note 20.
71 Nikolai Durov, Telegram Open Network, 3, 79, 101, 124 (Mar. 2, 2019),
http://test.ton.org/ton.pdf [http://perma.cc/E8TD-Q7Y6].
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OpenST72

Individuals and companies will mint and issue branded, digital
tokens that users can easily exchange for other branded tokens or for
a “Simple Token”—a convertible store of value across many brands.

Syncfab73

In the Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), tokens will incentivize
manufacturers and supply chain vendors to exchange timesensitive supply and demand information more rapidly, as well as
competitively sensitive data, like purchase histories, to
decentralize and revolutionize manufacturing.

Smart VALOR74

Memberships in a new form of stock exchange will be made
available in a token sale, with the members then participating in
a Swiss-based marketplace for crypto coins—including assetbacked tokens relating to emerging companies, venture capital,
private equity, and real estate funds.

Gram75

All information, including photo and video, will be sold at its
market-clearing price using a token that approximates in value a
share of all the information available for purchase with the token;
miners will maintain the metadata on available information and
its pricing to earn tokens.

Fetch.ai76

Using a new platform for trading machine intelligence, data can
“sell itself” over a decentralized protocol that operates more
efficiently, and in more dimensions, than traditional software
retailers.

The Bitcoin paper initiated the tradition of crypto coin
offerings heralding a new form of economic organization in
which the users of a public network, by joining the processing
power and storage capacity of their collective computing
resources, would forge an alternative to government-backed
financial intermediaries keeping currency users “honest.”77

72 Benjamin Bollen et al., OpenST Protocol White Paper, 22 (June 1, 2018),
http://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bwgf8QuAEOb7Z2xIeUlLd21DSjQ/view
[http://perma.cc/MY7Q-NUQV]. See also GITHUB PAGES, github.io [http://perma.cc/2BWBWW6H].
73 Decentralized
Manufacturing,
SYNCFAB
7
(Aug.
3,
2018),
http://syncfab.com/SyncFab_MFG_WP.pdf [http://perma.cc/3Y84-Z73Q].
74 Decentralized Marketplace for Tokenized Alternative Investments, SMART VALOR 2,
9–10, 60 (Nov. 2018), http://res.smartvalor.com/pblic/SMART-VALOR-WhitePaper.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4PJG-E2XJ] (arguing that it is a basic human right for people all over the
world to possess and make their own decisions about their money and investments).
75 Durov, supra note 71, at 45.
76 Toby Simpson, Arthur Meadows & Humayun Sheikh, Fetch.AI: Token Overview: A
Decentralised World for the Future Economy, 7, 22 (Feb. 2019), http://fetch.ai/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Fetch.AI-Token-Overview.pdf
[http://perma.cc/G5EC-6GAW].
Fetch.ai was among the top 200 coins by market capitalization in early 2020. See, e.g., All
Cryptocurrencies, supra note 20.
77 See Nakamoto, supra note 37, at 1 (arguing that the decentralized public ledger of
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Altcoins and other crypto coins continue to argue in their vein,
speculating that and providing reasons why peer-to-peer
administration of a collective resource such as a payment,
storage, or media network will benefit coin holders. Table 2
presents examples of peer-to-peer arguments from influential
or otherwise noteworthy white papers for ICOs.
Table 2: P2P Arguments in White Papers
Bitcoin78

A peer-to-peer network could document a public record of token
spending, using cryptographic proof-of-work timestamps to
distribute the role of verifying transactions and token status to
computer nodes distributed across a network, rather than using
a ledger controlled by a trusted central party.

Ethereum79

In the future, autonomous agents will exist on blockchains to
allocate resources and currency balances, offering an alternative
to centralized corporations.

Ripple80

There is a need for a global, distributed payment-processing
system which would resist both fraud and authentic but
conflicting (double-spent) transactions.

EOS81

Blockchain users typically write distributed applications or
DApps for customers in finance, logistics, media, retail sales, or
the sharing economy, and want a decentralized and open-entry
community in which to do so, secured with cryptography and a
“Constitution” for dispute-resolution.

TRON82

By acquiring the BitTorrent software and protocol, the TRON
token founders are bringing DApps and smart contracts to end
users who can now directly exchange information or value
without trusted central intermediaries.

token spending, maintained simultaneously at many nodes and updated on a peer-to-peer
basis, would be computationally too voluminous to tamper with if user nodes remain
“honest” for the most part: “The system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively
control more CPU power than any cooperating group of attacker nodes.”).
78 See id.
79 Buterin, supra note 56.
80 Schwartz et al., supra note 62; see also ARVIND NARAYANAN ET AL., BITCOIN AND
CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 36 (2016); STEFAN
LOESCH, A GUIDE TO FINANCIAL REGULATION FOR FINTECH ENTREPRENEURS 31 (2018);
BERNARDO NICOLETTI, THE FUTURE OF FINTECH: INTEGRATING FINANCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN FINANCIAL SERVICES 4 (1st ed. 2017); Robert Pemberton, THE RISE OF
RIPPLE - THE STARTER GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING RIPPLE CRYPTOCURRENCY AND WHAT
YOU NEED TO KNOW (2018),
http://www.scribd.com/read/367903350/The-Rise-of-Ripple-The-Starter-Guide-toUnderstanding-Ripple-Cryptocurrency-and-What-You-Need-to-Know
[http://perma.cc/KN5C-CZBP].
81 Grigg, supra note 63, at 7.
82 Tron: Advanced Decentralized Blockchain Platform, supra note 64, at 4–5, 7, 37.
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Golem83

Computers assembled in a peer-to-peer network can share the
network’s applications, computing capacity, and other infrastructure,
unrestricted by the rules of proprietary cloud solutions or payment
processors. When combined with storage coins like Filecoin and the
capabilities of other Ethereum tokens, the Golem network could
enable even large streaming services to run in decentralized ways.

Kin84

The Kin token will be a “decentralized ecosystem of digital
services for daily life,” enabling creators for social media and
other industries and even casual browsers to be paid for their
contributions to public discourse.

Filecoin85

A “peer-to-peer algorithmic market[]” for storage will be more
efficient than “monolithic” options.

Steem86

Social media intermediaries such as Facebook and YouTube
could be replaced with a blockchain for attribution and
payments, with fast-launching digital assets maintained using a
decentralized blockchain and open-source software.

Musicoin87

A Pay Per Play Smart Contract will harness peer-to-peer file
sharing’s efficiency while promoting remuneration of musicians at
higher levels than the record labels or streaming giants plan to allow.

Bancor88

A “Smart Token” network will facilitate a multiplicity of highly
liquid low-fee mechanisms of digital exchange.

OpenST89

Users who join an open network of networks can leverage “cryptoeconomics” to mint and issue their own tokens that may be tethered
to a convertible crypto-assets backed by a “value blockchain.”

Syncfab90

In the Industrial Internet of Things (IIOT), tokens will
incentivize manufacturers and supply chain vendors to
exchange time-sensitive supply and demand information more
rapidly, as well as competitively sensitive data like purchase
histories, to decentralize and revolutionize manufacturing.

Smart Valor91

A peer-to-peer marketplace for tokens and token-backed
investments achieves scale by incentivizing issuers and
investors to participate and then leveraging the transactional
relationships among its participants, thereby promoting the

GOLEM, supra note 65.
Defendant’s Answer at 82, SEC v. Kik Interactive Inc., No. 19-cv-5244 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug.
6,
2019)
http://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.nysd.516941/gov.uscourts.nysd.516941.2
2.0.pdf [http://perma.cc/YD6G-U73W].
85 PROTOCOL LABS, supra note 67, at 1.
86 STEEM, supra note 68, at 31.
87 MUSICOIN, supra note 69, at 12.
88 Hertzog et al., supra note 70, at 5.
89 Bollen et al., supra note 72, at 5.
90 SYNCFAB, supra note 73, at 18.
91 SMART VALOR, supra note 74, at 9, 58.
83
84
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“basic human right for people all over the world to possess and
make their own decisions about their money and investments.”
Gram92

A multi-blockchain infrastructure, potentially integrated with a
social messaging application, could execute and secure millions
of transactions per second, scaling up crypto applications.

Fetch.ai93

Decentralized software agents collaborating in an “economic
Internet” will offer themselves and seek out their brethren to
perform computing tasks including machine learning, in
exchange for tokens.

C. AppCoins as Microtransactions to Access Expressive Content
With appcoins, software developers will enjoy more open and
social—and perhaps more fair and just—ways of finding users.94
Cryptocurrencies and token standards enable investors and
startup founders to collaborate smoothly and quickly.95 A market
for apps worth an estimated $200 billion annually in this decade
will be revolutionized, and become more efficient.96 The West
Coast credo of “beg for forgiveness, don’t ask for permission” has
ensured that work on ICOs has continued despite many warnings
and great uncertainty, with those from the East Coast and other
regions who are more cautious being left behind.97
Appcoins could serve as decentralized versions of the
ubiquitous microtransactions that dominate video games

See Durov, supra note 71, at 3, 101.
See Simpson et al., supra note 76, at 7.
See APPCOINS OFFICIAL, AppCoins ICO is Closed—Hardcap Reached!, MEDIUM
(Dec. 21, 2017), http://appcoins.medium.com/appcoins-ico-is-closed-hardcap-reached3a653e6b9208 [http://perma.cc/6WJY-L5SU] (“AppCoins is a new cryptocurrency that all
Aptoide users can earn and spend inside app stores. Once the protocol is implemented,
AppCoins can be adopted by any app store, regardless of the operating system. The
protocol creates a new shared ecosystem among all app stores, powered by the blockchain.
AppCoins is to become the new universal language of the global app economy.”); see also
AppCoins: Redesigning the App Economy, supra note 14, at 1, 4–6, 16–18 (explaining how
AppCoins will target problems facing traditional app stores such as their closed systems
for app approval, high advertising costs as a percentage of initial revenue, low levels of
participation in in-app economies, and high intermediary charges reducing developers’
margins).
95 See generally Why Aptoide?, APTOIDE (2020), http://en.aptoide.com/company/
[http://perma.cc/QEG7-R5U4] (providing information on “[a]ll the advantages of the
blockchain technology" for over three hundred million users in addition to stating that
“[r]ecent studies prove that Aptoide is the safest Android app store”).
96 See AppCoins: Redesigning the App Economy, supra note 14, at 19.
97 Future Tech Podcast, supra note 51; see also Our Clients: Angellist, COOLEYGO
(2020),
http://www.cooleygo.com/clients/angellist/
[http://perma.cc/B5KT-YFPE]
(describing the “ask for forgiveness, not permission” approach as the corporate policy of
Angellist, a California-based company designed to help startups change the world through
permissionless innovation); see generally ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION:
THE CONTINUING CASE FOR COMPREHENSIVE TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM 7 (2016).
92
93
94
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marketed on a freemium model, or as existing in persistent
online multiplayer worlds. As of nearly five years ago, Electronic
Arts earned about two-thirds of a billion dollars in revenue from
microtransactions in sports games such as FIFA 16.98 In 2019,
the top five free-to-play video games each made more than $1.5
billion in revenue, driven largely by microtransactions.99 There
was as estimated $90 billion in freemium revenue in 2019.100
Cryptocurrencies may make microtransactions more lucrative
and efficient for developers of games, or other creative works,
because the administrative costs and intermediary fees may be
reduced.101
Using units such as the Satoshi, one hundred million of
which equal one Bitcoin, gatherers or curators of data to which
others might like to subscribe—like sports data for fantasy
football players or financial data for market timers—could be
paid in efficient microtransactions, including subscription or
usage fees.102 Microtransactions of this kind establish a
persistent market in virtual worlds alongside the traditional
market in game graphics and engines sold on recorded media,
such as CDs or DVDs.103 In addition, combining
microtransactions with crypto coins liberates players from the
arbitrary discretion of the publisher in the traditional model,
which results in days and days of work on characters and
buildings being deleted.104 An appcoin enables the players of
98 See Matthew R. Yost, Video Game Gambling: Too Big a Bet for New Jersey, 70
RUTGERS UNIV. L. REV. 335, 341 (2017); see also Rebecca E. McDonough, Loot Boxes: “It’s
a Trap!”, 46 N. KY. L. REV. 62, 85 (2019) (defining microtransactions and identifying them
as responsible for “81% of the approximately $36 billion generated in revenue for the
video game industry” in 2017 alone).
99 See Eric Griffith, 2019’s Top ‘Free’ Games Each Made $1.5 Billion-Plus, PCMAG
(Jan. 13, 2020), http://www.pcmag.com/news/2019s-top-free-games-each-made-15-billionplus [http://perma.cc/3UVN-UG9E].
100 See id.
101 See MARC ANDREESSEN, Why Bitcoin Matters, NEW YORK TIMES (Jan. 21, 2014, 11:54
AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/21/why-bitcoin-matters
[http://perma.cc/YA6SQDQ9]; Ioannis Lianos, Blockchain Competition: Gaining Competitive Advantage in the Digital
Economy—Competition Law Implications, in REGULATING BLOCKCHAIN: TECHNO-SOCIAL AND
LEGAL CHALLENGES 329, 335 (Philipp Hacker et al. eds. 2019); see also PEDRO FRANCO,
UNDERSTANDING BITCOIN: CRYPTOGRAPHY, ENGINEERING, AND ECONOMICS 187 (2014) (“It is
often said that Bitcoin makes micropayments viable, given Bitcoin’s low fees.”).
102 See SUREDBITS, Micro-Transactions with Crypto, MEDIUM (Aug. 17, 2018),
http://medium.com/suredbits/micro-transactions-with-crypto-117d6b72eebf
[http://perma.cc/3SFU-5X8M].
103 Cf. Kirill Shilov, 3 Innovative Ways the Blockchain Can Ramp Up Your In-game
Revenue, HACKER NOON (Mar. 12, 2018), http://hackernoon.com/3-innovative-ways-theblockchain-can-ramp-up-your-in-game-revenue-c00cc92c661e
[http://perma.cc/A4ARBF99] (stating that players are “more than happy to pay for in-game extras” and spend as
much as they want because they can access otherwise unavailable characters and items).
104 See BITGUILD, BitGuild: Changing Games Forever, MEDIUM (Mar. 1, 2018),
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some games to secure their creations on the blockchain,
protecting players from these abrupt losses.105
Appcoins can help check the power of what regulators
suggest is an emerging monopoly or oligopoly concerning the
monetization of online content.106 The market power of prominent

http://medium.com/the-notice-board/bitguild-changing-games-forever-132d97332f00
[http://perma.cc/882S-HHNV].
105 See id. (“On the BitGuild platform, everything you earn in-game belongs to you and
exists securely on the blockchain. As long as you control your private key, passphrase, and any
secure information tied to your wallet, everything you’ve collected while playing is owned by
you.”); see also BitGuild: Blockchain Gaming Platform, BITGUILD 10–12 (2018),
http://static1.squarespace.com/static/5d522e48bfd7c300010f2c3c/t/5e27ed4400949e3e253e0541/
1579674994414/BitGuild_Whitepaper_v0.73_EN.pdf [http://perma.cc/J2A5-L6AR]; Meet Your
New Blockchain Wallet, ENJIN (2020), http://enjin.io/software/wallet [http://perma.cc/8UZ72VFQ] (“Securely store, buy, and sell blockchain assets and collectibles.”); Jeffrey Kaufmann,
(July 2016) (LBRY Plan 6-10 on file with author) (offering an example of a blockchain-based
social media platform that allows for content monetization); cf. Tim Copeland, Taking
Ethereum Mainstream: Social Media App Pepo Goes Live at Devcon 5, DECRYPT (Oct. 8, 2019),
http://decrypt.co/10091/taking-ethereum-mainstream-social-media-app-pepo-goes-live-atdevcon-5 [http://perma.cc/43XL-5WA3] (describing Pepo, a crypto app that “allows for fast,
cheap micropayments” on the Ethereum blockchain so users can “get paid in crypto when
people upvote [or like their] 30-second videos”) (alteration in original); Jason Goldberg, Thanks
to Better UX, This Year Dapps Will Go Mainstream, YAHOO FINANCE (Dec. 30, 2019),
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/thanks-better-ux-dapps-mainstream-103954527.html
[http://perma.cc/R6VK-7XE5] (“In Pepo, every tap of the ‘like’ button transfers a token—giving
a whole new meaning and value to likes. Suddenly, content creators can be instantly rewarded
by their fans and earn real money for their creations, without any middlemen.”); Gabriel
Rubinsteinn, This Blockchain-Based Social Media Network is the First Apple Pay Approved
DApp, COINTELEGRAPH (Nov. 15, 2019), http://cointelegraph.com/news/this-blockchain-basedsocial-media-network-is-the-first-apple-pay-approved-dapp
[http://perma.cc/3UTF-87LX]
(noting that Pepo “tokens are used to tip the creators [chosen by the user], but also can be
spent on [gift cards via] the marketplace”) (alteration in original).
106 See, e.g., FIN. TIMES LTD., Big Tech Chiefs Cast as 21st Century Robber Barons at
US
Hearing,
IRISH
TIMES
(July
30,
2020,
12:31
AM),
http://www.irishtimes.com/business/technology/big-tech-chiefs-cast-as-21st-centuryrobber-barons-at-us-hearing-1.4317722 [http://perma.cc/Z29K-MKB3] (“The hearing cast
the leaders of 21st century corporate America as modern robber barons . . . .”); Keach
Hagey & Rob Copeland, Justice Department Ramps up Google Probe, with Heavy Focus on
Ad Tools, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 5, 2020), http://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-departmentramps-up-google-probe-with-heavy-focus-on-ad-tools11580904003?reflink=share_mobilewebshare&shareToken=stb1a208f43b2d40b2b3ad302d
d94fde86 (noting that an inquiry by the Justice Department into antitrust violations
involving the Internet is focusing on Google’s presence “at every link in the complex chain
between online publishers and advertisers, giving it unique power over the monetization
of digital content”); Pontin, supra note 13 (describing Internet intermediaries taking a
large share of app developers’ online earnings); see also Taylor Hatmaker & Devin
Coldewey, Secret Documents from US Antitrust Probe Reveal Big Tech’s Plot to Control or
Crush
the
Competition,
TECHCRUNCH
(July
31,
2020,
12:07
PM),
http://techcrunch.com/2020/07/31/house-antitrust-investigation-documents
[http://perma.cc/7YQU-J8N3] (suggesting that internal Google documents produced
“during the House Judiciary’s marathon hearing” may support some legislators’ theory
that Google strove to “control or crush” competitors like YouTube because Google officials
expressed “alarm about the ‘orthogonal threat’ posed by social networks and other
websites with ‘high entertainment value’”) (emphasis added); Rachel Denney, Will
Antitrust Probe into Google Start Crackdown on Big Tech?, IMPACT (Feb. 13, 2020),
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platforms upon which creators rely to earn a living is even being
compared to the railroad monopolies of the nineteenth century,
which treated farmers and shippers arbitrarily and charged
unjust and discriminatory rates in the years prior to the
Interstate Commerce Act, thereby increasing enforcement of the
Sherman Act.107
Unlike corporate stock, which is an investment that will pay
off or not based on the efforts of corporate management and does
not confer an entitlement to use of a product or service, ICOs and
appcoins such as Ether unlock network assets or application
data.108 Ether, as the Ethereum network token, leverages
computing power for applications to use.109 Most ICOs are not
typical business shares or partnership contracts sold as
investments without any utility in terms of software or
content.110 Crypto coins are uniquely valuable because they are
linked to creatively-developed applications and reams of
networked data, as a result of which commentators use phrases
such as “utility tokens” and “functional cryptocurrencies.”111

http://www.impactbnd.com/blog/will-antitrust-probe-into-google-start-crackdown-on-bigtech [http://perma.cc/G25H-LNS9] (“Google controls multiple key platforms that
companies use to place advertisements, such as YouTube, Google’s search engine, and a
host of platforms that fall under ‘Google Network.’”); id. (“Google Ad Manager—which is
comprised of DoubleClick Ad Exchange and DoubleClick for publishers—controls a
significant portion of the infrastructure for monetizing digital content.”); Paresh Dave &
Sheila Dang, Explainer: Advertising Executives Point to Five Ways Google Stifles Business,
REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2019, 1:29 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-tech-antitrustgoogle-explainer/explainer-advertising-execs-point-to-five-ways-google-stifles-businessidUSKCN1VW2L9 [http://perma.cc/ZP6P-8SAH] (“The ubiquity of Google’s ad server
provides virtually total control over which ads are shown and monetized for the majority
of the Internet[.]”) (alteration in original); Gerrit De Vynck, Google’s Chrome Becomes Web
‘Gatekeeper’ and Rivals Complain, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 2019, 5:00 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-28/google-s-chrome-becomes-webgatekeeper-and-rivals-complain (programmers of rival internet browsers argue that
Google stifles competition with its Chrome browser); Benjamin Edelman, Does Google
Leverage Market Power Through Tying and Bundling?, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
365, 365–66 (2015) (arguing that Google dominates some aspects of internet use by tying
practices in order “to expand its dominance into additional markets”).
107 See ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., Before the Federal Trade Commission: Hearings on
Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st Century, FED. TRADE COMM’N 1, 7–10
(Nov. 15, 2018), http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/11/ftc2018-0076-d-0021-162495.pdf [http://perma.cc/64GP-LGS8] (comparing dominant internet
platforms to “essential [railroad] facilities, resources, and services,” with user data and
connections serving as the virtual “bridge[s]” from market to market within the analogy)
(alteration in original).
108 See Marco Santori, Appcoin Law: ICOs the Right Way, COINDESK (Nov. 9, 2016, 12:11 PM),
http://www.coindesk.com/appcoin-law-part-1-icos-the-right-way [http://perma.cc/7E3K-QRGG].
109 See Zuluaga, supra note 17, at 2, 6 n.22.
110 See id. at 2–3.
111 See id. at 1, 4; DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT, supra note 48, at 100–01.
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III. CATEGORIZING CRYPTO COIN OFFERINGS AS EXPRESSION
Cryptocurrency offerings and appcoins in particular have
proliferated in a cloudy regulatory environment.112 Yet
increasingly, vague criminal statutes threaten coders who offer
computer files that operate in some ways like money, in other
ways like software, and in still other ways like the stuff of
cryptography or futurism in literature.113 This Part explains the
First Amendment standards applicable to crypto coin speech, and
advocates narrowing the scope of securities laws.
A. First Amendment Analogies
Analogies often prove to be critical to the resolution of
important First Amendment cases. For example, is a ban on
selling pharmacies’ data on doctors’ prescription trends more like
a “ban on the sale of cookbooks” (as the Supreme Court held), or
more like a ban on the sale of private medical records to other
112 See Gian Volpicelli, The $3.8bn Cryptocurrency Bubble Is a Huge Deal. But It
Could
Break
the
Blockchain,
WIRED
UK
(July
14,
2017),
http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-initial-coin-offering-ico-token-sale
[http://perma.cc/E3XH-4S3A]; see also Bhaskar et al., supra note 12, at 554 (suggesting
that most ICOs involve incentivizing labor that builds out a network of content or
transactions, by enabling the laborers to “exit” after selling coins on an exchange or to
another company in a merger or acquisition, or after coins are exchanged for stock subject
to an Initial Public Offering (IPO)); cf. Marco Santori, Appcoin Law: ICOs the Right Way,
COINDESK (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:11 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/appcoin-law-part-1-icosthe-right-way [http://perma.cc/7E3K-QRGG] (defining appcoins as ICOs that are not
securities because, inter alia, they are useful to access network or encrypted application
assets—like condominium shares, their “sellers” may not be the ones creating the trading
market that could lead buyers to profit from coin trading, or the profits from trading will
vary due to the efforts of appcoin buyers who are the ones building out the user-generated
content in a computer network, game, or virtual world); Reinaldo Ferreira, $18 Million
ICO: Social Android App Store Aptoide Launches AppCoins, EU-STARTUPS (Nov. 8, 2017),
http://www.eu-startups.com/2017/11/social-android-app-store-aptoide-launches-appcoinswith-a-e60-million-ico/ [http://perma.cc/GD5S-WQ7Q] (explaining how AppCoins
compatible with the Aptoide app store will enable video-game and virtual-world players to
be rewarded with virtual currency for their time, which they can then use to access new or
better games or world content, or to engage in trades with other players).
113 See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (statute prohibiting publishing
pattern of stories promoting “bloodshed” was void for vagueness under First Amendment
despite being justified by state as preventing criminal incitement); cf. Brown v. Ent.
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (statute making it a crime to sell violent video
games to minors was overly restrictive of protected software-encoded speech, as well as
underinclusive with respect to other violent content); Ent. Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich,
469 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2006) (statute making it a crime to sell sexually explicit video
games to minors “sweeps too broadly” in violation of First Amendment, although court did
not reach vagueness issue discussed by lower court); James v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d
683, 699 (6th Cir. 2002) (warning that imposing tort liability on violent video games
would raise First Amendment concerns). Futurism is a genre or movement that concerns
“events and trends of the future, or which anticipate[s] the future.” Futurism, LEXICO
(last
visited
Nov.
16,
2020),
https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/futurism
[http://perma.cc/4YM5-HHYU].
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doctors in search of new patients?114 Does a regulation
prohibiting the use of corporate funds in the creation of videos
attacking a likely presidential candidate justified as preventing
bribery, or does it amount to government censorship of political
speech, even on advocacy websites?115 Is an inaccurate credit
report, bond rating, or search engine result more like a
defamatory statement or more like profit-seeking ad activity?116
Commercial speech is accorded less protection than
non-commercial speech.117 Indeed, the Court has recognized that
the Government has wider latitude to regulate the former.118
However, commercial speech is not inherently undeserving of
protection; the Court has observed: “It is clear . . . that speech
does not lose its First Amendment protection because money is

114 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 570–72 (2011); id. at 586–90 (Breyer, J.,
joined by Ginsburg, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting) (analogizing regulation at issue to
regulation of privacy of patient records generated by provider participation in federal
insurance programs and to how “FDA oversees the form and content of labeling,
advertising, and sales proposals of drugs, but not of furniture” as content-neutral
regulation subject to lesser scrutiny).
115 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 337 (2010) (pressing
the website analogy as a “classic example[ ] of censorship”); id. at 447 (Ginsburg, J., joined
by Breyer, J., and Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (analogizing
case at bar to political corruption through “selling access,” an act mere degrees away from
bribery).
116 Compare Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762
(1985) (analogizing credit reports to advertising regulation for purposes of First
Amendment limitations on actions for libel and slander relating to a matter of public
concern); with id. at 788–90 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., Blackmun, J., and
Stevens, J., dissenting) (pressing the analogy between credit reports and more political
speech or press writing). See also id. at 762 n. 8 (plurality opinion) (“The dissent suggests
that our holding today leaves all credit reporting subject to reduced First Amendment
protection. This is incorrect. The protection to be accorded a particular credit report
depends on whether the report’s ‘content, form, and context’ indicate that it concerns a
public matter.”). See also Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Invs. Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520,
529–30 (6th Cir. 2007) (applying First Amendment actual malice standard to claim based
on credit rating of a public company); Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-021457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (rejecting argument that
accuracy of search engine results could be regulated as purportedly objective service
offered for profit); Paula Lauren Gibson, Does the First Amendment Immunize Google’s
Search Engine Results from Government Antitrust Scrutiny?, 23 COMPETITION: J. OF
ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETITION L. SECTION STATE BAR CAL., no. 1, 2014, at 125
(citing, inter alia, Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007)); Frank
Pasquale, Rankings, Reductionism, and Responsibility, 54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 115 (2006).
117 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
562–63 (1980) (“The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”).
118 Id. at 563 (“The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the
informational function of advertising. Consequently, there can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the
public about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more
likely to deceive the public than to inform it . . . .”).
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spent to project it, as in a paid advertisement of one form or
another.”119
Speech may be denied First Amendment protection if it offers
or facilitates a transaction that is itself illegal.120 Speech, however,
is not denied First Amendment protection simply because it invites
or induces a payment of funds.121 An advertisement for ordinary
products or services may deserve some manner of constitutional
protection because it serves the public interest.122 For this reason,
speech inviting a money-for-content transaction may enjoy
protection akin to that recognized for strictly political or non-profit
speech.123 In addition to information touching upon ethical and
political considerations, such as whether goods are “Made in the
USA” or produced without animal cruelty, price and quality
information is similarly important to consumers in a capitalist
democracy.124 As a result, even the laws of commercial libel and
deceptive advertising are hemmed in by free speech law.125
Crypto coin speech is quite unlike that of a lawyer, accountant,
or other professional, whose speech is ripe for regulation.126 In First
Amendment case law relating to lawyers, the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts have stressed the fiduciary relationship
between lawyers and their clients.127 Advice rendered by a fiduciary

119 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761
(citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35–59 (1976); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964)).
120 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm’n on Hum. Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 384 (1973)) (although
advertisements for employment may be “commercial speech,” they can be prohibited if
discriminatory, because discriminatory hiring is an illegal transaction).
121 See id. at 761; see also NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); Jamison v.
Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 417 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306–07 (1940);
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (striking down state
statute compelling disclosure of contributors’ actual contributions and imposing a
licensing requirement on professional fundraisers).
122 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)); Chicago Joint Bd. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970);
Fur Info. & Fashion Council, Inc. v. E. F. Timme & Son, 364 F. Supp. 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)).
123 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809 (1975)).
124 See id. at 765; FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 603–604 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
125 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762–65.
126 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5
(1985) (stating in dicta that “the power of the State to license lawyers, psychiatrists, and
public school teachers—all of whom speak for a living—is unquestioned”) (citing Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945)).
127 See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250–52
(2010) (while “[u]njustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements offend the
First Amendment by chilling protected speech,” regulation of advertising at issue was
constitutional because its requirements “govern only professionals who offer bankruptcy-
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is often delivered in private rather than in a public forum like a
newspaper or a website, and therefore does not implicate the
public’s weighty interest in the “free flow of . . . information.”128
Moreover, the patient or other client has a greater interest in
informed, accurate disclosures from an existing fiduciary than a
person whose will is not overborne by in-person solicitation of
specialized services.129 This interest is attenuated when it comes to
solicitation by strangers, or advice received from them.130

related services to consumer debtors.”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770
(“Virginia is free to require whatever professional standards it wishes of its pharmacists .
. . .”); Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 631 (1995) (Florida Bar may regulate
timing of attorney direct-mail solicitations to forestall “the demonstrable detrimental
effects that such ‘offense’ has on the profession it regulates”); Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus.
& Prof’l Reg., 512 U.S. 136, 139 (1994) (upholding regulation of attorney advertising
under scheme suggesting that “only licensed CPA’s may ‘practice public accounting’”)
(citing Fl. Stat. § 473.322(1)(a)); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Couns. of the Sup. Ct.
of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 629 (1985) (discussing professional regulation); Lowe v. SEC, 472
U.S. 181, 229–30 (1985) (noting that although licensing of professional speech—often
arising in fiduciary relationships—does not trigger heightened First Amendment scrutiny,
“a regulation of speech” rather than the “profession” would necessitate increased scrutiny)
(citing Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)); Riley,
487 U.S. at 813 (Rehnquist, J., joined by O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“For example, bar
admission requirements may have some incidental effect on First Amendment protected
activity by restricting a petitioner’s right to hire whomever he pleases to serve as his
attorney, but we have never suggested that state regulation of admission to the bar
should generally be subject to strict scrutiny.”).
128 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762; see also Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452
(1938) (“The liberty of the press is not confined to newspapers and periodicals. It
necessarily embraces pamphlets and leaflets.”).
129 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)
(discussing state law requiring doctors to disclose certain risks while advising patients
regarding services related to childbirth and abortion); Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848
F.3d 1293, 1308–09 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (where there is a law regulating a
professional who has a “personal nexus” to a particular client and is not “speaking
generally,” rational basis review may apply) (citing Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J.,
dissenting)); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229–31 (9th Cir. 2013) (as amended on
rehearing) (upholding a law providing a certain form of therapy and distinguishing it from
a law regulating abstract medical speech including “recommending” that same therapy);
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1191 (11th Cir. 2011) (“There is a difference, for First
Amendment purposes, between regulating professionals’ speech to the public at large
versus their direct, personalized speech with clients.”); Pearson v. McCaffrey,
139 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“During a doctor-patient conversation,
physicians are engaging in the practice of medicine, which has a long history of being
regulated to protect the public safety.”); but see Wollschlaeger, 848 F.3d at 1309–10
(holding, in striking down a state law prohibiting certain forms of medical advice or
discussions, that “characterizing speech as conduct is a dubious constitutional enterprise”
because, for example, “‘doctor-patient communications about medical treatment receive
substantial First Amendment protection”) (internal citation omitted); Conant v. Walters,
309 F.3d 629, 637–39 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting an attempt to regulate ways in which “a
doctor’s ‘recommendation’ of marijuana may encourage illegal conduct by the patient,”
and holding that professionals “have rights to speak freely subject only to the government
regulating with ‘narrow specificity.’”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
130 See infra notes 206–207.
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Professional speech and reports by hired experts (such as
credit bureaus) are also purportedly objective and therefore
verifiable.131 By contrast, the utility and ultimate value of any
particular crypto coin depends upon many debatable premises
and unpredictable future trends. While attorney and other
professional advertising may involve similarly subjective and
unverifiable claims about qualifications, respective track records,
and likelihood of various outcomes including large damages
recoveries in the case of personal-injury lawyers in particular,
such advertising is unlike crypto white papers in that it is often
“solely motivated by the desire for profit”132 and “[does] no more
than propose a commercial transaction.”133
Professional regulation does not dictate an orthodox
viewpoint in a “matter[ ] of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein.”134 By contrast, regulating crypto
white papers may censor calls for fundamental economic and
social change, a form of speech that has been deemed “the
essence of self-government.”135 It is a matter of great public
concern whether an alternative to the fraud-prone system of
banking and investment (a system arguably driving historic
levels of inequality) can be built, just as it was of great import
whether the Internet would make everyone a publisher. Thus,
crypto speech should take its place “on the highest rung of the
hierarchy of First Amendment values.”136 For speech at that
level, the constitutional presumption should be that “more
speech” is preferable to less, unless an “emergency” is
threatened.137
See id.
Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 762.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Com. on Human Rels., 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973). See also Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 791–92 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
J., Blackmun, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In every case in which we have permitted
more extensive state regulation on the basis of a commercial speech rationale the speech
being regulated was pure advertising-an offer to buy or sell goods and services or
encouraging such buying and selling.”).
134 Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
135 Garrison v. Louisiana., 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964). See also New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
136 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v.
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
137 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996); compare id. at 497
(discussing situations in which less speech might be permissible as a state-law mandate).
See also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) (“[I]t is our
law and our tradition that more speech, not less, is the governing rule.”); Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (“The First Amendment . . . constrains
state efforts to limit advertising of tobacco products, because so long as the sale and use of
tobacco is lawful for adults, the tobacco industry has a protected interest in
communicating information about its products and adult customers have an interest in
131
132
133
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Investment fraud and other misleading commercial speech may
be regulated without running afoul of the First Amendment.138 In
this regard, it is useful to compare price regulation of a goods and
services with more general, quasi-political statements about a
company’s business practices or its working environment, including
matters subject to collective bargaining. Statements relating to
price, the contents of goods, the qualifications of a person to perform
a service for a fee, and the like, do little more than propose a
commercial transaction, and often do not contain more general or
political opinions.139 On the other hand, compelled disclosures of
controversial statements of opinion or belief raise different and
heightened levels of constitutional scrutiny.140 The Supreme Court,
for example, has distinguished between a basic, factual disclosure
that a fundraiser is paid to raise funds, from a disclosure of more

receiving that information.”); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 497 (1995)
(observing that “more speech and a better informed citizenry are among the central goals
of the Free Speech Clause.”); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988)
(explaining that public education is less speech-restrictive alternative to compelling or
dictating the content of speech by adding unwanted disclosures or other verbiage).
138 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (“Numerous
examples could be cited of communications that are regulated without offending the First
Amendment, such as the exchange of information about securities . . . .”); Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973) (stating in dicta that “neither the First
Amendment nor ‘free will’ precludes States from having ‘blue sky’ laws to regulate what
sellers of securities may write or publish about their wares.”); Bulldog Inv. Gen. P’ship v.
Sec’y of the Commonwealth., 460 Mass. 647, 663, 668 (2011) (concluding that because
Supreme Court authority declares securities regulation to be consistent with First
Amendment rights in commercial speech area, it passed First Amendment muster to
require disclosure statements).
139 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 193–
94 (1999) (broadcasting of casino advertising may be regulated to prevent harm to
gamblers or the public, in part because “It is well settled that the First Amendment
mandates closer scrutiny of government restrictions on speech than of its regulation of
commerce alone.”) (citing Trs. of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989));
N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding
that state requirement that restaurants post caloric content data on menus was
permissible under First Amendment because “Commercial disclosure requirements are
treated differently from restrictions on commercial speech because mandated disclosure of
accurate, factual, commercial information does not offend the core First Amendment
values of promoting efficient exchange of information or protecting individual liberty
interests.”) (quoting Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2001);
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 308–11 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding
pharmaceutical benefit manager disclosure requirements as regulating only “‘expression
related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.’”) (quoting El Dia,
Inc. v. P. R. Dept. of Consumer Affairs, 413 F.3d 110, 115 (1st Cir. 2005), and citing
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561
(1980)); Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 824, 830 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (negligent misrepresentation claims related to investing are not subject to dismissal
under First Amendment); Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 651 F. Supp.
2d 155, 176 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (similar).
140 Riley, 487 U.S. at 796.
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complex ideas and claims with which the speaker may disagree.141
Requiring a credit rating agency to adopt standards might also rise
to the level of compelled speech.142 As a result, not every statement
by an agency that harms another business or investor can be
silenced or corrected without abridging the freedom of speech.
In addressing a case involving the publication of an article
relating to a security within the SEC’s jurisdiction, the D.C.
Circuit in 1988 rejected the notion that enjoining such an article
would constitute a forbidden prior restraint or an impermissible
intrusion of securities law into protected commercial speech
under the First Amendment.143 The court reasoned that “areas of
extensive economic supervision,” such as securities and
competition law, are subject to the deferential scrutiny of
commercial speech regulations.144 Moreover, the court analogized
the regulation of such articles—even those that resembled
journalism rather than proxy or offering statements—to the
regulation of attorney conduct.145
However, the continued viability of the D.C. Circuit’s 1988
ruling is questionable. While at the time misleading speech
seemed to be completely outside the First Amendment’s impact
zone, recent cases undermine this view.146 In Ibañez v. Florida

141 See id. at 796–99, n.11 (making this distinction). See also Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559, 577 (1995) (explaining
that it violates the First Amendment to force a speaker to be associated with a message
with which the speaker does not agree); Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
256 (1974) (holding that newspapers may not be required to serve as a neutral forum in
which candidates for public office may respond to attacks); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 539–40 (1945) (observing that a regulation which merely requires a speaker to
present identification might be permissible, while one that more aggressively censors or
shapes the speech would not be absent some commercial nexus); Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 481 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
“compelling cognizable speech officially is just as suspect as suppressing it, and is
typically subject to the same level of scrutiny.”); Compuware Corp. v. Moody’s Invs.
Servs., Inc., 499 F.3d 520, 533–34 (requiring company to change its rating of company
offering would violate First Amendment); Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. v. Moody’s Invs. Servs.,
Inc., 175 F.3d 848, 856–58 (requiring company to change its ratings of a bond would be
impermissible under First Amendment); Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1308
(observing that courts are “properly skeptical of the government's ability to calibrate the
propriety and utility of speech on certain topics.”); Search King Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,
No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *4 (requiring Google to up-rank website to avoid
interfering with site’s business interests might infringing Google’s freedom of speech)
(citing Mia. Herald, 418 U.S. at 256).
142 See Compuware, 499 F.3d at 533–34.
143 SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 369–73 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
144 See id. at 373 (citing Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Couns. of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 650.
145 Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 149 F.3d
679, 686 (7th Cir. 1998).
146 See Rebecca Tushnet, Truth and Advertising: The Lanham Act and Commercial
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Department of Business & Professional Regulation, the Supreme
Court distinguished between categories of “potentially” and actually
misleading speech, stating that only the latter is subject to
prohibition even in professional contexts of advertising services
offered for a fee.147 In United States v. Alvarez,148 the Court deemed
efforts to boost one’s image with an inflated and misleading military
record to be a potentially First Amendment-protected part of
“dynamic” public debates.149 In Expressions Hair Design
v. Schneiderman, the Court rejected an effort to regulate the prices
displayed or announced by retailers, even though the Solicitor
General of the United States warned that the law regulated conduct
alone and that such a ruling might jeopardize false advertising
law.150 The following year, the Court concluded that regulating the
manner in which unlicensed pro-life “pregnancy centers”
masqueraded as medical clinics at the expense of unwitting patients
violated the First Amendment. The state of California had passed a
law requiring such centers to disclose that they were not licensed
medical centers and did not employ doctors. California defended the
law, arguing that the centers were affected as “treatment” providers
or advertisers of treatment for a fee.151 The disclosure requirement
was justified only by a fear of potential harm, according to the
Court, and therefore imposed an unjustified burden.152 In short,
Speech Doctrine, TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
RESEARCH,
294–99
(Graeme
Dinwoodie
&
Mark
Janis
eds.
2008),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1014418 [http://perma.cc/BX2R-USM9] (citing, inter alia, Robert
Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 22 (2000)); cf.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978).
147 512 U.S. 136, 136–51, 152 (1994).
148 567 U.S. 709, 710 (2012).
149 Id. at 728; see also id. at 735–39 (Breyer, J., joined by Kagan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that lying without foreseeable injury to others may be protected
speech); id. at 733, 749 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)
(conceding that lying to “further philosophical or scientific debate” might be
constitutionally protected); Louis W. Tompros et al., The Constitutionality of
Criminalizing False Speech Made on Social Networking Sites in a Post-Alvarez, Social
Media-Obsessed World, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 65, 92–102 (2017) (suggesting that
criminalizing false statements on Internet that do not cause foreseeable harm is
unconstitutional after Alvarez). Whether the defendant in Alvarez stood to gain
commercially from the statement at issue is debatable. See Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 714 (he
was not applying for a job or “financial benefits”); id. at 744 (Alito, J., joined by Scalia, J.,
and Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming to have been awarded a military honor could lead to
“other material rewards, such as lucrative contracts”).
150 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1150–51 (2017); see Br. of Amicus Curiae, at 20–31, Expressions
Hair Design, v. Scheiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144 (U.S. brief filed Nov. 21, 2016) (No. 151391), https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/15-1391-amicus-neitherparty-U.S.pdf [http://perma.cc/22W7-DH9L] (arguing that the law passed First
Amendment muster by halting “‘potentially or demonstrably misleading advertising’”).
151 Nat’l Instit. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2369–78 (2018),
rev’g Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Harris, 839 F.3d 823 (9th Cir. 2016).
152 Id. at 2377.
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contemporary First Amendment doctrine relies on “counterspeech”
as an available method of resolving the potential harms of
unregulated public discourse, and disfavors preemptive bans.153
While registration of traditional securities might therefore
add to the body of information available to the public,154
registration requirements for coins such as Ether or Bitcoin
would chill a substantial amount of coin speech without
necessarily adding much information to the marketplace.155
Disclosure of the information required to register a traditional
securities offering may be primarily factual and uncontroversial,
but forcing a utility coin, service coin, or appcoin promoter to call
a coin a “security” and to call itself a shareholder or founder of a
company mandates a controversial statement of a subjective legal
conclusion.156 Such decisions present serious First Amendment
dangers by allowing government officials to determine whether a
potential speaker has satisfied “necessarily subjective” standards
to qualify as an eligible speaker.157 Even in the context of
advertising services to the general public, a disclosure
requirement violates the freedom of speech if it relates to
someone else’s services or is “‘unduly burdensome.’”158 It is
improper under Zauderer and its progeny to mandate a
disclosure that is inaccurate or one that is controversial.159 A
153 Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 726; Dan L. Burk, Patents and the First Amendment, 96
WASH. U.L. REV. 197, 248–50 (2018) (arguing that patents issued on methods or systems
of “digital writing” or “Internet communications” warrant strict scrutiny regardless of the
purpose of Congress in regulating such methods or systems under Reed); Lisa P. Ramsey,
Increasing First Amendment Scrutiny of Trademark Law, 61 SMU L. REV. 381, 431–41
(2008) (arguing that trademark doctrines trigger strict scrutiny by discriminating based
upon subject matter via content-based speech restrictions).
154 See SEC v. Wall St. Publ’g Inst., Inc., 851 F.2d 365, 374–76 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
155 See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945) (“As a matter of principle a
requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally
incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly.”); Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (requiring one to apply for a permit to speak
“strikes at the very foundation of the freedom of the press by subjecting it to license and
censorship”); William Hinman, Director, Bur. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Digital Asset
Transactions:
When
Howey
Met
Gary
(Plastic)
(June
14,
2018),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speech-hinman-061418
[http://perma.cc/B7VP-LNMS]
(Bitcoin and Ether) (questioning value of requiring registration of Bitcoin, for example, as
security regulated by SEC).
156 See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
157 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 510 (1981); see also Lovell v.
City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697
(1931).
158 Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs., 138 S. Ct. at 2372, 2377–78.
159 See American Beverage Ass’n v. City & County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749,
764–67 (9th Cir. 2019) (Christen, J., joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the result)
(inaccurate or scientifically controversial disclosure fails under Zauderer); National Ass’n
of Mfrs. v. SEC, 800 F. 3d 518, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that a non-factual or
ideologically-loaded disclosure fails muster under Zauderer); Ent. Software Ass’n v.
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compelled statement that Bitcoin or a utility token is a security
might be inaccurate, while a compelled statement that a
particular cryptocurrency can be subject to an accounting of
revenue or profits like a typical corporation would certainly be
controversial.
Major crypto coin white papers are starkly dissimilar to IPO
registration statements or other corporate proxy statements,
which may be regulated extensively with little fear of First
Amendment challenges to the regulatory scheme, or at least
under traditional First Amendment doctrine predating the
widespread adoption of the Internet.160 Unlike corporations
issuing stock, but like other open source software projects, many
cryptocurrencies lack a centralized issuer.161 Although other
tokens are explicitly marketed as investments and lose all their
value due to the incompetence or criminality of their founders
and/or promoters, so-called “service tokens” or appcoins as well
as payment or “currency” tokens operate less like corporations
and more like subscriptions or monies.162 Consumers do not
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (questioning a mandate of somewhat
subjective “18” label on “sexually explicit” video games as when not being a mere factual
disclosure); Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 282, 296–300 (D. Md. 2019) (A
disclosure requirement for paid digital communications on online platforms, such as
political ads on news websites, could not be sustained as a requirement to disclose
uncontroversial information under Zauderer. The court noted that “laws compelling
publishers to make election-related disclosures [do not] have much of a history in this
country.”), aff’d, 944 F.3d 506 (4th Cir. 2019).
160 See, e.g., supra note 146.
161 See, e.g., ARVIND NARAYANAN, JOSEPH BONNEAU, EDWARD FELTEN, ANDREW
MILLER, & STEVEN GOLDFEDER, BITCOIN AND CRYPTOCURRENCY TECHNOLOGIES: A
COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 25 (2016); cf. Philip Oettinger and Andrew Ellis,
Preparing a Successful IPO in 2018, HARVARD LAW SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOV. (Jan. 30,
2018),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/30/preparing-a-successful-ipo-in-2018/
[http://perma.cc/B8QR-FRFM] (companies considering an IPO typically have accounting
standards, corporate governance and committee charters, chief financial officers, and the
like).
162 See DMITRI BOREIKO, BLOCKCHAIN-BASED FINANCING WITH INITIAL COIN
OFFERINGS (ICOS): FINANCIAL INDUSTRY DISRUPTION OR EVOLUTION? 141–155 (2019)
(describing varying functional use cases and characteristics of cryptocurrencies, including
to purchase a service or serve as a medium of exchange); Phillip Hacker & Chris Thomale,
Crypto-Securities Regulation, ICOs, Token Sales and Cryptocurrencies under EU
Financial Law, 15 EURO. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 645, draft at 33–37 (2018),
http://ssrn.com/abstractid=3075820 (similar); see also Philipp Maume & Mathias
Fromberger, Regulation of Initial Coin Offerings: Reconciling U.S. and E.U. Securities
Laws, 19 CHI. J. INT’L L. 548, 558–59, nn. 70–75 (2019); see also Aurelio Gurrea-Martinez
& Nydia Remolina León, The Law and Finance of Initial Coin Offerings, in
CRYPTOASSETS: LEGAL, REGULATORY, AND MONETARY PERSPECTIVES 117, 120–29 (Chris
Brummer ed., 2019) (citing, inter alia, Hacker & Thomale, supra); cf. Andrea Ordanini et
al., Crowd-funding: Transforming Customers Into Investors Through Innovative Service
Platforms, 22 J. SERV. MGMT. 443, 444 (2011) (predicting that certain types of services
would lend themselves to having their development funded by their own customers, via
crowdfunding); see generally Dirk A. Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, & Douglas W. Arner, The
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“invest” in money or services, but rather earn or buy them; a coin
without an “enterprise” is therefore not a “security” that should
have to be registered unless exempt, among other
requirements.163 While the distinction might be lost if crypto
coins also had to preregister, this is an argument against
enacting such a requirement in the first place.
A crypto white paper, in many ways, is like computer
scientists’ research output, or (less charitably) like an article in a
magazine quoting a corporate executive touting his or her
corporation, or else a scientific study funded by a corporation to
boost its sales by praising its products.164 This is highly significant,
for it supports the contention that a white paper or other crypto coin
article or social media post does not “retain[ ] its commercial
character when it is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully
protected speech.”165 Unlike a pure advertisement (e.g. for a specific
car at a specific price), many white papers do not state a price, and
instead read like lengthy tracts of peer-to-peer software coding,
coupled with arguments for decentralized economic power and new
forms of online activity and human relationships.166 The paper that
popularized the digital coin movement, the Bitcoin white paper,
emphasized cybersecurity advantages of a digital cash system based
on coins secured by a peer-to-peer methodology using a lot of work
to make the ledger of transactions difficult to forge or mutilate as
hackers array computer power against the ledger.167 If
cybersecurity in 2008 was a scholarly discipline (notably in
computer science) related to reducing the perpetration of fraud
using the Internet, Bitcoin promised to advance it by harnessing the
users of the coin to generate a tamper-resistant chronological list of
past Bitcoin transfers, preventing digital check kiting.168 White

Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1361 (2018).
163 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (omitting money within definition of “security” even
while defining “security” to include “investment contract” and providing numerous
examples of such contracts or securities); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (excluding “currency”
from definition of “security” even while defining “security” to include “investment
contract”).
164 See, e.g., Andreessen, supra note 101.
165 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
166 See NARAYANAN ET AL., supra note 161, at 25 (exploring computer science of
cryptocurrencies in depth); cf. Bernstein v. United States Dep’t of Just., 176 F.3d 1132,
1141 (1999) (finding that computer source code is protected as free speech).
167 See Nakamoto, supra note 37, at 1.
168 See Nakamoto, supra note 37, at 1; cf., e.g., The Cybersecurity Partnership Between
the Private Sector and Our Government: Protecting Our National and Economic Security:
Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp. and the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. & Governmental Aff., 113th Cong. 11–12 (2013) (statement of Janet
Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (noting that fraud by
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papers may also summarize other tokens or their own white
papers, which is something not often seen in corporate disclosure
filings.169
Peer-to-peer payment systems often resemble labor
unions’ organizational structure to a greater extent than they
resemble corporations or partnership shares. In attempting to
evade the “excessive fees” of banks, payment processors, app
stores dominated by oligopolistic Internet platforms, and the like,
crypto coin founders and subscribers exercise their basic First
Amendment rights to freedom of association and joint economic
activism.170 While the users of such systems may expect to earn a
profit from successful management of their assets within the
system, a potentially larger portion of the value of payment
tokens derives from their utility in various marketplaces, rather
than their being invested and earning a return like money that
buys a share of stock.171 A union pension likewise depends on the
counterfeiting was a key cybersecurity priority during the Obama administration);
PRESIDENT’S INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CYBER SECURITY: A CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION
8 (2005), http://www.nitrd.gov/pitac/reports/20050301_cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf
[http://perma.cc/SXY4-ECHY]. Check kiting is the informal name for obtaining money or
assets in the control of a financial institution by knowingly and with the intent to defraud
making a false representation of having enough funds to pay for a purchase or debt, such
as by writing a completely bogus check with no funds there to cover the amount. See, e.g.,
18 U.S.C. § 1344; United States v. Doherty, 969 F.2d 425, 428 (7th Cir. 1992).
169 See generally, e.g., Paulo Trezentos & Diego Pires, AppCoins: Distributed and
Trusted App-based Transactions Protocol (Aptoide, Working Paper No. 0.40d, 2017),
http://web.archive.org/web/20171105090613/https://appcoins.io/pdf/appcoins_whitepaper.p
df [http://perma.cc/DJ6G-6LCP]; Buterin, supra note 56.
170 See United Transp. Union v. Mich. Bar, 401 U. S. 576, 577–80, 586 (1971) (holding
that union had right to offer Illinois attorneys to Michigan clients, in probable violation of
Michigan laws governing unlicensed provision of legal advice by those lacking admission
to the state bar, nonlawyers sharing or controlling a lawyer’s fees, nonlawyer soliciting
clients for lawyers, etc. Court invoked “the First Amendment principle that groups can
unite to assert their legal rights as effectively and economically as practicable.”) (emphasis
added) (first citing United Mine Workers v. Ill. State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); then
citing Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); and then citing
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963)); see also, In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978)
(“The Court has held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent state
proscription of a range of solicitation activities by labor unions seeking to provide lowcost, effective legal representation to their members.”); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60,
64 (1960) (noting right to hand out information without regulation of one’s identity);
United Transp. Union, 401 U.S. at 586–600 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (reciting various potential violations of Michigan law governing attorney
registration and conduct, and similar violations in Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen); State
Emp. Bargaining Agent Coalition v. Rowland, 718 F.3d 126, 133–34 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting
First Amendment also protects economic or other “‘associations’”) (quoting NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958)); Boardman v. Inslee, 354 F. Supp.
3d 1232, 1247 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (noting that “‘[c]onditioning public employment on
union membership, no less that on political association, inhibits protected association and
interferes with government employee’s [sic] freedom to associate,’” justifying “‘strict’” First
Amendment scrutiny) (quoting Rowland, 718 F.3d at 133–35)).
171 See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 562 (1979) (concluding
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efforts of the portfolio or investment managers to maximize the
return on investment while minimizing risk, ensuring that the
defined benefit or other retirement arrangement can be paid in
the end.172 Still, focusing only on the extent to which pension
funds are “invested” in order to mandate registration under
securities laws improperly ignores other aspects of a union and
its pension fund.173 Requiring preregistration as an approved
speaker on such topics as the trading of cryptocurrencies restricts
“[t]he right thus to discuss, and inform people concerning, the
advantages and disadvantages of [crypto coin open-source
software projects] and joining them”; this right “is protected not
only as part of free speech, but as part of free assembly.”174
Moreover, the fact that some white papers might not require
registration if they reject founder involvement in developing the
token ecosystem on principle, or forswear any commercial use of
the token under any circumstances, should trigger strict scrutiny
of Howey-style tests for registration.175
Crypto coin collectives also implicate the “right to work for a
living.”176 The right to work for some manner of compensation
may be protected under the Fifth Amendment from federal
interference, and under some combination of the Fifth and the
Fourteenth Amendments at the state level.177 Laws with
that a pension fund was not a security within meaning of anti-fraud provisions of
Securities Acts because larger portion of its value came from employer contributions in
exchange for labor than from investments by fund manager(s)).
172 See id. (noting that fund’s investments made tens of millions of dollars); see also
Manhattan Ford Lincoln, Inc. v. UAW Local 259 Pension Fund, 331 F. Supp. 3d 365, 382–
83, 393 (D.N.J. 2018) (noting that union pensions depend for viability on “long-term
investment-return assumption[s] [as to] . . . how much its current assets will grow
through investments” and are subject to federal law that makes plan sponsors liable to
overage of vested benefits vs. contributions plus investment-generated assets) (first citing
Kathryn J. Kennedy, Pension Funding Reform: It’s Time to Get the Rules Right (Part 1),
108 TAX NOTES 907, Appendix A (Aug. 22, 2005); and then citing 29 U.S.C. § 1393(a)–(c)).
173 See Daniel, 439 U.S. at 558–62.
174 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 519, 524–25, 532 (1945) (finding prohibition of
union solicitation for compensation unless one registers and obtains an organizer’s card
was unconstitutional for this reason); see also id. at 550 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting
requirement to register for the card under Texas law).
175 See Barr v. Am. Ass’n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 2335, 2347 (2020) (first
citing Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155, 163–64; and then citing Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 563–64) (stating strict scrutiny applies to any law that “focuses
on whether [a person] is speaking about a particular topic.”).
176 Examining Bd. of Eng’rs v. Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 604 (1976).
177 See Otero, 426 U.S. at 604 (noting the Fourteenth Amendment demands respect
for right to earn a living) (citing Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915)); see also, e.g.,
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 492 (1959) (“[T]he right to hold specific private
employment and to follow a chosen profession free from unreasonable governmental
interference comes within the ‘liberty’ and ‘property’ concepts of the Fifth Amendment.”);
Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232, 246–47 (1957) (finding the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects those pursuing legal occupations from
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unpredictable reach or breadth may be void for vagueness as
denials of due process of law; they may also violate equal
protection principles if they fail to apply to all actors, instead
singling out an unlucky few.178
Increasingly since the 1960s, the Fifth Amendment has
invalidated statutes or ordinances that (1) are framed
indefinitely or (2) that invite random or discriminatory
application to the detriment of economic or political activity.179 As
a criminally enforceable norm, the prohibition against selling
“Howey” securities absent a registration or applicable exemption
raises particularly acute vagueness concerns.180 Additionally, the

irrational exclusion from it); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating the
Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests under Due Process Clause extend “to engage in
any of the common occupations of life”); Truax, 239 U.S. at 41 (“[T]he right to work for a
living in the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amendment to
secure.”); Timothy Sandefur, The Common Law Right to Earn a Living, 7 INDEPENDENT
REV. 69, 70, 75 (2002) (citing right recognized in Magna Carta to buy and sell and arguing
that right to earn a living should be protected under Constitution’s Article IV, concerning
“privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of
right, to the citizens of all free governments.”) (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
551–52 (C.C.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)); see generally Timothy Sandefur, The Right to Earn a
Living, 6 CHAP. L. REV. 207 (2003) (exploring various sources of the right to pursue a
lawful occupation).
178 See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (“[T]he purpose of
the equal protection clause . . . is to secure every person within the State's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of
a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
179 See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 451–52
(1983), abrogated by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Kolender v.
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353–54 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972);
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents
of Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); AMA v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443, 452–53 (2d Cir.
1980); Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 653, 661–62 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Joseph A.
Kaplan & Sons, Inc. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 785, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1965)); Evan Bernick, Towards a
Consistent Economic Liberty Jurisprudence, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 479, 481–89 (2016)
(collecting cases). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (striking
down a “a statute sweeping in a great variety of conduct under a general and indefinite
characterization, and leaving to the executive and judicial branches too wide a discretion
in its application”); Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939) (“[U]ncontrolled official
suppression of the privilege [of expression]” is unconstitutional as “arbitrary suppression
of free expression of views”).
180 See Mukong v. Cameroon, Communication No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. No.
CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, ¶9.8 (views adopted July, 21 1994) (detention under arbitrary
legal norms that violate freedom of expression); Human Rights Committee, General
Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, ¶47, U.N. Doc. No.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12 2011) (“Defamation laws must be crafted with care to ensure
that they comply with paragraph 3, and that they do not serve, in practice, to stifle
freedom of expression.”). See also Gorji-Dinka v. Cameroon, Communication No.
1134/2002, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002, ¶5.1 (Mar. 17 2005); Van Alphen v.
Netherlands, Communication No. 305/1988, U.N. Doc. No. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, ¶5.6
(July, 23 1990).
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international human right of freedom of expression is also
infringed if civil or criminal sanctions are unpredictable or
speech-suppressive, such as by imposing to jail terms or fines.181
B. Commercial Speech Challenges
The First Amendment provides little protection for false or
misleading speech.182 For example, prior restraints on
commercial speech may be permissible when false or misleading
statements are made in connection with the marketing of
pharmaceutical ingredients or testimonials about their
effectiveness, as such speech does no more than propose a
commercial transaction.183
A “reasonable relationship” test, or form of rational basis review,
applies to law governing an “ordinary” commercial sale.184 This is
similar to the “permissive” standard of review for disclosure rules,
where a market actor is compelled by law to speak in a manner that
includes “purely factual and uncontroversial information.”185
There is a suggestion that speech “incidental” to unlawful
“conduct” (whether an offer, sale, failure to register within a
certain profession or trade, etc.) should be entirely excluded from
First Amendment coverage.186 If incitement of imminent lawless
181 See Reno v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 871–73 (1997); Semler v. Or.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’r, 294 U.S. 608, 609, 612 (1935). See also Van Alphen,
CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, at ¶5.6; Mukong, CCPR/C/5/D/458/1991, at ¶9.7; Gorji-Dinka,
CCPR/C/83/D/1134/2002, at ¶5.1.
182 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 771–72 n.24 (1976) (noting that “truthful information” may not be suppressed even
when “wholly false” or merely “deceptive or misleading” speech may be subject to state or
federal regulation to deal with its false or misleading character, for example “to require
that a commercial message appear in such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive.”).
183 See id. at 772 n.24 (“[G]reater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech . . .
may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior restraints.”) (citing New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971); Donaldson v. Read Mag., 333 U.S. 178,
189–91 (1948); FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc’y, 302 U. S. 112, 116–17 (1937); E.F. Drew &
Co. v. FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 739–40 (2d Cir. 1956).
184 See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (2017)
(Breyer, J. concurring) (citing Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
185 See id. at 1152 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S., at 651).
186 See id. at 1151 (“[I]t has never been deemed an abridgment of freedom of speech or
press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated,
evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.”)
(quoting Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. and Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006)); Holder v.
Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28–29 (2010); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of
N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 813 (1988) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam); ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND
ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 2–3,
22–24 (Yale Univ. Press) (2012) (suggesting that when Congress or a state legislature
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conduct may be proscribed, as the Court has often stated, speech
that is part of a pattern of such conduct cannot be protected.187
On the other hand, when violence or factual fraud plays no part
in the pattern of conduct, then speech incidental to such
nonviolent conduct may not be banned.188 Many scholars argue
for heightened First Amendment scrutiny of content-based
regulations such as those purporting to dictate how a particular
commercial message must be communicated to the public.189
Several justices of the Supreme Court, whose views were perhaps
more representative of recent majorities in First Amendment
cases, opined that it would violate the First Amendment to enjoin
the publication of a newsletter dedicated to recommending the
buying or selling of securities. Specifically, the violation was
alleged to be that a publisher had violated the Investment
Advisers Act by failing to disclose criminal convictions in the
course of registering as an adviser before starting the
newsletter.190
To begin with the Central Hudson test for narrower possible
regulations that would serve a governmental interest, there are
numerous alternatives to prior restraints on ICOs in the form of

regulates a profession—or presumably also, another trade or business—this does not raise
a constitutional issue under the First Amendment).
187 See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, 492 U.S. 115,
124–25 (1989); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Chaplinsky v. N.H., 315
U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942). See generally United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, passim
(2010) (declining to adopt categories of low-value speech in addition to fraud, obscenity,
fighting words, malicious libel, etc.).
188 See Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 497–98; Milk Wagon
Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 292–93 (1941) (emphasizing
“contemporaneously violent conduct” in affirming injunction against picketing nonunion
retailers or retailers purchasing from nonunion producers).
189 See Hillary Greene, Muzzling Antitrust: Information Products, Innovation and
Free Speech, 95 B.U. L. REV. 35, 69–70 (2015) (discussing antitrust as being potentially
content-based as prohibiting certain sales) (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2653, 2569–70, 2661–67, 2670–71 (2011)); Hillary Greene & Dennis Yao, Antitrust as
Speech Control, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1215, 1218 (2019) (citing, inter alia, Frederick
Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of
Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765, 68 (2004)) (discussing both
securities and antitrust laws as content-based regulations); Antony Page & Katy Yang, Is
Regulation Fair Disclosure Constitutional?, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 42–47, 63 (2005)
(citing, inter alia, Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980)) (discussing securities laws generally and Regulation Fair Disclosure in
particular as being content-based and subject to heightened review); Bruce E. Johnson &
Jeffrey L. Fisher, Why Format, Not Content, Is the Key to Identifying Commercial Speech,
54 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1243, 1253–54 (2004)).
190 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 211 (1985) (White, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., and
Burger, C.J., concurring). The lower court judges agreed. See also SEC v. Lowe, 725 F.2d
892, 906 (2d Cir. 1984) (Brieant, J., dissenting); id. at 895; SEC v. Lowe, 556 F. Supp.
1359, 1371 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The majority in Lowe did not reach the First Amendment
issue.
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registration as a security or commodity issuer/exchange. Under
light touch approaches, narrower restrictions on crypto coin
expression could regulate false but verifiable claims without
suppressing subjective or unverifiable opinions. For example, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) currently regulates misleading
Internet access subscription advertisements or terms under the
light touch approach adopted by the Federal Communications
Commission in 2017 for broadband Internet access regulation.191
The FTC also has the power (although it presently defers to the
ESRB) to regulate misleading claims in the marketing or terms
of video games, email accounts, online marketplaces, and social
media access contracts, without requiring such offerings to be
preregistered with it.192 Similarly, the statutes and common-law
191 See, e.g., Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 17–18, 49–50, 59, 71–72 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (citing In re Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd. 311, ¶ ¶ 1, 4, 18, 152, 209,
217 (2018)); id. at 71–72 (“We do note that antitrust enforcement by the Commission’s
sister agencies (the Department of Justice and the FTC . . . aims at generating and
protecting competition, . . . [which] would tend to multiply the voices in the public
square,” [promote transparency, and give teeth to] “ISP commitments [of open access to
the Internet and minimum quality of service provided to users] backed up by FTC
enforcement . . . .’”) (quoting Restoring Internet Freedom, 33 FCC Rcd., at ¶ 153).
192 See In re Take-Two Interactive Secs. Litig., 551 F. Supp. 2d 247, 263 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (noting FTC investigation of video-game “Easter eggs,” or “hidden” mini-games); St.
Clair Shores Gen. Empl. Ret. Sys. v. Eibeler, No. 06 Civ. 688, 2008 WL 2941174, *3
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2008) (“On July 26, 2005, Take-Two announced that the [FTC] had
commenced an investigation into the advertising for [Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas, a
video game].”); see also Press Release, FTC, FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and
Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on Facebook (July 24, 2019), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-new-privacyrestriction [http://perma.cc/YJ35-CJ2P]; FTC, FILE NO. 092-3184, STATEMENT OF
CHAIRMAN JOE SIMONS AND COMMISSIONERS NOAH JOSHUA PHILLIPS AND CHRISTINE S.
WILSON,
IN
RE
FACEBOOK,
INC.,
3–4
(July
24,
2019),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1536946/092_3184_facebook
_majority_statement_7-24-19.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FRY-QBRB]; Snapchat, Inc., File No.
132-3078,
Docket
No.
C-4501,
8
(F.T.C.
Dec.
23,
2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141231snapchatcmpt.pdf
[http://perma.cc/LJ6Z-TCAJ] (complaint relating to marketing of social media access
contracts); MySpace LLC, File No. 102-3058, Docket No. C-4369, 2012 WL 4101790, *4
(F.T.C. Aug. 30, 2012) (decision and order relating to marketing of social media access
contracts); Facebook, Inc., File No. 092-3184, Case No. 19-cv-2184, Docket No. C-4365, 1–
2,
4
(F.T.C.
Aug.
10,
2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2012/08/120810facebookdo.pdf
[http://perma.cc/BDB9-Q9MY] (decision and order relating to marketing of social media
access contracts); In re Google Inc., 152 F.T.C. 435, 454–55 (2011) (decision and order
relating to marketing of Google social networking service within Gmail); In re Take-Two
Interactive Software, Inc. , 142 FTC. 1, 24–26 (2006) (consent order requiring compliance
with video game marketing standards); In re Microsoft Corp., 134 FTC. 709, 710–12
(2002) (complaint relating to Microsoft Windows operating system marketing); In re
Geocities, 127 FTC. 94, 94, 96–98,123–25 (1999) (decision and order relating to marketing
of website hosting service); Press Release, FTC, Federal Court Finds Amazon Liable for
Billing Parents for Children’s Unauthorized In-App Charges (April 27, 2016),
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/122-3238/amazoncom-inc
[http://perma.cc/B6QT-59XU] (online marketplace); Press Release, FTC, Four National
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principles governing fraud, warranties, fiduciary duties, unjust
enrichment, restitution, and related causes of action provide
robust remedies—including incarceration and punitive damages
far in excess of the remedies the SEC typically seeks—and do not
require every transaction to be registered by a financial elite in
advance.193 In some cases, even counterspeech or public

Retailers Agree to Pay Penalties Totaling $1.26 Million for Allegedly Falsely Labeling
Textiles as Made of Bamboo, While They Were Rayon (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1023132/amazoncom-inc-united-states-america-federal-trade-commission
[http://perma.cc/5PVS-AXE6]; Press Release, FTC, FTC Finalizes Privacy Settlement with
Myspace (Sept. 11, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/1023058/myspace-llc-matter [http://perma.cc/L9QH-WMNV]; Press Release, FTC, Makers of
Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas Settle FTC Charges (June 8, 2006),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2006/06/makers-grand-theft-auto-sanandreas-settle-ftc-charges [http://perma.cc/2PM5-T2AU]; cf. In re Gateway Learning
Corp., 138 FTC. 443, 470 (2004) (decision and order relating to marketing of computer
hardware and bundled software). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2006); FTC Policy
Statement on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 FTC. 110, 174 (1984);
FTC Policy Statement on Unfairness, appended to Int’l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949,
1070 (1984), available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1980/12/ftc-policystatement-unfairness [http://perma.cc/L45E-CG5Y]; Letter from Jessica Rich, Director of
FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, to WhatsApp and Facebook (Apr. 10, 2014),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2014/04/letter-jessica-l-rich-directorfederal-trade-commission-bureau-consumer [http://perma.cc/8L6H-XDGN]; Complaint, In
the
Matter
of
WhatsApp,
Inc.,
(Aug.
29,
2016),
available
at
https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/whatsapp/EPIC-CDD-FTC-WhatsApp-Complaint2016.pdf?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss [http://perma.cc/FT4M-5UWA].
193 See, e.g., Anschutz Corp. v. Merrill Lynch and Co., Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 799, 824
(N.D. Cal. 2011) (after-the-fact negligent misrepresentation claims related to investing
not subject to dismissal under First Amendment despite issues of subjective ratings); Abu
Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 155, 176 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) (similar); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., 580 F. Supp. 2d 630, 639–40 (S.D. Ohio
2008) (after-the-fact negligent misrepresentation claim could be brought against rating
agency, despite First Amendment). The SEC typically seeks a cease-and-desist order,
disgorgement of profits, and sometimes a commitment to issue refunds and/or a ban on
trading or managing public companies. See LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 1054 (2003); see also id. at 1292–93 (punitive damages not available in civil
suits under Exchange Act, although they would be in common-law fraud and deceit
actions); id. at 97, 1239 (punitive damages not available under section 11 of Securities
Act, the cause of action for omission of material facts from a registration statement or a
misstatement of such facts in it). The FTC may seek similar remedies. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45(m), (n), 57b; FTC v. AMG Capital Mgmt., 910 F.3d 417, 428 (9th Cir. 2018)
(affirming $1.27 billion in equitable disgorgement relief in case involving misleading
websites); Press Release, FTC, FTC Approves Final Settlement With Facebook (Aug. 10,
2012),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-finalsettlement-facebook [http://perma.cc/SLQ9-V49A]; FTC, FILE NO. 092-3184, STATEMENT
OF CHAIRMAN JOE SIMONS AND COMMISSIONERS NOAH JOSHUA PHILLIPS AND CHRISTINE S.
WILSON,
IN
RE
FACEBOOK,
INC.,
3–4
(July
24,
2019),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1536946/092_3184_facebook
_majority_statement_7-24-19.pdf [http://perma.cc/2FRY-QBRB]; see generally J. Howard
Beales III & Timothy Muris, Striking the Proper Balance: Redress Under Section 13(b) of
the FTC Act, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 40 (2013); cf. Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Comm.
of the United States of Am. & Nat’l Ret. Fed’n in Supp. of Pet’r, AMG Cap. Mgmt. v. FTC,
910 F.3d 417 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 19-508) http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/amg-
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education efforts may be deemed adequate multi-stakeholder
alternatives to harsh penalties for proven falsehoods.194 The
availability of such alternatives to prior restraints and
difficult-to-satisfy preregistration requirements establishes a less
restrictive means to regulate ICO speech under the First
Amendment.
Regulation of commercial speech by means of keeping the
public in ignorance of developments in a field of applied science
or other commerce fails First Amendment scrutiny when less
restrictive but equally or more effective regulations of conduct
are available.195 For example, the Supreme Court has struck
down, because less restrictive means of regulation were
available, certain prohibitions on the promotion of products and
solicitation of new clients relating to prescriptions for
“compounded drugs.”196 Rather than enforced ignorance of
products that may not violate the law in itself—in this case, an
offer of compounded drugs—Congress should have directly
regulated the prescription of such drugs to patients who do not
need them or who might be harmed by them, either in isolation
or as combined with their other medications.197 Similarly, the
First Amendment makes it unconstitutional to ban
advertisements or labels that reference the low price or high
alcohol content of beer or spirits.198 Although this ban might

capital-management-llc-v-federal-trade-commission/
[http://perma.cc/XX79-PMYH]
(arguing against broad restitutionary powers of FTC as statutory and constitutional
matter); Berin Szóka & Geoffrey Manne, The Federal Trade Commission: Restoring
Congressional Oversight of the Second National Legislature (2016), available at
http://docs.house.gov/meet-ings/IF/IF17/20160524/104976/HHRG-114-IF17-WstateManneG-20160524-SD004.pdf [http://perma.cc/W9KG-89RW] (exploring and ultimately
criticizing scope of FTC’s remedial powers).
194 Thus, in Alvarez, the less restrictive means available to regulators trying to
preserve the incentive or expressive purposes of the military medal and honors systems
was to public a database of confirmed awardees and their medals or honors. United States
v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 735 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
195 See, e.g., Ibanez v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. & Pro. Regul., 512 U.S. 136, 152 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“States may not completely ban potentially misleading
commercial speech if narrower limitations can ensure that the information is presented in
a nonmisleading manner.”); cf. Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 176 F.3d 1132, 1139–41
(9th Cir. 2000) (speech on cryptography, including distribution of executable code,
protected by First Amendment from export controls that unconstitutionally operated as
prior restraint).
196 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 366, 375–76 (2002). But see id. at
382–83 (Breyer, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., Stevens, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the risk that patients will take “untested” compounds, which due to new
drug combinations, differing absorption rates, or other factors “can, for some patients,
mean infection, serious side effects, or even death”).
197 Thompson, 535 U.S. at 374–75 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumers Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
198 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 505–08 (citing Rubin v. Coors
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reduce alcohol abuse and implicitly subsidize alternatives like
water or fruit juice, directly regulating the price or alcohol
percentage of a beverage is a less restrictive and potentially more
effective alternative to compelled ignorance of available options
at alcohol retailers.199 For these reasons, a regulation’s
relationship to the underlying governmental interest should not
be indirect, immaterial, speculative, or disproportionate.200
Assuming that a form of rational basis review applies, the
path towards a First Amendment defense to ICO or appcoin
registration or other requirements will be more difficult.201
Regulators or prosecutors are citing abuses to crack down on
ICOs, as China, New York, and other jurisdictions are doing, in
order to protect consumers from harm, banks from unfair
competition, or investors and non-investors alike from
instability.202 Even as a “preventative” criminal statute triggered
by speech, the Supreme Court might uphold it as advancing
“urgent” national interests in consumer protection.203 The impact
on speech of regulating the conduct would be incidental and the

Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995)).
199 Id.
200 See Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 143–44 (quoting Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993))
(speculation and conjecture insufficient basis to invoke governmental interest in First
Amendment context); United States v. Caronia, 703 F.3d 149, 165–66 (2d Cir. 2012)
(promotion of off-label drug use could lead to patient injury, medical malpractice, and civil
claims for negligence, it may not be restrained simply due to these potential harms if true
and non-misleading under First Amendment); cf. Amarin Pharma, Inc. v. FDA, 119 F.
Supp. 3d 196, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he FDA's concern that future events may one day
make [a promotional] claim misleading cannot justify treating [a] presently true and nonmisleading statement as if it were unprotected speech.”).
201 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (explaining
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions” typically need
only “rest[ ] upon some rational basis.”); see also Expressions Hair Design v.
Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1152 (Breyer, J., concurring) (contending that this
precedent should apply to a regulation of how a business describes its prices and services
to purchasers).
202 See Franklin R. Edwards et al., Crypto Assets Require Better Regulation:
Statement of the Financial Economists Roundtable on Crypto Assets, 75 FIN. ANALYSTS J.
14, 15 (2019) (emphasizing these risks in call for better regulation of ICOs and cryptoexchanges like Coinbase); Kelvin FK Low & Ernie Teo, Bitcoins and Other
Cryptocurrencies as Property?, 9 LAW, INNOVATION & TECH. 235, 253–54 (2017)
(describing risk that consumers will suffer cyberthefts measured in tens or hundreds of
millions of dollars on unregulated cryptocurrency exchanges like Mt. Gox or Ethereum
blockchain); Christian Rueckert, Cryptocurrencies and Fundamental Rights, 5 J.
CYBERSECURITY 1, 4 (2019); Daniel Folkinshteyn & Mark Lennon, Braving Bitcoin: A
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) Analysis, 18 J. INFO. TECH. CASE & APPLICATION
RSCH. 220, 226 (2016) (arguing that after traditional financial institutions lobbied for
them, New York’s regulations had “their desired effect of causing many bitcoin businesses
to pull out of New York State altogether”) (internal citations omitted).
203 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2010).
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speech offering a prohibited transaction could be prohibited
alongside the transaction itself.204
Contemporary commercial speech doctrine does not, in my
view, support a rational basis review of the requirement that a
registration statement is required before a crypto coin may be
offered via a white paper, website, or social media account.
Section 5 of the Securities Act205 does not simply mandate that
coin promoters disclose “purely factual and uncontroversial
information,” like the address of a law office or the names and
bar affiliations of its partners.206 Instead, unless an exemption
applies, it requires years of audited income and cash flow
statements that have a contested and arguably speculative
application to tokens such as Bitcoin.207 Thus, a law requiring a
204 See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1150–51 (observing that if a law
regulated the price of a sandwich, it would regulate the speech announcing or evidencing
the price of the sandwich, but holding that a “law’s effect on speech [may] be only
incidental to its primary effect on conduct, and ‘it has never been deemed an abridgment
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the
conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed’”) (quoting Rumsfeld v. F. for Acad. & Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006)).
205 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
206 See Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1152–53 (Breyer, J., concurring)
(suggesting that a statute that required a merchant to disclose its respective cash and
credit-card prices for the same good or service would require such a disclosure of
uncontroversial information) (citing Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
207 See Eric M. Sherbet, Bridging the GAAP: Accounting Standards for Foreign SEC
Registrants, 29 INT’L L. 875, 880 (1995); Michael Vignone, Inside Equity-Based
Crowdfunding: Online Financing Alternatives for Small Businesses, 91 CHI. KENT L. REV.
803, 822 (2016). Exemptions may limit the amount of value that circulates via the token
by classifying such value as issued securities. 17 C.F.R. §§ 200, 227, 232 (1998) (onemillion-dollar limit within certain twelve-month periods). An exemption for securities
offered outside the United States may be placed at risk if there are resales back to
persons in the United States. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 249 (1998). Another exemption for
private placements may not be suited to publicly available crypto coins. See 15 U.S.C. §
77d(a)(2) (exempting transactions by issuers not involving a public offering); SEC,
Facilitating Capital Formation and Expanding Investment Opportunities by Improving
Access to Capital in Private Markets, Release No. 33-10763 (proposed Mar. 4, 2020); SEC,
Concept Release on Harmonization of Securities Offering, 84 Fed. Reg. 30, 460 (proposed
June
18,
2019),
http://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2019/33-10649.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3VHN-YG8G]. Regarding whether crypto coins can comply with SEC
regulatory requirements, it is noteworthy that many of them—perhaps hundreds—may
not have traditional operating profits at the time of launch; Bitcoin, Ether, Telegram, and
Kik, for example, strained to avoid being classified as passive investments whereby token
purchasers obtain shares in a traditional profit-making business, instead creating
foundations and emphasizing tokens’ use cases or non-transferability. See, e.g., Defs.’ Br.
in Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. Judg., at 6–12, 14–15, Telegram; Defs.’ Answer, at 9–16,
41–100, 121, SEC v. Kik Interactive, Inc., No. 19-cv-5244 (S.D.N.Y. answer filed Aug. 6,
2019) (hundreds of coins, and Kik’s case); Wells Submission of Kik Interactive, Inc. at 17–
26, No. 19-cv-05244 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); In re Kik Interactive, No. HO-13388 (SEC Div. of
Enf’t., brief filed Nov. 16, 2018) (similar); Hinman, supra note 155; infra note 238 (noting
heavy burden of applying accounting standards to crypto coins); infra note 338 (tokens
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gas station to disclose a cash price of $2.99 for a gallon of regular
unleaded gasoline alongside a credit-card price of $3.19 merely
requires the credit-card price to be revealed, and “would not
hinder the transmission of information to the public.”208 Strictly
applying Section 5 of the Securities Act and Section 12(g) of the
Exchange Act to crypto coins would hinder speech relating to
them because, as explained below, such coins are frequently not
amenable to traditional metrics of profitability, managerial
control, and expectation of success.
Requiring pre-registration of all token offerings undermines
a primary function of the First Amendment: “To require a
censorship through license which makes impossible the free and
unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart
of constitutional guarantees.”209 Like the restriction on
pharmaceutical effectiveness claims that have not been cleared
with the FDA, an outright restriction on non-registered claims
regarding crypto coin use cases or potential value is clearly
unconstitutional.210 Even someone with a criminal record should
have the right to publish ideas that could become potential
investments via a newsletter or its contemporary internet
equivalent.211 Like a restriction on federal employees from
receiving pay for speaking on topics on which they have
expertise, a pre-registration requirement for ICO and AppCoin
white papers would chill the formulation and growth of
expression, while other regulations with lesser impacts on speech
were available.212

feel they must break law).
208 Expressions Hair Design, 137 S. Ct. at 1153 (Breyer, J., concurring).
209 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939).
210 See Lars Noah, Off-Label Drug Promotion and the First Amendment, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE 239, 251 (2014) (arguing that a “blanket prohibition on any statements
concerning off-label uses sweeps broadly to prevent the dissemination of information even
if it is presented in an entirely truthful and nonmisleading way . . . would strike First
Amendment scholars as at least mildly perplexing, if not blatantly unconstitutional”)
(citing, inter alia, Wash. Legal Found. v. Henney, 51 F. Supp. 2d 81, 83–87 (D.D.C. 1999),
vacated in part, 202 F.3d 331 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
211 Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 235 (1985) (White, J., concurring in the result) (person
with criminal record should not be banned from advising others as to propriety of
investments via a newsletter, because such a regulation would be contrary to the Court’s
“commercial speech cases [which] have consistently rejected . . . drastic prohibitions on
speech” even if justified by preventing “fraudulent” claims) (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S.
626); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S.
350, 384 (1977).
212 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 476 (1995); Ned
Snow, Content-Based Copyright Denial, 90 IND. L.J. 1473, 1481 (2015) (“The facts and
reasoning of National Treasury seem to imply that Congress may not deny copyright to
content creators. Denying copyright could be viewed as a denial of compensation for
speech, where property rights in expression (i.e., a copyright) would represent a form of
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It is not sufficient to say that advertisements or professional
speech must be subject to some kind of legal oversight.213 Rather,
courts consider whether the mode of advertisement or solicitation
can overbear the will of the recipient, rendering the recipient
unable or unwilling to simply discard or ignore the contents.214
Absent that kind of overpowering solicitation, the less restrictive
alternative of remedying fraudulent crypto coin or other product
offerings after the fact, shows that penalizing unregistered
speech relating to the utility or value of crypto coins is
disproportionate and unconstitutional.215

compensation. Under National Treasury, . . . [Congress may not] chill speech before it
ever happened.”) (citing National Treasury, 513 U.S. 454).
213 Cf. Bhagwat, supra note 45, at 839–40.
214 See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n., 486 U.S. 466, 474–76 (1988) (noting that an
advertisement from a lawyer, unlike an ongoing attorney-client relationship, “can readily
be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or discarded,” so the relevant inquiry is
not whether advertisements harm “potential clients” but rather “whether the mode of
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility”);
see also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 637–40 (1995) (arguing that under
Shapero, direct mail solicitations of clients within thirty days of their accidents may serve
a “legitimate purpose” and recipients may simply throw them in the trash if they are not
useful or helpful).
215 See, e.g., Shapero, 486 U.S. at 468, 476 (ban on “soliciting legal business for
pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to
face particular legal problems” unconstitutional because less restrictive means existed:
punishing “actual abuses” or “isolated abuses of mistakes,” and requiring filing of all
solicitations with the bar or other regulator for investigative and information-gathering
purposes related to such prosecutions and punishments); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 201–02
(noting overbearing or inherently misleading advertising may be banned, but truthful
advertising of legal services may not be prohibited by state bars that could punish
“inaccurate” solicitations plagued by major “omissions;” “‘the preferred remedy is more
disclosure, rather than less’”) (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 375); Went For It, 515 U.S. at
641–43 (Kennedy, J., joined by Stevens, J., Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(objecting to “wild disproportion” of relatively narrow regulation on solicitation of legal
business of accident victims within thirty days of accident, and emphasizing a less
restrictive alternative that when a client “enters into a contract with an attorney and
later regrets it, Florida, like some other States, allows clients to rescind certain contracts
with attorneys within a stated time after they are executed”); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20 (1978) (finding the Court has held that “a lawyer who
engages in solicitation as a form of protected political association generally may not be
disciplined without proof of actual wrongdoing that the State constitutionally may
proscribe.”); id. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(while “misrepresentation” may occur in attorney solicitation, its prevention is among the
“concededly legitimate interests [that] might well be served by more specific and less
restrictive rules than a total ban on pecuniary solicitation”); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,
438–39 (1978) (imposing ethical discipline on attorney who solicits client—in furtherance
of right of free association—violates the First Amendment unless there is actual
misconduct). But see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 456, 461, 464 (upholding “prophylactic” ban on
in-person solicitation which might, among other evils, be misleading, even though
presumably such “misrepresentation” could be punished after it actually occurs).

Do Not Delete

450

5/17/2021 12:06 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

C. International Law Perspectives on Freedom of Expression
Human rights law recognizes the right of everyone “to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art,
or through any other media of his choice.”216 The Human Rights
Committee—which is empowered to opine to signatories to a core
human-rights convention as to the scope of the right to seek and
impart ideas in the media—maintains that such infringements
must be “provided by law,” and must be necessary “for respect of
the rights or reputations of others” or “for the protection of
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.”217 Preregistration of crypto coin speech is of
doubtful necessity to protect the rights of others, which could be
protected by a variety of other means including FTC cease and
desist orders and disgorgement of profits, civil litigation for fraud
or other torts with the prospect of class actions and punitive
damages, and criminal prosecution for a variety of fraud-related
offenses.
Human rights law also recognizes the right to hold an
opinion, and this is seen as so fundamental that it is “a right to
which the Covenant permits no exception or restriction.”218 The
UN expert on the freedom of expression, David Kaye, announced
in 2018 that his office sees “laws or arrangements” that “require
the ‘proactive’ monitoring or filtering of content” as conflicting
with the free expression norm against “prepublication
censorship.”219 He objected that “restriction of user-generated
content before its publication subjects users to restrictions on
freedom of expression without prior judicial review of the
legality, necessity and proportionality of such restrictions.”220
Any disproportionate or unjustified restrictions on the freedom of
expression violate the right to speak and communicate ideas
recognized under human-rights law.221
216 G.A. Res. 14668, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19 pt. 2
(Dec. 19, 1966).
217 Id. at pt. 3.
218 U.N. OHCHR, 102d Sess., General Comment No. 34, art. 19 ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34,
9 (Sept. 12, 2011); see also Letter from the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression to European Commission, at 3 (June 13, 2018),
https://spcommreports.ohchr.org/TMResultsBase/DownLoadPublicCommunicationFile?gId=23907
[http://perma.cc/GZB9-QJ4G].
219 Letter from Special Rapporteur, supra note 218, at 6 (quoting Human Rights
Council, Report of the Spec. Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye, A/HRC/38/35, ¶ 67).
220 Id. at 7.
221 See Eric Barendt, Freedom of Expression in the United Kingdom Under the
Human Rights Act 1998, 84 IND. L.J. 851, 862 (2009) (finding that under ECHR Art.
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Regional as well as universal human-rights treaties protect
the right to earn a living and choose one’s occupation.222 They
also protect the freedom of association, which frequently and by
tradition includes the exchange of funds as dues, as well as the
freedom of expression including the right to share ideas by any
media regardless of national frontiers.223 As Christian Rueckert
explains, there is a human right to build crypto coin ecosystems:
When a message is transmitted or information is embedded in the
blockchain using a transaction of bitcoins, [for example], this
transaction clearly falls within the scope of the right to freedom of
expression and information. . . . Persons who provide software as an
infrastructure for the transfer of information can also invoke the right
to freedom of expression and information. This follows from the Pirate
Bay decision of the [European Court of Human Rights] where the
Court decided that providers of a file-sharing website can rely on Art.
10 [of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms]. . . . [A]ny restriction of the Bitcoin protocol’s development
and any regulatory guideline for developers interfere[s] with their
right to freedom of expression.224

Like the securities laws and the other laws analyzed below,
the freedom of expression may not protect the utterance of false
facts, even in noncommercial speech—although nations may have
more leeway to prevent misleading advertisements.225 Some
10(2), when a law limiting a right is “disproportionate and [not] justified by relevant and
sufficient reasons” it gives rise to a “strong presumption” that the right should be
protected) (citing [European] Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, art. 10, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230).
222 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2016 O.J. (C 202)
7.6.2016 at art. 15 ¶ 1; Rueckert, supra note 202, at 7–8; see also G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 ¶ 1, adopted and opened for
signature, ratification, and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976); Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to The American
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
“Protocol of San Salvador”, at art. 6, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-52.html
[http://perma.cc/4LU8-6MJF]; Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented
Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, at 36 (Sept. 17,
2003); Hugh Collins, The Impact of Human Rights Law on Contract Law in Europe, 22
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 429 (2011); Michael Ramsden & Luke Marsh, The ‘Right to Work’ of
Refugees in Hong Kong: MA v. Director of Immigration, 25 INT’L J. OF REF. L. 574, 582,
584–85 (2013).
223 See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 222, at
arts. 10 ¶ 1, 12 ¶ 1; Rueckert, supra note 202, at 8–9.
224 Rueckert, supra note 202, at 9 (citing European Court of Human Rights, Fredrik
Neij and Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi (The Pirate Bay) v. Sweden, No. 40397/12.Ret (13 Mar.
2013), ¶ 11.27; Lorna Woods, Article 11: Freedom of Expression and Information, in THE
EU CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 311–340 (Steve Peers, Tamara
Hervey, Jeff Kenner, & Angela Ward eds., 2014)).
225 See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456, 461, 464 (1978) (upholding
“prophylactic” ban on in-person solicitation which might, among other evils, be
misleading). But see Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., concurring) (observing that
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incorrect factual statements, however, are inevitable in all
domains and may fall within the freedom of expression.226
IV. REGULATING MISLEADING EXPRESSIONS WHILE
DEREGULATING “ECOSYSTEM SPEECH”
One must distinguish commercial speech that makes an “easily
verifiable” claim from speech that is subjective, quasi-political, or
based on optimistic projections.227 Under the Central Hudson test,
the “State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the
asserted state interest, . . . nor can it completely suppress
information when narrower restrictions on expression would serve
its interest as well.”228 There is a real danger, as explained above,
that speech relating to crypto coins as an alternative to traditional
ways of conducting e-commerce or buying software will be
completely banned.229 Requiring pre-registration of crypto white
papers in this way strikes at the heart of the First Amendment.
That is because all “sanctions on the publication of truthful
information of public concern” threaten “the core purposes of the
First Amendment.”230
blanket requirement that solicitation not be done in person could be unconstitutional in
certain circumstances, such as those in In re Primus).
226 See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 10 ¶ 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 230; Rueckert, supra note 202, at 9
(citing GRABENWARTER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2014)).
227 Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1976).
228 Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565
(1980); see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (“[I]f the
Government could achieve its interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that
restricts less speech, the Government must do so.”); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island,
517 U.S. 484, 507 (1996) (plurality opinion) (holding the state law ban on advertising the
price of alcoholic beverages invalid under the First Amendment because “alternative
forms of regulation that would not involve any restriction on speech,” such as counterspeech/education or taxation or limitation of sale of aggregate alcohol content per
container or per consumer, might have been successful); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514
U.S. 476, 490–91 (1995) (finding law restricting advertising alcohol content of beer was
invalid as suppression of information that would be less effective than “directly limiting
the alcohol content of beers”); Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 373 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (striking down regulation and stating: “Without any evidence that alternatives
would be less effective, we still cannot say that the restriction here is narrowly tailored.”).
229 While some companies could file for registration with the SEC and/or CFTC and
sell their tokens, the decentralized establishment and circulation of tokens by poorly
funded, widely dispersed financial amateurs might make the typical crypto coin virtually
impossible to launch under a restrictive securities or commodities law regime. See infra
notes 250, 337.
230 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533–34 (2001); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
565 (government may not “completely suppress information when narrower restrictions on
expression would serve its interest as well.”) (emphasis added); Geoffrey Miller, The SEC as
Censor: Is Banning an Investment Newsletter a Prior Restraint of the Press?, 11 PREVIEW OF
THE U.S. SUP. CT. CASES 243, 243 (1985) (“The First Amendment . . . prohibits the government
from unreasonably interfering with people’s ability to communicate . . . through speech. It
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Regulation of securities may do no violence to the First
Amendment if it is not targeted at speech or if such targeting is
“necessary to achieve the goals of federal securities laws.”231 Still,
in framing regulations of software (and internet) speech,
Congress, the states, the courts, and administrative agencies
attempt to differentiate speech that governments regard as
harmful from other speech that should be lawful.232 They have
drawn distinctions that support the conclusion, among others,
that writing the Bitcoin or Ether white papers and launching
these foundational crypto coins did not violate the Securities Act
or amount to fraudulent activity. Similar distinctions are drawn
in implementing other laws governing advertising, commerce,
and commercial speech. Accordingly, this Part surveys federal
and state law for distinctions and doctrines relevant to
misleading ICO/AppCoin speech.
A. The Governmental Interest in Regulating Coin-Founding Speech
The governmental interest in preventing fraud and regulating
professional conduct or complex economic systems is often said to be
substantial and even compelling.233 Yet there is a reduced public
interest in regulating vague boasts and wild-eyed boosterism.
Throughout the law, legislatures and adjudicators tend to
distinguish between vague or optimistic statements about oneself or
one’s enterprise, and statements of existing or recent fact that could
be verified as being true or false. This distinction supports statutory
and constitutional principles embodying light-touch regulatory
regimes, including principles of the law of federal securities fraud,
securities registration and disclosure requirements, false

limits the power of the government to regulate the flow of information among individuals.”).
231 Page & Yang, supra note 189, at 7 n.26 (quoting Regulation of Communications
among Shareholders, Release Nos. 34–31, 326, IC-19031, 57 Fed. Reg. 48,276 (Oct. 22,
1992)).
232 The agencies on which this Part will focus include the SEC and the FTC.
233 See, e.g., Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns. of Super. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 657–58 (1985) (substantial interest in preventing deception with reasonable
regulation); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978) (finding a
“particularly strong” interest in “protecting consumers and regulating commercial
transactions,” and “a special responsibility for maintaining standards among members of
the licensed professions”); SEC v. Wall Street Pub., 851 F.2d 365, 373–74 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(suggesting that government interest in preventing misleading statements about
securities was either unquestionable or substantial enough under Zauderer); cf. Janus v.
Am. Fed’n of State & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2465–66 (2018) (peaceful
relations between unions and management even in public employers is a compelling
interest); Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)
(consumer “welfare” a “‘substantial’ governmental interest’”).
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advertising of goods or services, common-law fraud, and products
liability.234
Crypto white papers tend to focus on projections and puffery.
In that, they are similar to relatively unregulated provision of
information in both securities law and in other fields, including
over-the-top self-promotion, honest if flawed optimism about the
future, subjective comparisons of securities or commodities,
search-engine results or other rankings, and the creation of
economies in virtual worlds.235 Depending on how the SEC
conducts its enforcement and public-education campaigns, the
law’s solicitude for puffery will either buttress its regulatory
forbearance, or stand in contrast to its potential overreaching.
B. Traditional Legal Principles Governing Optimistic Statements
1. The Securities Act and Exchange Act
Federal courts have concluded that cryptocurrencies could
fall under the regulatory purview of the SEC under the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, as well as under other
investment-related laws.236 Moreover, the ABA wants states to
follow New York’s lead in purporting to impose prior restraints
on persons handling “virtual currencies.”237 Such laws, however,
threaten to make most cryptocurrency speech unlawful as it has
234 See TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 31, at ch. 11 (observing that numerous
legal scholars argue for a light touch approach to blockchain); supra note 34 (citing
authorities on status of information services under communications law); infra notes 323,
325, 340 (citing treatment of puffery and forward-looking statements in securities law,
puffery in false advertising and fraud law, etc.).
235 See, e.g., supra note 116; cf. VILI LEHDONVIRTA & EDWARD CASTRONOVA, VIRTUAL
ECONOMIES: DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 96 (2014) (suggesting that certain sales of Facebook
Credits by users to Facebook Platform developers, and even more marketplace sales of
Linden dollars, a virtual currency in a virtual world, are unregulated); Iviane Ramos de
Luna et al., Analysis of a Mobile Payment Scenario: Key Issues and Perspectives, in
IMPACT OF MOBILE SERVICES ON BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND E-COMMERCE 22, 27
(Francisco Liébana et al. eds., 2019) (stating that European Central Bank regards
Facebook Credits and virtual world currencies as unregulated virtual currencies).
236 See, e.g., Press Release, Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree
to Register Tokens as Securities, supra note 8.
237 Chino v. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin. Servs., No. 101880/2015, slip op. 51908(U) (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Dec. 21, 2017) (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.1 et seq.,
noting that it requires filing lists of "the identity and physical address of parties to
transactions,” current financial statements, official background checks, verification of tax
status of every applicant's household or business, fingerprints, etc., and holding that
plaintiff had failed to file a cognizable challenge to its constitutionality); Plaintiff’s
Amended and Verified Complaint and Article 78 Petition, Chino v. N.Y. Dep’t of Fin.
Servs., No. 101880/2015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty. complaint filed May 25, 2017)
(challenging constitutionality of BitLicense regime, which allegedly drove out of business
a service intending to provide computers and services needed to process cryptocurrencies
at delis and bodegas).
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historically been articulated and structured. The cost of reporting
financial results with the SEC under the Exchange Act is more
than most coins could bear, and it is unclear how Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles apply to Ether or Bitcoin, not to
mention other coins with artificial intelligence or social media
integration.238 In other countries, notably China and South
Korea,
regulation
drove
much
crypto
coin
activity
underground.239
The principles of American consumer and investor protection
law provide a basis for regulating misleading ICO promotions
after the fact and only as to provably false factual claims, as
opposed to punishing mere failures to register in advance. The
SEC and CFTC initially took a somewhat hands-off approach to
crypto coins, warning that transactions in them could satisfy the
Howey test and the definition of capital gains, etc., but not
pursuing enforcement actions in 99% or 99.9% of cases that their
announcements might justify.240 The SEC Chairman has referred

238 See Justin Cooke, Jason Denisenko & Richard Cohen, Initial Coin Offerings: A
Comparative Overview of Securities Regulatory Environments in the US, UK and Asia
Pacific, Allen & Overy, in BLOCKCHAIN & CRYPTOCURRENCY REGULATION 2019 (Josias
Dewey ed., Rory Smith, 1st ed. 2019), (“The extensive ongoing reporting and other
obligations that accompany Exchange Act registration would prove far too burdensome for
the typical ICO issuer.”). Since 2003, the use of Generally Accepted Accounting Standards
has become more mandatory, with fewer available exceptions even for truthful departures
from them. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 228.10–229.10 (2020); Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP
Financial Measures, Securities Act Release No. 8176, Exchange Act Release No. 47, 226,
68 Fed. Reg. 4,820 (Jan. 30, 2003).
239 See Emily Parker, Can China Contain Bitcoin?, MIT TECH. REV. (Dec. 11, 2017),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609320/can-china-contain-bitcoin
[http://perma.cc/7D3W-M49X]; Elaine Ramirez, Crazy For Cryptocurrency: Why South
Koreans
Are
Risking
It
All,
FORBES
(Aug.
2,
2017,
1:28
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/elaineramirez/2017/08/02/crazy-for-cryptocurrency-whysouth-koreans-are-risking-it-all-on-ethereum/ [http://perma.cc/CWN6-9ZKL]; cf. Steven
Russolillo & Eun-Young Jeong, South Korea’s Cryptocurrency Crackdown Isn’t Stopping
This Bitcoin Exchange’s Launch, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 22, 2018, 5:25 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/south-koreas-cryptocurrency-crackdown-isnt-stopping-thisbitcoin-exchanges-launch-1516616723 [http://perma.cc/NE3J-SQCW].
240 See Letter from Llew Claasen, Exec. Dir., Bitcoin Found., to Uniform Law
Commission San Diego Meeting (July 14, 2017) (noting early federal consensus that
blockchain
innovation
typified
by
Bitcoin
should
continue),
https://www.scribd.com/document/353781110/07-14-2017-Letter-to-ULC-RegardingVirtual-Currencies [http://perma.cc/8X33-Q2A8]; Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Testimony
on “Oversight of the U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n” (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.sec.gov
[http://perma.cc/FN4T-PZN7] (suggesting that SEC enforcement activity on unregistered
digital token sales began in 2017, long after such sales began, and did not target
promoters of Bitcoin or Ethereum, two of the largest token ecosystems, in first two years);
see also Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Subject Matter Jurisdiction &
Vagueness at 22, United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL 4346339
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018); Angela Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial
Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational Risk, 18 NYU J. LEGISL. PUB. POL’Y 837,
891 (2015).
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to a period of educating ICO promoters being followed by a period
of suing or prosecuting them.241 Famously, SEC guidance relating
to the DAO affair indicated that digital token investment
schemes may be unregistered offerings of securities.242 The SEC
has sued several firms for unregistered ICOs and obtained
consent decrees or injunctions against many, perhaps most, of
them, as well as a short criminal sentence in one egregious
case.243 Moreover, the CFTC warned of pump and dump practices
in crypto markets, which is a manipulative device in connection
with the sale of a security or a commodity.244
The Supreme Court has recognized a critical distinction
between fraud in an investment offering versus a non-”investment”
fraud, which would not be securities fraud.245 Thus, many
See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 240.
See, e.g., SEC Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 8; Brief of SEC in Support of United States in
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, at 11-17, United States v.
Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2019) (discussing DAO report). See also
Zaslavskiy, No. CR-647(S-1), slip op. at 1 (S.D.N.Y. sentence imposed Nov. 18, 2019)
(resulting in SEC obtaining a sentence of incarceration of eighteen months, plus
restitution).
243 See, e.g., SEC v. Titanium Blockchain Infrastructure Servs. Inc., No. CV18-4315DSF, slip op. at § III (C.D. Cal. May 30, 2018), subsequent proceedings at (C.D. Cal.
consent judgment filed May 23, 2019) (injunction against offering unregistered token as
security); SEC v. PlexCorps, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206145 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2017)
(finding SEC likely to be able to show that “PlexCoin Tokens” were securities that need to
be registered); SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 4652121, at *1, *10 (E.D. Tex.
Sept. 18, 2014) (investigating the SEC’s stated claim against promoter of Bitcoins Savings
& Trust for selling unregistered securities, although promoter did not seem to have own
coin or token); Press Release, Two ICO Issuers Settle SEC Registration Charges, Agree to
Register Tokens as Securities, supra note 8; Press Release, SEC Obtains Emergency
Order Halting Fraudulent Coin Offering Scheme, supra note 8; Press Release, SEC
Suspends Trading in Three Issuers Claiming Involvement in Cryptocurrency and
Blockchain Technology, supra note 8.
244 Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Issues First Pumpand-Dump Virtual Currency Customer Advisory CFTC Warns Customers to Avoid Pumpand-Dump Schemes (Feb. 15, 2018); see also Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, CFTC Staff Issues Consumer Advisory on Digit. Tokens (July 16, 2018)
(“Beware Virtual Currency Pump-and-Dump Schemes highlights virtual currency pumpand-dump schemes that occur in the largely unregulated cash market for virtual
currencies and digital tokens, and typically on platforms that offer a wide array of coin
pairings for traders to buy and sell.”); Oscar Williams-Grut, ‘Market Manipulation 101’:
‘Wolf of Wall Street’-Style ‘Pump and Dump’ Scams Plague Cryptocurrency Markets, BUS.
INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/ico-cryptocurrencypump-and-dump-telegram-2017-11?op=1
[http://perma.cc/N8Z9-5U7W]
(“Traders
artificially inflate the price of small cryptocurrencies with the hope of making a quick
profit . . .”). A pump and dump scheme traditionally involved the purchase of stock, the
false touting of it online or elsewhere, and then its dumping or sale at the resulting
inflated price. See SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v.
Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124, 1128 n.2 (10th Cir. 2013); Schnell v. Conseco, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d
438, 441, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Hoke, Exchange Act Release No. 16266, 1999 WL 670961
(Aug. 30, 1999); United States v. Hoke, Dock. 99-CR-411-ALL (C.D. Cal. 1999).
245 See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990) (“Congress did not . . . ‘intend
241
242
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investments that are offered to others do not need to be registered
as securities, including business and law partnerships and sales of
businesses, software licenses useful in making the licensee’s
business more profitable, contracts to sell or lease items which the
investor continues to control, union pension fund investments,
condominiums and housing cooperatives, and certificates of deposit
to earn a fixed interest rate on capital delivered to a bank—any
fraud preceding such deals would not be fraud in connection with
the sale of a “security” or “investment contract.”246 When an

to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud.’”) (quoting Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455
U.S. 551, 556 (1982)).
246 See Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557 n.5 (explaining that for purposes of securities
fraud action, a certificate of deposit did not qualify as a “certificate of deposit, for a
security” under Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10), even though the plaintiff invested
such a certificate in a slaughterhouse and retail meat-market refers, because a “certificate
of deposit, for a security” traditionally refers to instruments issued “in the course of
corporate reorganizations”); Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
& Helpers of Am. v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 561–62 (1979) (indicating that entitlement to
benefits paid under union pension fund whose size would be affected by success of fund’s
investments was not a “security” or “investment contract” under SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946)); United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 845, 858–59
(1975) (stating that “shares” in a nonprofit housing cooperative are not “securities” or
“investment contracts” under Securities Act/Exchange Act); SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc.,
408 F.3d 727, 732–33 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding that investments in payphone
leasing and placement business would only be securities if investors “retained minimal
control over the telephones”); Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 731–32 (9th Cir. 1988)
(suggesting that investments in general partnership are not put into a security or
“investment contract” when partners control enterprise using their voting rights and have
access to information about partnership affairs otherwise than through protections of
SEC filing requirements); Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir. 1984) (“An
investment contract or interest may still be classed as a security even if the investor is
required to perform some duties, as long as those duties are ‘nominal or limited and would
have little direct effect upon receipt by the participants of the benefits promised by the
promoters.’”) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that joint venturers or partners may not buy securities or investment contracts
when their “powers” are “real one[s] which they are in fact capable of exercising”); Odom
v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (similar to Williamson); Lino v.
City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 691–93 (3d Cir. 1973) (concluding that even when
promoters contact investors to sell them franchises, franchises created by such sales are
not securities when investors work to make the franchises profitable); Rivanna Trawlers
Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1378, 1383 (W.D. Va. 1986) (“In
determining whether a partnership or joint venture comes under the securities law,
courts have considered the powers that the investors or partners are legally entitled to,
rather than what powers they exercised or expected to exercise” and “courts have
uniformly refused to define investments as securities in cases where ‘the power retained
by the investors is a real one which they are in fact capable of exercising . . . ’”) (quoting
Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419); Cryptocurrencies: Oversight of New Assets in the Digital
Age: Hearing Before the Comm. on Agric., 115th Cong. 70 (2018) (statement of Lowell D.
Ness, Managing Partner, Perkins Coie LLP) (“Ongoing software updates and upgrades
constitute ongoing efforts of others under Howey, but they are not likely to rise to the
requisite level of efforts to form an investment contract.”); Debevoise & Plimpton, A
Securities Law Framework for Blockchain Tokens, COINBASE 20, 22 (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://www.coinbase.com/legal/securities-law-framework.pdf
[http://perma.cc/AEL9ZBG3] (indicating that licenses of software should not be treated as security, because
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investor continues to control the business in which he or she
invests, as with a franchise of a national restaurant or retail chain
that uses standard layouts or recipes, he or she may not purchase a
security or investment control because the franchisor or other
business partner is not in complete control.247 In the case of union
pension funds, it is not a typical “investment” to labor under a
collective bargaining agreement that calls for a share of one’s
compensation to be diverted into a pension whose funds are
invested for profit.248 With respect to condominiums and housing
cooperatives, they are not securities when they are not marketed
based “solely by the prospects of a return,” because units may be
used for household purposes even though any shares in units and
common areas may also be flipped for large profits.249
Crypto coin corporations are arguing in several pending
lawsuits that because their token actually operates as a currency,
it is excluded from the definition of security by statute.250 The
Exchange Act states that a security or investment contract, by
definition, “shall not include currency.”251 To the extent that a
crypto coin is useful in payments, just like euros and to a greater
extent some foreign currencies (those of Venezuela or Zimbabwe,
for example), this exemption should apply.
A narrowing construction of “security” would be appropriate
in view of the principle of statutory construction known as
noscitur a sociis, and perhaps also the one known as ejusdem
generis, at least when it comes to crypto coins that are not
marketed as shares of stock or securities using those precise
words. The principle of noscitur a sociis states that one should

software used in a business is not directly controlled by licensor).
247 See ETS Payphones, Inc., 408 F.3d at 732 (holding that investors in payphone
leasing and placement business only purchased securities because they “retained minimal
control over the telephones” and that “the more control investors retain, the less likely it
becomes that the contract qualifies as a security”).
248 Daniel, 439 U.S. at 561–62.
249 Forman, 421 U.S. at 852–53 (emphasis added) (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 300).
250 See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of L. (1) in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment & (2) in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for a Preliminary
Injunction at 5–6, SEC v. Telegram Grp. Inc., No. 19 Civ. 9439 (PKC), 2020 WL 61528
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2020); Answer to Complaint at 12, 22, 26–27, U.S. SEC v. Kik
Interactive Inc., No. 19 Civ. 5244 (AKH), 2020 WL 5819770 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2020);
Notice of Motion & Motion to Dismiss Consol. Complaint for Violations of Fed. & Cal. L.
at 21 n.19, Zakinov v. Ripple Labs, Inc., No. 18-cv-06753-PJH, 2020 WL 922815 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 26, 2020). A criminal defendant already mentioned above also has argued
unsuccessfully that a currency used for payment, whether Bitcoin or some new coin, is not
a security. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment for Subject Matter Jurisdiction &
Vagueness at 6, 9–10, United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17 CR 647 (RJD), 2018 WL
4346339 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 11, 2018).
251 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (2018).
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construe a phrase like “investment contract” by its neighbors in a
statute or statutory clause.252 The principle of ejusdem generis
requires a general term or phrase to be interpreted as within the
same class or genus as the more specific terms that precede it in
a statutory list.253 In the case of the Securities Act, the terms
that precede and follow “investment contract” are relatively
passive investments like stocks, bonds, mineral rights, and debt
notes.254
An important consequence of paying attention to these basic
rules of construction is that some crypto coins would be neither
securities nor commodities. Protecting crypto coins from the prior
restraints imposed by the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
alone will not vindicate the freedom of expression when it comes
to white papers and token ecosystems if any contract relating to a
digital token remains unlawful unless it is sold by an entity
regulated under the Commodities Exchange Act (CEA).255
Reading the catch-all clause of the CEA as being restricted by
ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis to commodities similar to
the agricultural and precious mineral commodities listed in CEA
is one way of ensuring that crypto coins are not subject to the
CEA’s restraints.256
Congressional intent may also be relevant to the question of
whether crypto coin white papers are offers of investment
contracts. Congress intended the definition of “security” to
capture “the ordinary concept of a security,” as of the 1930s,
which was likely far removed from something like Bitcoin or
other digital tokens.257 Likewise, the legislative history indicates
that by “commodities,” Congress meant such tangible items like
fruit, lumber, and metals.258 Both the Securities Act and the CEA
were intended to apply to new instruments such as “irregular”

252 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 195 (2012).
253 Egon Guttman, The Futures Trading Act of 1978: The Reaffirmation of CFTC-SEC
Coordinated Jurisdiction over Security/Commodities, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 24–25 (1978);
Ejusdem Generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1968) (citing Goldsmith v. United
States, 42 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1930)).
254 See Forman, 421 U.S. at 847 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018)).
255 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6(a), 6h (2018); SEC v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 463 (1969);
Guttman, supra note 253, at 29.
256 See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6a(a)(1), 6h (2018); see also Andrew Verstein, Crypto Assets and
Insider Trading Law's Domain, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1, 20 (2019) (noting that if
cryptocurrencies are still commodities, exemption from classification as securities may be
of limited value, because it “takes crypto assets out of the frying pan of securities
regulation and into the fire of commodities regulation”).
257 Forman, 421 U.S. at 847–48 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)).
258 Guttman, supra note 253, at 24–25 (collecting authorities).
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securities or futures contracts on ocean shipping rates or
mortgages, but as mentioned above, they have not been applied
to investments such as franchises, even though franchises
resemble stocks or mineral rights, so there must be a limit to
such laws’ protective scope.259
Many crypto coins are unlike public corporations in which
members of the general public passively own shares, because
such coins require significant efforts by coin adopters to succeed.
The mining of Bitcoin and other mined tokens, which can confirm
the validity of ongoing transactions and assemble the blockchain
while preventing fraud, is an obvious example of how crypto
owners are non-passive investors who are more like franchisees
than Apple or Wells Fargo shareholders.260 As a result of being,
in part, dependent on the expertise and marketing efforts of
token purchasers, as well as their “efforts to ‘setup and
maint[ain]’” a blockchain and token-based ecosystem, many
token founders do not exploit purchasers who are “solely” reliant
on their efforts.261
When it is a license of software, or a partnership to control a
protocol directly rather than via managers and boards of
directors as intermediaries, a crypto coin investment should not
be ruled to be a security because the community and the
ecosystem it creates shapes a coin’s value.262 Software and real
property, like certificates relating to the ownership of precious
metals, are not securities because they fluctuate based on market
conditions rather than solely due to the developer’s or metals
dealer’s ongoing efforts.263 A lease of valuable property rights is

259 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946) (referring to new promotional
schemes covered by definition of security, which is not formulaic); Guttman, supra note
253, at 11, 14–15 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 351 (1968))
(indicating that “irregular” forms of investment are covered, including futures on
mortgages or ocean shipping rates).
260 See Andreessen, supra note 101; Bhaskar et al., supra note 12, at 311–12; Notice
of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of Shares of the
Etherlndex Ether Trust Under NYSE Area Equities Rule 8.201, 2017 WL 149923 (Jan.
13, 2017). Some crypto coins, it must be noted, are more centralized and do not use
miners, making them less susceptible to this particular defense to being classified as a
“security.” See Ying-Yinghsieh, Jean-Philippe (JP) Vergne & Shawang, The Internal and
External Governance of Blockchain-Based Organizations: Evidence from Cryptocurrencies
in BITCOIN AND BEYOND CRYPTOCURRENCIES, BLOCKCHAINS, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
(Malcolm Campbell-Verduyn ed., 2017).
261 Ne. Revenue Servs., LLC v. Maps Indeed, Inc., 685 F. App’x 96, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2017).
262 See Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 246, at 17–22; Ness, supra note 246, at 47–48.
263 See Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79–80 (9th Cir. 1980) (Certificates of
ownership of silver bars are not a security because value “depended upon the fluctuations
of the silver market,” even though dealer in certificates might go out of business before
actually delivering silver, making purchasers investors in their view.); Marini v. Adamo,
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clearly not a security, even though it is needed to create or
expand a profitable enterprise such as oil or gas drilling.264 A sale
of a work of art as an investment, even under false pretenses,
does not create an “investment contract.”265 Similarly, a note
secured by a mortgage on residential real estate, even if as part
of an investment, is not a security if there is a “commercial”
purpose for it such as resolving cash flow difficulties, rather than
selling a business to the public in parts.266
The Bitcoin protocol and founding documents operate as a
copyright and trademark license, to compensate the developers of
an extremely complex and ingenious open-source software
project, and one of the most successful branding and marketing
campaigns of all time.267 An expectation that a digital token will
support a “business” related or underlying the token may be
different than an “expectation of profits” from an “enterprise”
directly controlled by another’s “efforts,” as required by securities
law. 268 At least one court has held that an expectation that the

812 F. Supp. 2d 243, 256–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) (questioning whether purchaser of rare coins
through another is strictly dependent upon intermediary for success of that investment if
purchaser could sell coins early); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for a
Preliminary Injunction, at 31–39, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Telegram Grp. Inc., 448 F.
Supp. 3d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 19-cv-9439).
264 See Nolfi v. Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 546–47 (6th Cir. 2012); see also
Odom v. Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 213–15 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that a limited partnership
agreement to develop a real estate community was not a securities transaction even if a
minor partner was denied control of it, making him dependent on the other general
partners); SEC v. Crude Oil Corp. of Am., 93 F.2d 844, 845, 847–48 (7th Cir. 1937)
(emphasizing that none of the purchasers of contracts for future delivery of oil actually
expected or wanted to receive the oil, instead desiring merely a speculative profit, in
finding “forward contract” to be a security); Perry v. Gammon, 583 F. Supp. 1230, 1231–
33 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding the “ordinary sale of real estate” is not a “securities
transaction” even if purchasers intend to rely on real estate’s existing management at
time of sale); Wabash Valley Power Ass’n v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind., 678 F. Supp. 757, 765–
67 (S.D. Ind. 1988) (working through a similar analysis as to purchasers of interest in
nuclear power project, who expected to use the power but also perhaps to profit from
energy transactions).
265 See Mechigian v. Art Cap. Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1421, 1424, 1428 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(investor in a lithographic plate for work of art touted as being worth much more than it
really was, due to ability to make and sell prints from it at a profit, did not purchase
security because “we should not try to turn every ‘thing’ which might be purchased and
sold into a ‘security’” or “every commercial contract would end up being enforced in . . .
class actions.”).
266 See Singer v. Livoti, 741 F. Supp. 1040, 1048–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (indicating that a
“commercial or consumer purpose” would indicate that a “routine” consumer transaction,
including a “note secured by a mortgage on a home,” is not regulated by securities laws); see
also Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, 943 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 1991) (noting that a note secured
by a mortgage on one home held as an investment for a return would not be a security).
267 See Walch, supra note 240, at 876–80.
268 But see Cryptocurrencies: Oversight of New Assets in the Digital Age: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on Agric., supra note 38 (statement of Lowell D. Ness, Managing
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Blockvest digital token will support a “business” would not make
it a security; the court refused to find that purchasers of the
token were investors in securities.269 A subsequent decision
finding the Blockvest tokens to be securities emphasized that the
purchasers were described as “‘passive’ investors.”270 A more
active investor is different, as illustrated by cases declining to
find a securities transaction when a franchisee buys the right to
use trademarks and trade secrets in exchange for paying
royalties and fees while agreeing to abide by certain standards,
or when a business buys complicated software like Photoshop or
Salesforce that is subject to use terms.271
Many crypto coins also serve as a license to use a
privacy-preserving form of software, reminiscent in some ways of
anonymous email accounts, network firewalls, or internet
browsers with privacy modes.272 The absence of a dominant
central firm in permission-less token-funded ecosystems could
reduce the level of distrust with which many people view new
technologies such as e-commerce, digital subscriptions, or social
networking.273 In the context of online purchases of creative
Partner of Perkins Coie LLP, arguing that some token purchasers rely on promoters to
build token “network”).
269 See SEC v. Blockvest, LLC, No. 18CV2287-GPB(BLM), 2018 WL 6181408, at *6–*7
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2018).
270 See id. at *5, *8 (quoting ICO marketing materials). The ICO at issue was relatively
egregious in terms of portraying itself as a security, including by adopting a name that mashed
up “blockchain” and “invest,” using a “Blockchain Exchange Commission” logo with an eagle
design purloined from the SEC itself, and in terms of promising passive investors strong
returns. To view the logo, see Ross Todd, Lawyers Sound Off on What SEC’s Early Loss Really
Means for Crypto ICOs and Securities, LAW.COM (Nov. 29, 2018, 2:51 PM),
http://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/2018/11/29/lawyers-sound-off-on-what-secs-early-lossreally-means-for-crypto-icos-and-securities/ [http://perma.cc/84HW-CV3J].
271 See Debevoise & Plimpton, supra note 246, at 20–22. The analysis in this
memorandum is based in part on SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (2d Cir.
1974), in which the court suggested that a promoter of an investment must retain
“immediate control” for its contract with investors to qualify as “investment contract,”
because “remote” control analogous to that of a franchisor over a franchisee’s format or
décor would not qualify. Id. at 484–85. See also Cont’l Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466,
470 (10th Cir. 1967) (to be a security, an investment must be “inescapably tied to the
efforts of the ranchers and the other defendants and not to the efforts of the investors.”)
(emphasis added).
272 See Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in
Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 AM. UNIV. L. REV.
69, 133 (2018); Benedikt Bünz et al, Zether: Towards Privacy in a Smart Contract World,
in FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY 423, 424 (Joseph Bonneau & Nadia
Heninger eds., 2020) (discussing tokenized “techniques for confidential and anonymous
payments, such as Monero and Zcash”) (footnote omitted); Yong Yu et al., BlockchainBased Solutions to Security and Privacy Issues in the Internet of Things, 25 IEEE
WIRELESS COMMC’NS 12 (2018).
273 See THIBAULT SCHREPEL & VITALIK BUTERIN, BLOCKCHAIN CODE AS ANTITRUST
4–5 SSRN 3597399 (2020); see also Charles Kim, How Patreon Champions its Creators
and Patrons' Data Rights, TRANSCEND (May 12, 2020), http://transcend.io/blog/how-
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content, ranging from films to software, such protection of the
purchasers’ privacy promotes their own right to read, exchange
ideas, and participate in the benefits of intellectual and scientific
advances.274
Moreover, like the owners of general partnerships, many
token holders can vote to affirm or reject a particular protocol or
transactions, thereby potentially forking or otherwise altering a
blockchain.275 Just as importantly, many tokens operate on
blockchains that are open to inspection and provide transparency
without SEC filings, just like general partners or joint venturers
have access to books, records, and important meetings, which
assures them of transparency without classifying their
partnership or venture interests as securities.276 Such
patreon-champions-its-creators-and-patrons-data-rights
[http://perma.cc/B5MN-ETRU]
(noting that digital subscriptions create considerable privacy risks in terms of sharing
personal and payment data).
274 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 19(2), adopted and opened for signature, ratification, and accession Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (“Everyone shall have the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27 ¶ 1, (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the
right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to
share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read
Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV.
981, 981–83 (1996); Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 388–89
(2008); Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 274–75
(2018); Lea Shaver, The Right to Science and Culture, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 121, 123–25
(2010).
275 See BitGuild, PLAT Is Migrating to Tron, MEDIUM, (Apr. 8, 2019),
http://medium.com/the-notice-board/plat-is-migrating-to-tron-cf64909bfba3
[http://perma.cc/ZP3C-56XH]; Stéphane Blemus & Dominique Guégan, Initial Cryptoasset Offerings (ICOs), Tokenization and Corporate Governance 8 (Centre d’Économie de
la Sorbonne, Working Paper No. arXiv:1905.03340, 2019) (“Besides, each type of cryptoasset issued during an ICO possesses its own underlying characteristics, granting rights
different from the other crypto-assets (voting rights, share of capital or any particular
advantage ...).”); James Grimmelmann, All Smart Contracts are Ambiguous, 2 J.L. &
INNOVATION 1, 19 (2019) (observing that of some smart contracts, in which category
author includes some digital tokens, “protocol changes, forks, 51% attacks, and other
consensus breakdowns are a kind of corruption threat” that “subject smart contracts to
abrogation or alteration at the whims of other blockchain users”); Wenbin Zhang et al., A
Privacy-Preserving Voting Protocol on Blockchain, 2018 IEEE 11TH INT’L CONF. ON
CLOUD COMPUTING (CLOUD) 401, 401 (“As blockchain technologies mature and
ecosystems over blockchain evolve, peers on blockchain networks often face situations in
which they need to conduct voting for decision-making; as happened in the case of the
DAO hard fork event on Ethereum.”); see also Jonathan Rohr & Aaron Wright,
Blockchain-Based Token Sales, Initial Coin Offerings, and the Democratization of Public
Capital Markets, 70 HASTINGS L. J. 463, 475 (2019); Walch, supra note 240, at 861–66,
876–80; Angela Walch, Open-Source Operational Risk: Should Public Blockchains Serve
as Financial Market Infrastructures?, in 2 HANDBOOK OF BLOCKCHAIN, DIGITAL FINANCE,
AND INCLUSION 243, 259–66 (David Lee Kuo Chuen & Robert Deng eds., 2018).
276 See, e.g., Andreessen, supra note 101; David Bernstein, Blockchain Could
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transparency and control leads courts to find that some
partnerships are not securities.277 While corporate shareholders
and limited partners also have voting rights, their shares in an
enterprise may be deemed a security because their real say in
what goes on is heavily diluted.278 The same may be true of
widely-subscribed crypto coins, where the number of voting
rights with respect to ledger transactions may rival the
shareholder count of public companies and exceed the number of
limited partners in a limited liability partnership.279 Still, unlike
a corporation, blockchain-enabled tokens may provide a way of
managing the token that is more democratic than the process
characterizing most shareholders’ ability to participate in
corporate governance, which is minimal in many cases due to
officers’ and directors’ power.280 Like Bitcoin users, adopters of
new crypto coins “must rely on the efforts of others on the
blockchain’s ecosystem to bring their investment to fruition,” but
that does not mean that they are like corporate shareholders.281
Transform Securities Transfer System, INT’L FIN. L. REV. (May 29, 2018)
http://www.iflr.com/Article/3807306/IFLR-magazine/Blockchain-could-transformsecurities-transfer-systems.html [http://perma.cc/8JCX-6D6U]; DE FILIPPI & WRIGHT,
supra note 48, at 19–26, 35–37, 56–57, 109–13, 119, 133–35, 196–99; FEFER, supra note
48; Guadamuz & Marsden, supra note 10; Nakamoto, supra note 37, at 2, 6; compare,
with supra note 246 (citing, inter alia, Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 730–31 (9th Cir.
1988), abrogated by SEC v. Schooler, 905 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2018)).
277 See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 419–20 (5th Cir. 1981) (emphasizing
partners’ access to information and abilities to participate in enterprise’s affairs); Odom v.
Slavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214–16 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that ability to participate in affairs
of an enterprise would result in investment in enterprise as partner not being a security);
Gotham Print, Inc. v. Am. Speedy Printing Ctrs., 863 F. Supp. 447, 454 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(noting profits of enterprise resulting “at least in large part” from participant-investors’
efforts, in addition to those of promoter, franchise-style agreement was not a security).
278 Williamson, 645 F.2d at 419–20.
279 Cf. Michael Abramaowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, 389
(2016) ("In corporations . . . voters elect board members and entrust those board members
to make decisions."); id. at 386 ("But . . . Bitcoin cannot allow voting based on one-person,
one-vote, even if that were desirable.").
280 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 557–59 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The
Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 836–37, 843–47 (2005);
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 BUS. L. 43, 44–45,
47–48 (2003); Lisa M. Fairfax, From Apathy to Activism: The Emergence, Impact, and
Future of Shareholder Activism as the New Corporate Governance Norm, 99 B.U. L. REV.
1301, 1304, 1307–11 (2019); but see id. at 1304–5 (recognizing a new era of actively voting
shareholders has emerged, particularly with “SEC rule allowing shareholders to submit
proxy access bylaws,” although scholars continue to argue that low rate of directors being
ousted means that “majority voting has no impact or . . . that shareholders are not willing
to exercise their voting authority”) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(i)(8) (2018)); Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1146–47 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Stephen J. Choi et al., Does
Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1119, 1122, 1128
(2016); William K. Sjostrom, Jr. & Young Sang Kim, Majority Voting for the Election of
Directors, 40 CONN. L. REV. 459, 469 (2007).
281 Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, Crypto Securities: On the Risks of Investments in
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Some combination of coding, mining, and automated processes
may be more determinative of the coin’s value than the identity
of its founders or the coding enterprise’s cash flow at the time of
a coin’s initial issuance.
Finally, like franchisees or member-managers of apartment
cooperatives and the like, many coin purchasers use and
improve their investments.282 The SEC looks to the token
purchasers’ role in managing the network as an important
factor, but it views crypto coins with influential or
indispensable founders as more likely to be securities.283 It is
true that in a case involving investors in rare (precious metal)
coin portfolios designed—at the option of the buyer—with coins
of the buyer’s choosing or coins selected by the manager and
seller, the court found a security to exist.284 However, that
decision relied on a binding precedent regarding apartment
cooperatives—finding their utility and owner-member upkeep to
be irrelevant—which was later reversed by the Supreme
Court.285 Other cases involving investments in live beavers or
cosmetics for resale also predated the apartment cooperative

Blockchain-Based Assets and the Dilemmas of Securities Regulation, 68 Am. U. L. Rev. 69,
121–25 (2018). Although Bitcoin is now viewed as a “decentralized” token with an
unimportant central management, see Hinman, supra note 155, at 3, the Bitcoin
Foundation continued to shape the technological requirements of the token as late as
2017, by its own statement. See Claasen, supra note 240. Likewise, while the blockchainbased Aptoide app store had an existing open-source reference implementation, in 2018
the “ASF - App Store Foundation” was “created to coordinate the development of the
protocol and reference implementation under an open governance model; board of
directors is elected by AppCoins owners.” AppCoins Milestones, ICOBENCH (2019),
https://icobench.com/ico/appcoins/milestones [http://perma.cc/Z7KM-VWL3].
282 See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 690–93 (regarding franchisees);
Endico v. Fonte, 485 F. Supp. 2d 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting member-manager of
apartment rehabilitation project, in which members who purchased access to the project
would need to perform labor on it).
283 See No-Action Letter re: Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., supra note 8; Hinman, supra
note 155; Brief of SEC in Support of the United States’ in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss Indictment, United States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR-0647 (RJD)
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2018), at 14–15 (citing Cont. 1 Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F. 2d 466, 470–
71 (10th Cir. 1967)); SEC v. Aqua–Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 583–84 (2d Cir.
1982); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir. 1973); SEC, Div.
of Corp. Fin., Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets (2018),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets
[http://perma.cc/FK4G-CB5E]; SEC Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, supra note 8, at 9–10.
284 SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distribs., Ltd., 388 F. Supp. 1288, 1292–93 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
285 See id. at 1293 (citing Forman v. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 500 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 419 U.S. 1120 (1975), rev’d, 421 U.S. 837, as justifying the expansive
definition of “security” applied in the case); Wuliger v. Eberle, 414 F. Supp. 2d 814, 821
(N.D. Ohio, 2006) (citing Brigadoon Scotch ruling on Federal Coin Reserve as justifying a
conclusion that “viatical life settlements” were securities).
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case.286 If such precedents do not count, “functional
cryptocurrencies” or “utility tokens” may not be securities after
all.287
Crypto coin promoters such as Ripple Labs and Telegram
Group are increasingly arguing that, as a functioning currency
their tokens are and should be excluded from the definition of a
security.288 Broad definitions of “currency” as a medium of
exchange that circulates regardless of official status bolster this
argument.289 This argument might not place crypto coins on the
same lightly-regulated plane as other forms of software or
political information, because the coin firms making this
argument often point to the CFTC as having jurisdiction over
currencies as commodities.290 However, there is a third category
286 See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 485 (5th Cir. 1974); Cont’l
Mktg. Corp. v. SEC, 387 F.2d 466, 469–70 (10th Cir. 1967); cf. Forman, 421 U.S. at 851–
52, 858 (emphasizing that while a share in an apartment complex may be an
“investment,” it is not a security or “investment contract” because it was not marketed as
generating profits or resale revenue but was capable of “personal use”). It is true that in
Forman, the Court announced that it was not deciding whether the promotion of an asset
as both personally useful and a profitable investment would be a securities transaction,
but it also suggested that it would not have been an investment contract to lease land
rights that were directly useful as well as being a potentially profitable source of oil
drilling rights that the lessor was primarily responsible for and promoting, stating
instead that the land was strictly “incidental” to the drilling rights. Forman, 421 U.S. at
858 nn.17–18 (citing SEC v. CM Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 348 (1943)).
287 See, e.g., Nate Crosser, Initial Coin Offerings as Investment Contracts: Are Blockchain
Utility Tokens Securities, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. 379, 409–11 (2018); Anthony R.G. Nolan et al.,
Initial Coin Offerings: Key US Legal Considerations for ICO Investors and Sponsors, 19 J. INV.
COMPLIANCE 1 (2018), https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/JOIC-02-20180016/full/html [http://perma.cc/A9JA-6ZYW]; Zuluaga, supra note 17, at 2, 4.
288 Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment, at 20–23, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 19-cv-9439 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
14, 2020); Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Consol. Complaint for Violations of
Fed. & Cal. L.., at 3, In re Ripple Labs Inc. Litig. No. 18-cv-06753 (PJH) (N.D. Cal. brief
filed 2019); Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Indictment, at 6–10, 16–17, U.S. v. Zaslavskiy,
No. 17-cr-0647 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2018)); Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of
Motion to Dismiss Indictment, at 2–11, U.S. v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-cr-0647 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 26, 2018); Defendant’s Reply Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Ex. A at 3, U.S.
v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-cr-0647 (RJD) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2018) (referencing McDonnell/Coin
Drop Markets); see also Defendant’s Local Rule 56.1 Statement in Support of Their
Motion for Summary Judgment, at 1, 3, 6–7, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 19-cv-9439
(PKC) (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2020).
289 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER INC., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 557
(Philip Babcock Gove ed. 2002) (defining “currency” as “something that is in circulation as a
medium
of
exchange”)
(emphasis
added);
Currency,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/currency
[http://perma.cc/S8MF-ENEN]
(last
visited Nov. 16, 2020); see also Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F.2d 166, 172
(8th Cir. 1938) (“Our investigation indicates that any one of three meanings may be attributable
to the term ‘money’: (1) Gold or silver as the monetary standard of the Nation; (2) coins and
currency actually circulating as a medium of exchange; or (3) the unit of value, the dollar.”).
290 See Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Its Motion for
Summary Judgment, at 15, SEC v. Telegram Group Inc., No. 19-cv-9439 (PKC) (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 27, 2020), (No. 19 Civ. 9439); Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Consol.
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that is probably even more apposite: vouchers or barter units.
The customs laws of the United Kingdom have a category
possibly suited to such virtual commodities used for barter, called
“special purpose vouchers.”291 The Monetary Authority of
Singapore, Canada’s Revenue Agency, and the Australian
Taxation Office have analogized Bitcoin to a barter transaction,
in which a business decides to trade its goods or services for
another asset that may not be a domestic or foreign currency in
traditional terms.292 Hong Kong and the Central Bank of the
Republic of Taiwan made a similar move by calling bitcoin a
“virtual commodity,” rather than traditional currency.293
The SEC has been vague in announcing that the duty to
register applies to “virtually any instrument that may be sold as
an investment.”294 Virtually anything may be bought and sold for

Complaint for Violations of Fed. Cal. L., at 3, In re Ripple Labs Inc. Litig., No. 18-cv06753 (PJH) (N.D. Cal. brief filed 2019).
291 See LIBR. OF CONG., supra note 12 (citing Tom Gullen, The Challenge of Being a
Bitcoin
Trader,
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
CLUB
BLOG
(Nov.
13,
2013),
http://thefinanser.co.uk/fsclub/2013/11/the-challenge-of-being-a-bitcoin-trader.html
[http://perma.cc/UG9W-AUCH]).
292 See id. (citing Terence Lee, Singapore Government Decides Not to Interfere with
Bitcoin, TECHINASIA (Dec. 23, 2013), http://www.techinasia.com/singapore-governmentdecides-interfere-bitcoin/ [http://perma.cc/72WN-7NK7]); Bitcoins Aren’t Tax Exempt,
Revenue
Canada
Says,
CBC
NEWS
(Apr.
26,
2013),
http://www.cbc.ca/news/business/revenue-canada-says-bitcoins-aren-t-tax-exempt1.1395075 [http://perma.cc/8W6Y-EU44]; Jasper Hamill, Canadian Regulators Welcome
US Bitcoin Refugees with Open Arms, THE REGISTER (May 20, 2013),
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/05/20/canada_welcomes_bitcoin_traders_fintrac_letter/
[http://perma.cc/Q5T5-KXH2].
293 See Oksana Panova et al., International Models of Legal Regulation and Ethics of
Cryptocurrency Use: Country Review, 22 J. LEG., ETH. REGUL. ISSUES 1, 3 (2019); Yogesh
Malhotra, Future of Bitcoin & Statistical Probabilistic Quantitative Methods: Global
Financial Regulation (Interview: Hong Kong Institute of CPAs), H.K. INST. CERTIF. PUB.
ACCTS., (Jan. 20, 2014), http://finrm.org/Future_of_Bitcoin.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ZLUA6DY].
294 Letter from Jay Clayton, SEC Chairman, to the Hon. Ted Budd, supra note 8, at 1
(emphasis added); see also Proskauer, SEC Director William Hinman: “Current offers and
sales of Ether are not securities transactions,” JD SUPRA (June 18, 2018),
http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sec-director-william-hinman-current-32939/
[http://perma.cc/PGY6-288R] (describing SEC “Chairman Jay Clayton’s position that he
has not seen a single token issued through an ICO that is not a security . . . .”); SEC to
Regulate
Bitcoin
ICOs,
Token
Sales,
PYMNTS
(Aug.
17,
2017),
http://www.pymnts.com/news/payment-methods/2017/sec-to-regulate-bitcoin-icos-tokensales/ [http://perma.cc/8ARX-FEL7] (“According to a report in Seeking Alpha, the SEC
said the cryptocurrencies are subject to federal securities laws. ‘Offers and sales of digital
assets by ‘virtual’ organizations are subject to the requirements of the federal securities
laws,’ said SEC Chairman Jay Clayton, according to the report.”). One application of the
definition of a “security” to digital asset transactions by an SEC official is slightly more
precise, in requiring that the asset be purchased as an investment will be profitable due
to the promoter’s “efforts,” but becomes virtually limitless again by incorporating a
definition of promoter that would include eBay, franchisors, law firm partners,
condominium associations, banks offering certificates of deposit, sellers of food crops or
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speculative purposes by investors in the age of eBay and
StubHub.295 The SEC has warned, in issuing no-action letters to
sellers of unregistered digital tokens, that such a transaction
might constitute the (criminal) unregistered sale of a security if
proceeds are used “to build the . . . Platform,” if the platform is
not “fully functional and operational,” if the tokens are not
“immediately usable” on the platform, or if it is possible to
transfer tokens to wallets.296 That leaves open a very narrow
window in which to sell tokens without the chill and threat
imposed by potential criminal prosecution or civil orders making
an enterprise insolvent.297 Under the SEC’s view, would any form
of blockchain-based art that could be exchanged for
cryptocurrencies held in wallets be considered a “security?” A
certain reading of its no-action letters might suggest that digital
art, such as cryptokitties that sold for Ether, might be a security
because it can be exchanged for other tokens.298
products in bulk, and anyone else who “is working actively” on a matter relevant to the
“success of [an] enterprise.” See Hinman, supra note 155 (“Similarly, investment contracts
can be made out of virtually any asset (including virtual assets), provided the investor is
reasonably expecting profits from the promoter’s efforts.”); cf. Framework for “Investment
Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets, U.S. SEC, DIV. OF CORP. FIN. (Apr. 3, 2019),
http://www.sec.gov/corpfin/framework-investment-contract-analysis-digital-assets
[http://perma.cc/SW7Y-HTYC] (similar). Commodities such as wheat, soy beans, oranges,
orange juice, beer, and whiskey are not defined as securities under federal law even
though farmers and cooperatives thereof invest in their production and expect a profit
from their eventual sale. See Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027,
1033–34 (2d Cir. 1974) (collecting cases).
295 See, e.g., George Hopkin, Kidding Around: Investing in Rare Toys, H. K. TATLER
(Dec.
28,
2015),
http://hk.asiatatler.com/life/kidding-around-investing-in-rare-toys
[http://perma.cc/6HB3-JH7T] (noting that some rare toys are worth tens of thousands of
dollars as an investment, more than a Bitcoin and many times what Ether or other newer
tokens may be worth); Vintage Super Mario Bros. Video Game Sells for $114,000,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(July
11,
2020),
http://apnews.com/article/99710286a6d37450f8dd87fd71faa1d3/
[http://perma.cc/8K9HBL7U]; Jason M. Bailey, Collectors Are Spending Thousands on Video Games They Will
Never
Play,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
27,
2020),
http://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/business/video-games-wata-heritage.html
[http://perma.cc/5XSX-VPNH] (noting rare Nintendo games may be sold for more than
$12,000 or even $100,000 each); Mark Seifert, Highest Graded Copy Of X-Men #1 Goes
For
Record
$492,937.50,
BLEEDING
COOL
(July
26,
2012),
http://bleedingcool.com/comics/highest-graded-copy-of-x-men-1-goes-for-record-492937-50/
[http://perma.cc/T4EH-V2VV].
296 No-Action Letter re: Pocketful of Quarters, Inc., supra note 8; cf. No-Action Letter
re: Turnkey, Jet, Inc., supra note 8.
297 See Olly Jackson, US, UK Cryptocurrency Laws Deterring Blockchain Companies,
INT’L FIN. L. REV. (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.iflr.com/article/b1lp1wzy4q4wh9/us-ukcryptocurrency-laws-deterring-blockchain-companies [http://perma.cc/QF68-9HKA]; Olly
Jackson, Initial Coin Offerings: SEC Stance Discouraging Issuances, INT’L FIN. L. REV.,
Aug. 20, 2018, at 1–2, LEGAL SOURCE.
298 See generally Tonya M. Evans, Cryptokitties, Cryptography, and Copyright, 47
AIPLA Q.J. 219, 220–250 (2019) (describing how smart contracts permit digital artists to
exercise more control over their productions than traditional online games or worlds such
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As long as the freedom of speech is not impacted, courts have
held that the broad definition of security utilized by the SEC
after Howey may not be determined to be unconstitutionally
vague or overbroad.299 At least one court, however, has held that
“impersonal” investment publications that do not propose a
purchase by a specific customer are not commercial speech, and
are therefore “protected” under the First Amendment.300 As a
result, persons desiring to publish newsletters or market chart
documents could challenge a registration requirement in the U.S.
Code, albeit one governing commodities investment advice.301
Under the analysis of that court, white papers or other crypto
coin promotional speech are directed to the world at large, rather
than being targeted to the particular situation of any particular
buyer or proposing an imminent purchase. A law censoring them
should be struck down as being void for vagueness; it leaves
speakers guessing as to how much speech or conduct directed at
the general public it forbids or requires.302
The vagueness defect of a potential prohibition on marketing
of unregistered crypto coins is compounded by the relative
weakness of the scienter requirement contained in the statute
cited by the SEC.303 Courts rejecting vagueness challenges in
complex financial crimes often emphasize the scienter
requirement of the underlying statutes, which may, for example,
only criminalize falsifying certain paperwork with a “purpose of
evading” the statutory paperwork mandate.304 Although a
violation of the Exchange Act, for example, must be committed

as Minecraft or World of Warcraft); Bryan Wilson, Blockchain and the Law of the Cat:
What Cryptokitties Might Teach, 88 UMKC L. REV. 365, 369–70 (2019) (observing that
cryptokitties have been sold for tens of thousands of Ether tokens worth more than $27
million over the two years ending March 2019).
299 See Glen-Arden Commodities, Inc. v. Costantino, 493 F.2d 1027, 1029–30 (2d Cir.
1974); SEC v. Brigadoon Scotch Distrib. Co., 480 F.2d 1047, 1052 n.6 (2d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Zaslavskiy, No. 17-CR-647, 2018 WL 4346339, at *8–9 (E.D.N.Y Sept. 11, 2018).
300 See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 149
F.3d 679, 686 (7th Cir. 1998).
301 See id. at 686–89 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 1a(5)(C)).
302 See United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 266 (1997).
303 See Hinman, supra note 155, at n.2 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1) and 78c(a)(10));
Complaint at 6–35, SEC v. ReCoin Grp. Found., LLC, No. 17 CV 5725 (RJD), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 34225,(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2018), 2017 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 34225,
at *1 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1)),77e(a), 77e(c), 78c(a)(10), 78u(d)(1)–(3), and 78u(d)(5));
see also SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (equating the definition of “security” in
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) with the definition in the Securities Act, 15
U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1)).
304 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 412 (2010); United States v.
DeVore, No. 90-3982, slip op. at 12 (6th Cir. May 6, 1991) (unpublished table disposition);
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449, 464 (C.D. Cal. 2009); United States v. Scanio, 705
F. Supp. 768, 773–79 (W.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 900 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1990).
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“willfully” in order to be a crime, courts have relaxed this
requirement by holding that a willful violation does not require
knowledge of the existence or meaning of the rule at issue.305
This state of affairs aggravates the lack of a clear meaning
attached to the obligation to register “investment” offerings.
Imprisonment for up to 10 years is a penalty that may be difficult
to justify in cases involving ignorance of the law.306
Attorney speech presents a helpful analogy to token
promoter speech, as both attorneys and promoters solicit new
business and could be trusted by their clients or customers,
raising questions of fiduciary duties and misleading
advertisements. A Nevada Supreme Court rule restricting
attorney speech on pending cases because it may disrupt the
proceedings, or taint the result, was void for vagueness because
the rule did not clarify what kinds of pretrial or mid-trial public
appeals stating that a client in a criminal case is innocent, are
permissible.307 Although attorneys perform services for pay in
trials, they still have a First Amendment interest in undeterred
free speech, in being clearly told what they can do, in objective
standards, and in uniform enforcement procedures for their
profession.308 Finally, the attorney speech and academic freedom
cases strongly suggest that civil consequences for vague offenses
may violate the First Amendment; this is relevant to such
securities or commodities law remedies as being barred from
certain markets or being ordered to halt an offering or to refund
all proceeds.309

305 See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1395 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1970). Perhaps for this reason, although seemingly
glossing over the insistence by these courts that willfully represents a mens rea
requirement, the SEC contends that it is a strict liability offence for a broker in
cryptocurrencies or an offeror thereof to make an untrue statement or omission of material
fact. See Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-And-Desist Proceedings, Crypto Asset
Management, L.P., Securities Act Release No. 33-10544, Investment Company Act Release
No. 33222 (Sept. 11, 2018), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2018/33-10544.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4YJS-F6VV].
306 See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (2002); Skilling, 561 U.S. at 412; Drew, 259 F.R.D. at 464.
307 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nev., 501 U.S. 1030, 1048–51 (1991).
308 See id. at 1048–52; see also United States v. Wunsch, 84 F.3d 1110, 1119 (9th Cir.
1996) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1972)). Some degree of
subjective enforcement by administrative agencies or state attorneys general may be
permitted. See Prime Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Harris, 216 F. Supp. 3d 1096, 1125 (S.D.
Cal. 2016) (upholding scheme requiring California Attorney General to approve sale of
nonprofit health care provider’s assets, including by determining whether sale is in public
interest, Supreme Court has upheld statutes “‘based upon standards such as the public
interest’”) (quoting Montgomery Nat. Bank v. Clarke, 882 F.2d 87, 89–90 (3d Cir. 1989)).
309 See Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1034–35, 1051; see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
567 U.S. 239, 254–55, 257–58 (2012) (indicating non-criminal penalties imposed by FCC
violated Fifth Amendment by not placing penalized broadcaster on reasonable notice of
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2. The Lanham Act of 1946
The Lanham Act provides a cause of action for false or
misleading descriptions, statements of fact, or representations in
interstate commerce.310 A claim for deceptive advertising under
federal law requires proof of a factual statement that is false,
that will be likely to induce purchases (be material to them), and
that has a tendency to deceive a “substantial” number of
persons.311 Thus, “adspeak” and other claims that lack a specific,
“inherent” meaning may be unregulated by laws on advertising
on Internet-based services.312
The First Amendment’s protection of scientific studies that boost
demand for commercial products may be relevant to crypto coin white
papers. It has been held that the “publication and dissemination of a
scientific study that had the effect of touting a company’s product is
noncommercial speech and [is] thereby immune from the false
advertising provisions of the Lanham Act.”313 One court has
articulated an even broader principle: “Statements of opinion are not
generally actionable under the Lanham Act.”314 The FTC once
adopted a similar standard in regulating deceptive acts and practices
in interstate commerce.315 Moreover, the publication of boastful
offense definition or scope); Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 970 (9th Cir.
1996) (illustrating non-criminal penalties imposed by public college); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich.
Univ., 55 F.3d 1177, 1183–84 (6th Cir. 1995) (illustrating non-criminal penalties imposed by
public university); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 579–80
(1985) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) (assuming that civil copyright suit
triggered First Amendment principles); Burk, supra note 145, at 197, 236, 238 (arguing that
civil enforcement invoking the “coercive mechanisms of the state” is state action triggering
First Amendment scrutiny); Ramsey, supra note 145, at 407–08 (arguing that civil
enforcement of trademarks constitutes First Amendment state action); Eugene Volokh, The
Void-for-Vagueness / Fair Notice Doctrine and Civil Cases, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June
21, 2012), https://volokh.com/2012/06/21/the-void-for-vagueness-fair-notice-doctrine-andcivil-cases/ [http://perma.cc/KL7L-Z3Z6] (collecting cases, including Fox, supra note 300).
But see Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019) (indicating
holder of public monopoly right is not state actor); San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543–47 (1987) (rejecting challenge to discriminatory
enforcement of trademark-like exclusivity in term “Olympics” and/or Olympic symbol
because how recipient of right enforced it was not state action).
310 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2012).
311 Wells Fargo & Co. v. ABD Ins. & Fin. Servs., Inc., 758 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir.
2014) (citing Southland Sod Farms v. Stover Seed Co., 108 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 1997)).
312 See XYZ Two Way Radio Serv. Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 3d 179, 185
(E.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing Greenwich Taxi, Inc. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 3d 327, 336
(D. Conn. 2015)).
313 See Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Uber Techs., Inc., 155 F. Supp. 3d 670, 690 (S.D. Tex.
2015); see also ONY, Inc. v. Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc., 720 F.3d 490, 498 (2d Cir. 2013).
314 Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999).
315 See FTC, Advertising in Books Enforcement Policy, 36 Fed. Reg. 13,361, 13,414
(July 21, 1971) (distinguishing between promotion of a “product as part of a commercial
scheme” other than a book, and statements in or quotations from books, as to which FTC
as a “matter of policy” and in light of First Amendment “issues” will not attempt to enjoin
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claims is frequently classified as noncommercial speech, because
such claims are not sufficiently specific or measurable.316
Similarly, the many projections and assertions that crypto coin
ecosystems will disrupt or revolutionize some industry, are
likewise general and not specific.
The trademark tort arose as an application of fraud or deceit
as a cause of action at common law.317 It was not a deceit at
common law to make boastful claims upon which no reasonable
person would rely.318 As the Restatement (Second) of Torts put it,
or seize profits from even if opinions stated in said books are misleading or deceptive).
316 See Greater Hous. Transp. Co., 155 F. Supp. 3d at 692, 695–96 (finding Uber’s
“taking the necessary steps to . . . build the safest option for consumers” was mere puffery,
not a specific or measurable claim that could be false); XYZ Two Way Radio Serv., 214 F.
Supp. 3d 179 at 183, 185 (similar). As one court discussed:
The patchwork of district court decisions in such cases discuss, but do not
create, a workable test for puffery. This Court, however, discerns several
factors on which these decisions rely: (i) vagueness; (ii) subjectivity; and (iii)
inability to influence the buyers’ expectations. . . . See Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil
Co., 987 F.2d 939, 945 (3d Cir.1993) (“Puffery is distinguishable from
misdescriptions or false representations of specific characteristics of a
product.”); . . . General descriptions about the product—e.g., high-speed
internet service as the “fastest, easiest way to get online”; a truck as the “most
dependable, long-lasting”; or an insurance policy as providing that its
policyholders are “in Good Hands”—can constitute puffery. See Fink v. Time
Warner Cable, 810 F.Supp.2d 633, 643–44 (S.D.N.Y.2011); Hubbard v. Gen.
Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 WL 274018, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 22,
1996); Loubier v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:09cv261, 2010 WL 1279082, at *5
(D.Conn. Mar. 30, 2010) . . . The “subjectivity” factor applies when the disputed
statements may not be measured on an objective basis, such as by reference to
clinical studies or comparison with the product’s competitors. See Lipton v.
Nature Co., 71 F.3d 464, 474 (2d Cir.1995) (“Subjective claims about products,
which cannot be proven either true or false, are not actionable [for false
advertising claims].” (quotations omitted)); . . . [A] statement that “you can
grow thick, beautiful grass ANYWHERE” with a specific type of grass seed is
“so exaggerated as to preclude reliance by consumers.” In re Scotts EZ Seed
Litig., No. 12 Civ. 4727, 2013 WL 2303727, at *7 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2013)
(quotations omitted). Likewise, “consumers know that vehicles that are ‘rocksolid’ will be dented by an impact that would not dent a rock.... A fiberglass
roof may be `strong’ enough to withstand a hard blow, a falling tree branch, or
the weight of an elephant, without being guaranteed to be indestructible.”
Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 37 F.3d 1181, 1185 (6th Cir. 1994). See also Leonard v.
Abbott Labs., Inc., No. 10-CV-4676, 2012 WL 764199, at *22 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
2012) (Spatt, J.) (finding that a statement concerning a baby formula
manufacturer’s aim to “comply[ ] with all applicable laws and regulations”—
which, taken literally, would entail every single law in the hundreds of
“countries where it operates”—embodies the sort of exaggeration that no
buyers could take seriously).
Avola v. La.-Pac. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 2d 381, 392–94 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
317 See Taylor v. Carpenter, 23 F. Cas. 742 (C.C.D. Mass. 1844); Robert C. Denicola,
Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the
Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160 (1982).
318 Cf. Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 F. 853, 856 (2d Cir. 1918) (L.
Hand, J.) (“There are some kinds of talk which no sensible man takes seriously, and if he
does he suffers from his credulity. If we were all scrupulously honest, it would not be so;
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a seller’s attempt to “exaggerate the advantages of [a] bargain” is
a well-known tactic that should not deceive.319
The First Amendment protects a great deal of nonfiction
commentary and creative world-building from prior restraint or
subsequent punishment under the Lanham Act and similar state
laws. Thus, using the trademark of another person in a political
statement or campaign may not create trademark infringement
liability.320 In addition, creatively evoking a trademark in an artistic
or musical work may be shielded from injunctive relief or damages by
the First Amendment.321 For similar reasons, crypto coin white
papers that are dominated by socioeconomic or techno-political
commentary deserve protection.
3. State Consumer Protection Law
Other courts have construed state law protections against
false or misleading advertising to require a consideration of basic
reasoning techniques available to potential consumers, which
might dispel potential deception or confusion as to promotional
content.322 For example, the prohibition of false advertising
under California law immunizes puffery and relatively pure
statements of opinion from liability.323 Although advertising need
but, as it is, neither party usually believes what the seller says about his own opinions,
and each knows it.”).
319 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 539 cmt. c (AM. L. INST. 1977).
320 See Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934–35 (D.C. 1985) (holding
that public interest group’s use of “star wars” to persuade the public of views about the
Reagan Administration’s strategic defense initiative did not infringe upon filmmaker’s
STAR WARS trademark because “[p]urveying points of view is not a service” and because
it was a “descriptive, non-trade use”); see also Tax Cap Comm. v. Save Our Everglades,
Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1077, 1081 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (concluding that although not passing
judgment on use of trademark to solicit contributions, its use to promote environmental
group was not marketing of a service but rather “political activity”).
321 See, e.g., Mil-Spec Monkey, Inc. v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1134,
1140–43 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding use of another’s trademark for “expressive purpose”
protected by First Amendment unless it is “explicitly mislead[ing]”) (collecting cases);
Dillinger, LLC v. Elec. Arts Inc., 795 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837–38 (S.D. Ind. 2011).
322 For example, when a few steps of reasoning from publicly available data could
dispel the falsity or misleading character of the defendant’s speech, it is not actionable.
See MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley L. Sch., 880 F. Supp. 2d 785, 794 (W.D. Mich. 2012)
(finding no claim could be pled based on misleading employment statistic because “‘basic
deductive reasoning[]’ informs a reasonable person that the employment statistic includes
all employed graduates, not just those who obtained or started full-time legal positions.”);
Gomez-Jimenez v. N.Y. L. Sch., 956 N.Y.S.2d 54, 59 (App. Div. 2012) (finding where
defendant was arguably not fully “candid and []complete” in making disclosures of data
plaintiffs allegedly relied on, not to be material); Austin v. Albany L. Sch. of Union Univ.,
957 N.Y.S.2d 833, 842–43 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (holding that “a reasonable consumer acting
reasonably under the circumstances” would not be materially misled by data disclosures
that claimed a certain number of law school graduates were employed without
disaggregating part-time jobs).
323 See Atari Corp. v. 3DO Co., No. C 94-20298 RMW (EAI), 1994 WL 723601, at *2–3
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only be “unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading” under California
law, federal courts interpret a key provision (California Business
and Professions Code § 17200) as requiring proof similar to that
needed in a false advertising claim under the Lanham Act.324
Likewise, false advertising law and warranty law in other states
provide a safe harbor for boastful claims that a product is great
or the best.325 Similarly, the protection of products from “trade
libel” does not regulate opinions or personal judgments.326
(N.D. Cal. May 16, 1994) (holding that a video game system was the “most advanced”
video game system available was puffery under state law of false advertising) (citing Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, 17500). See also Anderson v. 1399557 Ontario Ltd., No. 18CV-1672 (PJS/LIB), slip op. at 11 (D. Minn. Nov. 4, 2019) (suggesting that claim of
providing a “lifetime” warranty might be true or subjectively believed to be right even if
warranty lasted a “very limited” time); Fair Isaac Corp. v. Experian Info. Sol., Inc., 645 F.
Supp. 2d 734, 763 (D. Minn. 2009) (it protected as puffery under the Lanham Act to claim
that a credit score service determined creditworthiness with “significantly greater
precision,” is “more predictive than what’s in the market,” is “the most accurate scoring
algorithm attainable,” and uses “most up-to-date information available”).
324 Zeltiq Aesthetics, Inc. v. BTL Indus., Inc., 32 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1099 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (quoting Clearly v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255, 1262–63 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also
Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Shalabi, 352 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1072 (C.D. Cal. 2004).
325 See, e.g., Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 WL 274018, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996); David A. Hoffman, The Best Puffery Article Ever, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 1395, 1402–03, 1411 (2006).
326 See, e.g., Coastal Abstract Serv., Inc. v. First Am. Title Ins. Co., 173 F.3d 725, 730
(9th Cir. 1999) (equating commercial libel’s protection of opinions with that under
Lanham Act, which requires false statement of existing fact); Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc.
v. N. Cal. Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that no cause of
action would lie for disparagement or libel of a corporation by publishing an ad suggesting
its fees or costs would eat customers alive, or that ad’s publisher are “‘low cost commercial
collection experts’” in comparison to it); Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1181,
1183 (Cal. 1985) (affirming demurrer to action for trade libel and holding: “Statements of
opinion, ‘[h]owever pernicious,’ are immunized by the First Amendment in order to insure
that their ‘correction [depends] not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas.’”) (citation omitted); Hofmann Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 248 Cal. Rptr. 384, 388 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating trade libel plaintiff may not hold
speaker liable for expressing speaker’s “view, judgment, or appraisal . . . [a] belief
stronger than impression and less strong than positive knowledge.”). Cf. Sullivan v.
Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding statement that lawyer is “very poor”
was an “opinion that is so difficult to verify or refute that it cannot feasibly be made a
subject of inquiry by a jury”); Levinsky’s Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 127 F.3d 122, 126–
27 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding statement that store is “trashy” could not be basis of tort
liability as it was merely expressing “a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory,
conjuncture, or surmise”); Moldea v. N.Y. Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 312, 316 (D.C. Cir.
1994) (finding statement that journalist was “sloppy” and unprofessional could not be
grounds for tort liability because “reasonable minds can and do differ” on what these
terms mean); Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (accusing
a charity of “charging hefty mark-ups on goods it ships” was a statement that was
immune from tort liability as it stated an opinion); Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated
Publ’ns, 953 F.2d 724, 727–28 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding statements that stage play was
“fake,” “phony,” “a rip-off, a fraud, a scandal, a snake-oil job” were not tortious as
admitting “of numerous interpretations”); McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842–43 (1st
Cir. 1987) (holding reference to the plaintiff’s real estate development as a “scam” to be
non-actionable because of the “lack of precision”); Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc.,
902 P.2d 740, 751 (Cal. 1995) (holding expression of opinion should not result in liability
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4. Protecting “Ecosystem Speech”
Like the print press or social media, crypto coins create
ecosystems. Instead of readers/browsers, writers/uploaders,
editors, and advertisers, crypto coins often have four
“constituencies,” in addition to their own founders and
promoters: subscribers who use or pay with the coin, other
subscribers who accept payment with the coin, “miners” who
verify the authenticity of transactions and maintain distributed
ledgers, and software developers and other creative businesses
who make new uses of the coin possible.327 The creation of a
forum for speech, edited by the founder or current manager,
implicates First Amendment interests.328 Even the organizers of
a public parade, the Supreme Court famously held, have a right
to shape the message conveyed by the various floats and
marchers who participate.329 Whatever the merits of the Court’s
ruling, its analysis of the First Amendment problem posed by
forced conformity to an ideology is pertinent to crypto coins and
banking norms: the right to articulate “public viewpoints”
deserves protection against “forced inclusion” in another
viewpoint.330
It matters not that crypto coin white papers are lower-quality
speech, for some, than the Miami Herald or CNN. The freedom of
expression does not depend on the quality of a speaker’s
viewpoint.331 Promoting oneself in the marketplace of ideas and
touting one’s platform on social media are important entitlements
under the First Amendment doctrine.332

for tortious interference with prospective business relations).
327 Andreessen, supra note 101.
328 See Mia. Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250, 258 (1974); see also
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 651 (1994).
329 See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
330 See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (2000).
331 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972) (“The dangers and the
undesirability of making [free speech] determination[s] on the basis of factors such as the
size of the audience or the probity of the speaker’s ideas are obvious.”).
332 See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (noting
importance of social media for exchanges of views); see also Village of Schaumburg v.
Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 628–29 (1980) (recognizing constitutional right
to distribute literature in order “to present [one’s] views on political, social or economic
questions”) (quoting Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)); cf. Manhattan Cmty.
Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934–44 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., joined by
Ginsburg, J., Breyer, J., and Kagan, J., dissenting) (contending that there is a right of
access to cable access television channel opened up as a public forum by legislation
creating a corporation to manage a local cable network).

Do Not Delete

476

5/17/2021 12:06 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

C. Allowing Forward-Looking Statements in and After Coin
Offerings
In First Amendment cases, the narrow-tailoring or
less-restrictive-means inquiry involves whether Congress or the
states could have been more careful and discriminate in regulating
speech.333 Yet, how is one to determine that a “substantial number
of [a rule’s] applications are unconstitutional” so as to conclude
that it is overbroad?334
An obvious less-restrictive and narrowly-tailored alternative
to the obligation to preregister coin offerings is to punish false
statements of fact with civil and criminal liability after harm is
done. This should not be too difficult to achieve; there seems to be
an enormous range of harms involving cyberthefts, insider
trading of cryptocurrencies, and garden-variety frauds that could
be prosecuted or enjoined under a variety of theories.335
Focusing on actual harm and factual misstatements would
liberate startups to participate in the blockchain revolution.
According to a senior attorney to ICO founders, the SEC has
declared “war on cryptocurrencies.”336 One entrepreneur told a

333 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 336–37 (2010); Glickman v.
Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 466 (1997); United States v. Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
334 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 473 (2010) (quoting Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S.
at 122 n.* (“A regulation is not ‘narrowly tailored’ . . . where, as here, ‘a substantial
portion of the burden on speech does not serve to advance [Congress’s] goals.’”) (citation
omitted); 16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 429 (2017).
335 See First Amended Class Action Complaint at 38, Fabian v. LeMahieu, 2019 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 172906 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (No. 19-cv-00054) (alleging that $170 million worth of digital
tokens were lost on Bitgrail exchange in early February 2018); Bloomberg, The SEC Is Sending
Subpoenas in Expanded ICO Crackdown, FORTUNE (Mar. 1, 2018, 2:45 AM),
http://fortune.com/2018/03/01/sec-ico-cryptocurrency-subpoenas/ (noting that SEC “has been
concerned for months that some ICOs are raising money for businesses that don’t even exist”);
Jordan Pearson, Everything You Need to Know About the Congressional Cryptocurrency
Hearing, VICE (Mar. 14, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/qveg3p/financialservices-congressional-hearing-ico-cryptocurrency-regulation
[http://perma.cc/B6AE-QBJY]
(mentioning $500 million taken in cybertheft affecting Japanese crypto exchange); Shane
Shifflett & Coulter Jones, Buyer Beware: Hundreds of Bitcoin Wannabes Show Hallmarks of
Fraud, WALL ST. J., (May 17, 2018, 12:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/buyer-bewarehundreds-of-bitcoin-wannabes-show-hallmarks-of-fraud-1526573115 (“Hundreds of technology
firms raising money in the fevered market for cryptocurrencies are using deceptive or even
fraudulent tactics to lure investors.”); Andrea Tan & Yuji Nakamura, Timeline: Growing List of
Major
Cryptocurrency
Heists,
INS.
J.
(Feb.
1,
2018),
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/international/2018/02/01/479206.htm
[http://perma.cc/V5J9-8FAM] (“[In 2016,] Bitfinex said hackers took 119,756 Bitcoin, valued at
about $65 million.”).
336 Jeff John Roberts, SEC Guidance Sparks Fear and Loathing in Crypto Industry,
FORTUNE (Apr. 5, 2019, 7:16 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/04/05/sec-crypto-rules/.
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researcher: “‘If you’re just starting up, you’re almost forced to
break the [criminal] law and hope that you can get away with it
long enough to produce some traction’ to secure investors’ money,
after which you can try to meet regulatory requirements.”337 As
another entrepreneur stated: “We’re all forced to break the law
until someone calls us out.”338 If a crypto coin is a security,
simply discussing the value of owning it via impersonal online
publications might be enjoinable, or even criminal, if such an act
is widely known to be illegal.339
Pursuing the true perpetrators of investor harm while leaving
other coins alone would ameliorate this problem. A well-known and
workable framework for such a regulation results from application of
the “bespeaks caution” doctrine and “safe harbor” for
“forward-looking statements” as well as the falsity and materiality
requirements of securities fraud law.340 This would shield good-faith
statements that have a basis when made or that are so “rosy” that no
one would reasonably rely on them. Such a framework properly
distinguishes between false statements of existing fact or fraudulent
promises or projections on the one hand and genuine but
controversial aspirations communicated publicly to potential share
purchasers or business partners.341 Participants in high-technology
337 BRIAN PATRICK EHA, HOW MONEY GOT FREE: BITCOIN AND THE FIGHT FOR THE
FUTURE OF FINANCE (2017).
338 Id.
339 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 80(b)-2(a)(11) (West) (regulating recommendations involving
securities); 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (West) (criminalizing willful violation of provisions of
Securities Act or regulations thereunder involving securities); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (West)
(criminalizing willful violation of provisions of Securities Act or regulations thereunder);
Lowe v. SEC., 472 U.S. 181, 216–19 (1985) (White, J., concurring); SEC. v. Suter, 732 F.2d
1294, 1298–1302 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding SEC could enjoin newsletters with investment
recommendations about whether or when to buy or sell particular securities); United
States v. Peltz, 433 F.2d 48, 54–55 (2d Cir. 1970) (holding “willfully” means realizing
illegality of act); S. REP. NO. 76-1775, at 22–23 (1940).
340 Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758, 768–70 & n.5 (2d Cir. 2010). The safe
harbor for forward-looking statements is statutory, being modeled on the “bespeaks
caution” doctrine and added to the Exchange Act. Id. at 770 & n.5 (citing, inter alia, 15
U.S.C.A. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i) (West)).
341 See, e.g., Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 214 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that “no
reasonable investor would have been misled by Defendants’ optimistic statements regarding
the approval and launch” of their new drug); Shaw v. Digit. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1217
(1st Cir. 1996) (holding no securities liability for “rosy affirmation[s] commonly heard from
corporate managers and numbingly familiar to the marketplace—loosely optimistic statements
that are so vague . . . that no reasonable investor could find them important in the total mix of
information available”); In re Syntex Corp. Sec. Litig., 95 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 1996)
(distinguishing statement that turns out not to be true from one untrue at outset); Kline v.
First W. Gov’t Sec., Inc., 24 F.3d 480, 486 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding forward-looking projections
actionable as securities fraud only if “[they are] issued without reasonable genuine belief [in
their accuracy or truth] or if [they] ha[ve] no basis”); Gregory v. ProNAi Therapeutics Inc., 297
F. Supp. 3d 372, 398–417 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (distinguishing “sincerely held views” from
“historical statement” that is not “correct”) (quoting In re Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. Sec. Litig.,
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markets are familiar with this framework as courts have routinely
applied it to them.342 Although a special-purpose law on fraud
involving crypto coin offerings might need to modify aspects of the
framework, its fundamental distinction or premise would be
helpful.343
Regarding regulatory and jurisdictional competition, other
countries will move forward aggressively with their token-based
businesses whether or not the United States falls behind. Several
European countries are establishing legal frameworks that
facilitate crypto-coin inventions and platforms.344 China is taking
numerous moves, including creating state-owned crypto coins, to
become the world leader in virtual currency and blockchain
technology.345 As of late 2019, Japan had not clearly defined ICOs
as securities. Europe and the United Kingdom may not regulate
payment mechanisms on blockchain platforms as investments.346

163 F.3d 102, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1998)); Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Oracle Corp., 242 F.
Supp. 2d 671, 678 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (distinguishing “statements of present fact” from “future
projections”) (internal citation omitted); In re MobileMedia Sec. Litig., 28 F. Supp. 2d 901, 936–
40 (D.N.J. 1998) (similar to Kline and Shaw); In re Bell Atl. Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 91-0514,
1997 WL 205709, at *23 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (cited in MobileMedia).
342 See Slayton, 604 F.3d at 770, 772 (distinguishing “historical fact” from “future
projections, estimates or opinions”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
343 In particular, the safe harbor for forward-looking statements appears to require a
warning list of factors that could cause projections or intentions not to materialize such as one
might find in a registration statement or prospectus, which typically has a different and much
more formal organization and tone than a white paper about a token. See Slayton, 604 F.3d at
770–72 (indicating cautionary statements should be “‘substantive’” about such “‘important
factors’”) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(A)(i); H.R. Conf. Rep. 104-369, at 42 (1995), as reprinted
in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 742); Inst. Invs. Grp. v. Avaya, Inc., 564 F.3d 242, 256 (3d Cir. 2009)
(discussing specificity of statements in prospectus); Gregory, 297 F. Supp. 3d at 405 (indicating
cautionary statements must have “specificity” about risks).
344 See J.D. Alois, Will Paris Become the Capital of ICOs? French National Assembly
Approves Key Framework for Initial Coin Offerings, CROWD FUND INSIDER (Sept. 13, 2018, 5:30
pm), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2018/09/139003-will-paris-become-the-capital-of-icosfrench-national-assembly-approves-key-framework-for-initial-coin-offerings/
[http://perma.cc/L6MQ-SV9K] (discussing France, Malta, and Switzerland).
345 See Arjun Kharpal, With Xi’s Backing, China Looks to Become a World Leader in
Blockchain as US Policy Is Absent, CNBC (Dec. 15, 2019, 6:30 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/16/china-looks-to-become-blockchain-world-leader-with-xijinping-backing.html [http://perma.cc/223L-C9K7] (“Since March, over 500 blockchain
projects have been registered with the Cyber Administration of China. Some of China’s
largest internet companies from Tencent to Huawei have registered projects.”); id.
(stating a partner at “Blockchain Valley Ventures” claimed “that China’s blockchain push
could put other countries behind, to the point where the world’s second-largest economy
could dominate the technology and the way it’s developed.”); Coie, supra note 35 (warning
blockchain technology could cluster abroad).
346 See Cooke, Denisenko & Cohen, supra note 229.
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D. Increasing Remedies for Factual Fraud
The Securities Act and/or Exchange Act could be amended to
award treble damages, punitive damages, and/or statutory
damages in cases of willful misstatements of existing fact in
connection with the purchase or sale of a security.347 The breadth
of a law is not the only measure of its effectiveness; its deterrent
and remedial strength may also be relevant.348 Investment law
would be more forceful if it offered the relief available under
other federal laws, such as those governing counterfeiting ($2
million per willful offense type), copyright infringement
($150,000 per willful offense type), false advertising (treble
damages), or competition law violations (treble damages).349 As
one court has observed: “Undeniably, punitive damages would
deter violations of the Act and punish those who did commit
violations.”350
Amendments to the securities laws would not help the
purchasers of utility tokens and appcoins under the approach
advocated in this article. To aid such purchasers and anyone else who
buys a good or service, the Lanham Act could be amended with a few
simple words that would create a federal remedy for interstate
commerce fraud.351 This amendment would significantly impact

347 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 78bb(a) (West) (limiting plaintiffs’ recovery to “actual damages”);
Globus v. Law Rsch Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1282–86 (2d Cir. 1969); Green v. Wolf
Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 302–04 (2d Cir. 1968).
348 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21–22 (1980) (noting that cause of action
promising punitive damages may have greater deterrent effect); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974) (stating that punitive damages punish and deter). Statutory
damages may also deter; indeed, one law increasing statutory damages ranges in
copyright was called the Digital Theft Deterrence and Copyright Damages Improvement
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–160, 113 Stat. 1774 (1999). See Jeremy Wilson et al.,,
Product Counterfeiting Legislation in the United States: A Review and Assessment of
Characteristics, Remedies, and Penalties, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 521, 533–34
(2016); Pamela Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A
Remedy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 461–62 (2009).
349 See 15 U.S.C.S. § 15 (LexisNexis) (treble damages); 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (West) ($2
million); 17 U.S.C.A. § 504(d) (West) ($150,000 per work). By contrast, the Supreme Court
has rejected a theory that would allow securities fraud plaintiffs who cannot plead
conventional investment damages to be able to recover for an inflated purchase price at
the time of a transaction; absent actual damages, the Court apparently intends that
securities plaintiffs receive nothing under federal law, in stark contrast to copyright or
trademark plaintiffs. See Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 346–47 (2005).
350 Globus, 418 F.2d at 1284.
351 The amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) would have to state that the standing to
sue for false advertising and the like under federal law extends to those “likely to be
damaged by such act, regardless of the presence or absence of the person’s direct
competition with the plaintiff or the person’s economic or reputational injury from such
act.” This proposed amendment is based on language in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c), which creates
a federal injunctive remedy for dilution (and, which 15 U.S.C. § 1117 creates a damages
remedy). For extensive arguments in favor of such an amendment, see Jeremy Rovinksy,
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remedies in false advertising by granting consumers a private right
of action for false descriptions of fact in connection with goods or
services marketed in interstate commerce.352 In its discretion, the
court could increase the damages award to three times those actually
inflicted on the plaintiff.353 Similarly, consumers could obtain a
private right of action for unfair or deceptive methods of competition
under the FTC Act.354 Many consumers have such a cause of action
under state law already, but the elements and remedies could be
harmonized.355 Arbitration clauses that make class actions or
punitive damages unavailable in fraud or false-advertising cases
could be declared incompatible with federal law, or at least it could be
made permissible under federal law for the states to prohibit or
restrict such clauses.356 Frauds that inflict many minor economic
losses are not economical to litigate individually.357
E. Reducing the Burden Associated with Disclosure
Requirements
In the House of Representatives, legislation has been
introduced to exclude from the definition of a “security,” in the
Securities Act and the Exchange Act, certain digital tokens based
on a mathematical digital ledger or data structure that are not
controlled as to their supply by any single person or group of

Troubleshooting Legal Malfunction: Lexmark and Consumer Standing Under the Lanham
Act, 48 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 453 (2015).
352 See Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control, 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014) (“A consumer
who is hoodwinked into purchasing a disappointing product may well have an injury-infact cognizable under Article III, but he cannot invoke the protection of the Lanham Act—
a conclusion reached by every Circuit to consider the question.”); Halicki v. United Artists
Commc’ns, Inc., 812 F.2d 1213, 1214 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that to bring suit for false
advertising, plaintiff must be a competitor injured in business that directly competes with
false advertiser).
353 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117 (West).
354 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 45 (West).
355 See CAROLYN CARTER, NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER
PROTECTION IN THE STATES 42 (2018), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udapreport.pdf. Among other divergences that could be harmonized, some states do not extend
private standing to consumers, cap treble damages, impose procedural hurdles, or require
proof of individualized reliance. See id. at 42–45.
356 Cf. American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 252–53 (2013) (Kagan,
J., joined by Breyer, J., and Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (urging that class action waivers in
arbitration clauses be declared incompatible with or at least unprotected by federal
arbitration law when they threaten to deprive plaintiffs of “any effective opportunity” of
challenging a violation of substantive federal law, due to cost of hundreds of thousands
dollars in proving a claim worth tens of thousands); Br. of Am. Antitrust Inst. as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 16, American Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570
U.S. 228 (2013) (No. 12-133) (urging similar result when class action waivers undermine a
role of a “private damages remedy” such as treble damages in antitrust law to “serve[] its
intended function of deterring antitrust violations and compensating victims”).
357 Cf., e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997).
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persons “under common control.”358 The Howey test is outdated
and has generated tremendous uncertainty even as applied to
traditional business enterprises.359 Its roots lie in a state
supreme court decision from 1920, purportedly viewed by
Congress as a helpful addition to the word “security” to cover
“booster agent” contracts involving the sale of goods, i.e.,
“investment contracts.”360 While there are some similarities
between cosmetics salespersons and crypto coin users, the
dissimilarities are arguably more significant.
The cost of registering securities with the SEC has been called
“tremendous” and disproportionate in the case of startups.361
According to two researchers at Tallinn Law School, smart
contracts supported by crypto coins could replace modes of
ecommerce or financial or insurance transactions that are
“restrictive, antagonistic, contentious, competitive, divisive and
costly, [with new modes that are] participative, responsible,
responsive and collaborative.”362 For example, they could slash the
transaction fees on micropayments, international remittances, and
wire transfers, and reduce financial-industry collusion.363 New
358 H.R. 7356, 115th Cong. §§1–3 (2018); see also H.R. 2144, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R.
1628, 117th Cong. (2021).
359 See, e.g., Maura Monaghan, An Uncommon State of Confusion: The Common
Enterprise Element of Investment Contract Analysis, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 2135, 2171
(1994); Ronald J. Coffey, The Economic Realities of a “Security”: Is There a More
Meaningful Formula?, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 377 (1967); James D. Gordon III, Defining
a Common Enterprise in Investments Contracts, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 59, 73–74 (2011).
360 See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, 497 F.2d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 1974).
361 See Carol Goforth, Why Limited Liability Company Membership Interests Should
Not Be Treated As Securities and Possible Steps to Encourage This Result, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 1223, 1285 (1993) (collecting sources).
362 María Claudia Solarte-Vásquez & Katrin Nyman-Metcalf, Smart Contracting: A
Multidisciplinary and Proactive Approach for the EU Digital Single Market, 7 BALTIC J. EUR.
STUD. 208, 233 (2017).
363 See Andreessen, supra note 101; see also BPP Illinois, LLC v. Royal Bank of Scotland
Grp. PLC, 859 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2017) (alleging potential rigging of benchmark interest rate);
Contant v. Bank of Am. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 3d 284 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (alleging potential rigging
of currency exchange rates); In re Commodity Exch., Inc., Gold Futures & Options Trading
Litig., 328 F. Supp. 3d 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (alleging potential rigging of precious metals prices,
specifically gold); Levy v. BASF Metals Ltd., 917 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 2019) (alleging manipulation
of precious metals prices, specifically platinum); In re LIBOR-Based Fin. Instruments
Antitrust Litig., 299 F. Supp. 3d 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (alleging similar fraud as preceding case);
In re London Silver Fixing, Ltd., Antitrust Litig., 213 F. Supp. 3d 530 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (alleging
potential rigging of precious metals prices, specifically silver); In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark
Rates Antitrust Litig., 74 F. Supp. 3d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (alleging similar rigging as Contant);
In re Moody’s Corp. Sec. Litig., 599 F. Supp. 2d 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (alleging potential
misrepresentations involving rating of collateralized debt and mortgage-backed securities as
investment-grade securities); In re Stock Exchanges Options Trading Antitrust Litig., No. 99
CIV. 0962 (RCC) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2006) (involving collusion in marketing of stock exchange
options in settlement of suit); DEAN BAKER, RIGGED: HOW GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULES OF
THE MODERN ECONOMY WERE STRUCTURED TO MAKE THE RICH RICHER (2016); Janith Aranze,
Visa and MasterCard Interchange Fees Restricted Competition, English Court Rules,

Do Not Delete

482

5/17/2021 12:06 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

ecosystems would arise, with new pro-democratic possibilities for
promoting economic and environmental sustainability.364 Socially
responsible investing objectives or automatic divestment upon
specified breaches of corporate social responsibility principles
could be encoded.365 In contrast to traditional forms such as
private equity and the like, open-source smart contract
investments could be examined by consumers, investors, and
regulators to gauge compliance with various ethical or political
norms.366 Unlike traditional financial firms and social media
giants, crypto coins enable privacy preservation through emerging
anonymous trading systems and applications.367
There is reason to be hopeful about disruption when it comes
to loans, interest on deposits, business capital, remittances, and
even insurance, selling creative works, and renting out cars,
devices, and houses. The fintech firm, SoFi, has saved borrowers
about two billion dollars in what would have been excessive
interest charges.368 The use of the Ripple token for remittances
could save the poor and the middle class billions of dollars in
SCOTT+SCOTT: GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW (July 4, 2018), http://scott-scott.com/visa-andmastercard-interchange-fees-restricted-competition-english-court-rules/ [http://perma.cc/9RN57WG7] (describing anti-competitive cross-border payment card fees in Europe); Richard Jones
et al., MasterCard in £19bn UK Interchange Fees Class Action, LEXOLOGY (July 26, 2016),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c58d7828-e845-4d43-9222-02eebcec57fc
[http://perma.cc/5XX4-RXAL] (describing similar anti-competitive interchange fees as Janith
Aranze); Antitrust: Commission Welcomes Court Judgment Confirming that MasterCard’s
Payment Card Interchange Fees are Anti-Competitive, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Sept. 11, 2014),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-528_en.htm [http://perma.cc/BSQ4-5PHW].
364 See Merlinda Andoni et al., Blockchain Technology in the Energy Sector: A
Systematic Review of Challenges and Opportunities, 100 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY REVS. 143, 158–60 (2019) (describing potential for tokenized clean energy trading);
Ryan Browne, Sustainable Energy: IBM Joins Forces with a Start-up to Combine Crypto
with Environmental Credit Trading, CNBC (May 15, 2018, 8:00 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/15/ibm-veridium-team-up-on-blockchain-enabled-carboncredit-trading.html [http://perma.cc/2QF3-BSP6] (describing potential for carbon-trading
tokens to trade with less friction than traditional carbon/energy credits); Miriam Denis Le
Sève et al., Delivering Blockchain’s Potential for Environmental Sustainability, ODI
BRIEFING NOTE 3, 5–6 (Oct. 2018), http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resourcedocuments/12439.pdf [http://perma.cc/28U2-7FX8] (describing how the Sun Exchange token
use could, at least partially, enable financing conversion of buildings to solar power).
365 See Massimo Lomuscio, Smart Social Contracts, Unstoppable Promises on the
Blockchain, MEDIUM (Feb. 4, 2018), http://medium.com/reason/what-are-smart-social-contractsthe-new-business-model-for-the-blockchain-d3a27025fc4b [http://perma.cc/6A3F-5QJR].
366 See id. But cf. Alfred C. Aman Jr. & Landyn W. Rookard, Private Government and
the Transparency Deficit, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 437, 472, 484 (2019) (noting that opacity as to
practices of private equity firms is expected by the public, and actually results).
367 See Azgad-Tromer, supra note 272.
368 SoFi saved borrowers $1.45 billion by mid-2017, and has grown tremendously since
then, more than doubling the total loan volume since the end of 2016. See Michael Bartlett,
Digital or Doomed? What Credit Unions Need to Be Top of Wallet, AMERICAN BANKER (July 26,
2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/creditunions/news/digital-or-doomed-whatcredit-unions-need-to-be-top-of-wallet [http://perma.cc/6K8R-FDS2].
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excessive fees for international transfers of their own money to
family members or others in need.369 The average interest rate on
U.S. savings accounts was about a quarter of a percentage point at
a time when a crypto account could offer a fixed rate of seven
percent or more, and when investments in tokens such as Bitcoin
earned well in excess of 100% a year.370 The average U.S. equity
fund investor earns less than a five percent return per annum over
10 to 20 years, but the average crypto investor through mid-2018
earned double-digit returns in a matter of days or months.371
Based on a mid-2020 technical analysis, a $1,000 investment in
Bitcoin in late 2016 might be worth $20,000 four years later, or a
210% annual return.372
Blockchain-based asset trading systems could democratize value
exchanges by disrupting the financial system’s models for extracting
value from disempowered “users.”373 The Lightning Network and
Hyperledger are examples of sustained, high-level collaboration
among sophisticated players to achieve efficient and fairly reliable
mechanisms of commerce over blockchains.374 In blockchain-based
content monetization systems, artists or other creators designate
rights information, which eMusic encodes into “smart contracts” so

369 See Andreessen, supra note 101 (referring to Bitcoin); In Latin America, Ripple
Makes Remittance Waves, PYMNTS (Aug. 22, 2019), http://www.pymnts.com/news/b2bpayments/2019/in-latin-america-ripple-makes-remittance-waves/
[http://perma.cc/723YUDQE]; Santander Becomes First U.K. Bank to Use Ripple for Real-time Cross-border
Payments,
RIPPLE
(2019),
http://ripple.com/files/case_study_santander.pdf
[http://perma.cc/4ACP-H2JH] (predicting billions of dollars in savings, at first for financial
institutions in their cross-border payments); Billy Bambrough, Former Hedge Fund
Billionaire Makes the Case for $20,000 Bitcoin Price by the End of 2020, FORBES (July 28,
2020, 7:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/billybambrough/2020/07/28/former-hedgefund-billionaire-makes-the-case-for-20000-bitcoin-price-by-the-end-of2020/#2d1072842f76 [http://perma.cc/ND46-L5T7].
370 See Mohammed v. Central Driving Mini Storage, Inc., 128 F. Supp. 3d 932, 956
(E.D. Va. 2015) (estimating an average interest rate of less than two-tenths of a
percentage point between January 2011 and November 2014); Valerie Ashton, See Interest
Rates
Over
the
Last
100
Years,
GOBANKINGRATES
(July
14,
2017),
http://www.gobankingrates.com/banking/interest-rates/see-interest-rates-last-100-years/
[http://perma.cc/PVK4-KVTS] (showing the rate has steadily declined to less than onetenth of a percent); A New Way to Borrow and Lend Money http://nebeus.com,
COMMUNICATIONS TEAM@NEBEUS (Apr. 25, 2016), http://medium.com/@Nebeus/a-newway-to-borrow-and-lend-money-874a10754e97 [http://perma.cc/8P42-M44E] (claiming
that peer to peer lenders could set their own interest rates, and borrowers could save with
lower rates, with the platform taking a 10% cut).
371 See Thane Stenner, Why the Average Investor Is So Bad at It, THE GLOBE AND MAIL (July
1, 2016), http://www.theglobeandmail.com//globe-investor/globe-wealth/why-the-average-investoris-so-bad-at-it/article30728320/ [http://perma.cc/Z2QN-R69H]; Hugo Benedetti & Leonard
Kostovetsky, Digital Tulips? Returns to Investors in Initial Coin Offerings, BOSTON COLLEGE 1,
35–36 (May 20, 2018), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=3182169 [http://perma.cc/D2C-Z5LY].
372 See Thane, supra note 362; see also Benedetti & Kostovetsky, supra note 362.
373 TAPSCOTT & TAPSCOTT, supra note 31, at loc 61.
374 See id. at loc 69.

Do Not Delete

484

5/17/2021 12:06 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 24:2

that streams or sales result in faster, more open and “autonomous”
payments of both the streaming or download provider, the
performers, the songwriters, and the label(s).375 The operation of such
systems is rich with informative speech:
Rather than erecting walls and aiming to create artificial scarcity, we
view decentralization as a means to break walls down and enable
more open re-use that aligns with the way information propagates on
the internet. Leveraging content identification technology we can
make information about the work—who made it, where it was
published, and what people are saying about it—discoverable
anywhere media is found. This is a prerequisite to enabling value to
flow. It starts with attention (attribution), gratitude, analytics, and
can lead to financial exchange, directly through media itself.376

Thus, content monetization systems express an idea about
democratization, and implement that idea by attempting to multiply
and propagate truthful information about the underlying speech.
Another way of saying this is that such systems express opposition to
intermediary interference in speech flows, and that they do so by
conveying more information to the benefit of participants and by
structuring that information in more efficient and transparent
ways.377
V. CONCLUSION
Blockchain-fueled software and Internet innovation have
rekindled debate about how crypto coins are regulated. The
global Internet lends itself to a combination of proprietary and
multistakeholder governance strategies, with the corporate tech
giants coexisting with a variety of foundations, consortia, and
open source software and digital content projects such as the
Linux Foundation, the Wikimedia Foundation, and Creative
Commons. Cryptocurrencies incentivize Internet users to
contribute processing power and applications to new economic
and social networks. The laws governing the registration of
investments, primarily securities investments but also
commodities futures and other investments, could erect giant

375 eMusic, Press Release, eMusic Building a Blockchain Platform to Fix a Broken Music
Industry, CISION PR NEWSWIRE (July 31, 2018: 3:00 PM), https://www.prnewswire.com/newsreleases/emusic-building-a-blockchain-platform-to-fix-a-broken-music-industry300688788.html [http://perma.cc/M8XR-WN8U]; George Howard, Mediachain Facilitates
Automatic Attribution Using Blockchain and Machine Learning, FORBES (July 29, 2016),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgehoward/2016/07/29/mediachain-facilitates-automaticattribution-using-blockchain-and-machine-learning [http://perma.cc/8KXD-6D8V].
376 Howard, supra note 375.
377 See eMusic, Press Release, eMusic Building a Blockchain Platform to Fix a Broken
Music Industry, supra note 375.
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hurdles to these incentive structures. By requiring the
registration of crypto coin white papers and sales, they deter
truly decentralized economic and cultural cooperation.
This Article has argued that the freedom of expression
protects crypto coin software and related economic and technical
speech from being treated like a simple offering of stock in a
bank or an oil company. Crypto coin white papers are not strictly
commercial speech, and blockchain networks are not traditional
corporations or limited partnerships with passive investors in
need of transparency and active managers who control the
enterprise and dictate its future. Instead, crypto coins and their
white papers promote information sharing, open source software,
insights in computer science and peer-to-peer networking
technologies, and new socio-economic and political models of
decentralized collaboration. They promise alternatives to the
often slow, costly, and unequal schemes by which corporations
organize exchanges of value, whether on or off the Internet.
Unless they are marketed using false statements of existing fact,
crypto coins deserve to be exempt from civil liability and
especially from preregistration requirements. By statute and
under the Constitution, crypto coin promotion is a human right.

